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A psychological sophistication which contains no component of historical orientation seems to me to be no sophistication at all. --- E. G. Boring
Anyone who is practically acquainted with
scientific work is aware that those who
refuse to go beyond fact rarely get as
far as fact. --- T. H. Huxley

PREFACE
The suggestion to translate Franz Brentano 1 s Psychologie !5!! Empirischen
Stand.punkt, with a cri tioal introduction as a companion, was made several
years ago by Dr. Frank J. Kobler, Professor of Psychology and Director of the
Clinical Training Program at Loyola University (Chicago), in a Seminar on
Contemporarz Psychological Literature.

The very context surrounding this

suggestion clearly defined its frame of references the undertaking was not
meant to be a nostalgic "retrogression" to }\ypothetical "good old days" in
psychology, or a futile, though learned, exercise j,n erudition) rather, it
implied that Brentano•s thinking, through its historical influences and its

own iilller dynamism, was continuous with present-day trends and projected
future developments in our science. More in particular, Professor Kobler'•

own specific academic and professional interest in clinical psychology implied
that Brentano•s orientation fitted into the mainstream of what

broadly~

be

labeled dynamic psychology, and more narrowly existential-personalistic psychology (as to subject matter of stuc:JT), and holistic-phenomenological psychology (as to preferred methods of research).

IV

At first, the writer's newly found interest and dedication to sound
training in scientific psychology came into rather sharp conflict with his
formal background in philosophy, as to his committment to follow through with
the above mentioned suggestion.

Indeed,. his doubts in the matter still per-

sisted at a distance of two to three years,. even after reception of the fol•
lowing personal letter from Professor E,

a. Boring,

who stated in part:

"It

would seem to me that a translation of Brentano•s Psyohologie .!!?!! !fmPirischen
Standpunkt would be a vecy useful undertaking and would promote an intelli•
gent understanding of the background of modem psychology b7 English-speaking
graduate students of psychology. They never seem to be able to understand
what Brentano was driving at and of course they do not, as a rule, read German very well.

If there could be added to this an introduction and commen-

tary of a kind that would make Brentano•s meaning clear to America! graduate
students of psychology, that would put him into perspective in the historical
scene, indicating his relation to the scholastic tradition and hia other
background, and showing further the nature of his influence, if all that
could be done the monograph would become very valuable indeed, not only for
graduate education but for the other psychologists who are supposed to be
already educated." It was only in the wake of continuoua keen interest in
this project by Dr. Kobler and other psychology professors at Loyola Uni versi ty that the writer's doubts in the matter were resolved-in practice, i t
not in principle. Therefore, it was a very rewarding experience when, some•

v

time later on, he received the following endorsement from another leading
American psychologist, Professor G. W. Allport, in a personal letter: "It
excites me greatly to hear that you have translated Brentano•s Psychologie

!2! !npirischen Sta11dpunkt. Professor Boring was likewise pleased
It should haw been translated 50 to 15 years ago.

news.

forming a belated service of great magnitude.

w1 th thia

So you are per•

I shall watch for the publi•

cation eagerly."
Unless the writer is mistaken, all indications are that the context and
atmosphere in psychology are more receptive of, and show a greater degree of
"belonginese• with, the present project and interest now 1 in comparison with
only a decade ago. Witness, for example• (1) the formation within the Ameri•
can Psychological Association of a Division or Philosophical Psychology, and

-----

a Division of the History of PsychologyJ (2) the founding of a Journal of the
Historz

2£. !!:!!,

Behavioral Sciences, and the increased pace at which books and

articles are published on the impact and meaning ot e:xistentialiam, phenomenology, and •hwftanism" upon psychology, and the even greater demand across
the land for seminar1, workahopa, lectures on practical applications of these
theoretical frames of reference, be it in the clinical area, or in counseling,
education, teaching, social interaction and communication, etc.f and (3) on a
more restricted, though not less significant level, the "second look" which
American psychologists are more and more boldly taking at their science and
at themselves. as indicated among other things by numerous book reviews on
VI

their unofficial forum, Contemporary Psychology, and by the following arti•
cles recent]\y' published on their official journal, the American Pszchologist1
"The mystery-mastery complex in contemporary psychology" (Bakan, 196.5), "Will
psychologists study human problems?" (Sanford, 196.5), and "The teaching of
psychology and the psychology we teach" (Molaod, 1965).
In at least one basic conrnon inspiration, the preceding trends and events
in psychology seem to go back to the frame of reference and vision of the two
captions quoted at the beginning of this writing, and through them, to Brentano •a orientation. Brentano, in fact, 1• perhapa unique among modern think·
era in respect to the breadth and depth of hia historical orientationJ and
he himself went beyond fact, beyond his empirical psychology, not in the

sense of renouncing it, but in the sense of incorporating it into a broader,
more comprehensive synthesis of fact.
Among other things, this new synthesis involved the clear recognition on
his part of the indispensable role of experimentation in all types of psycho•
logical researches, and his consequent repeated efforts to obtain an Institute and a Laborator.y of psychology at the University of Vienna. Within this
context, although these efforts were in vain, one may legitimatel,y wonder
what lcind of laboratory "Brentano'• Laboratory" would have been• what its
functional organization would have looked like, what kind of research projects would have filled its rooms, what spirit would have bestirred the ongoing activities and the people involved in them.

VII

The answers to these hypo-

thetical questions, even though lzypothetical themselves, may very well be a
close approximation to "what might have been." First of all, "Brentano•s
Laboratory" would not have been in the nature of either a medieval castle or
a more recent ivory tower, both removed in their own wtqs from real life,
from the problems confronting people individually and collective~J hence,
secon~,

it would have then been an Action Research Center, in the best

spirit of Lewinian tradition and other contemporary trends in psychology,
aiming in principle at investigating all that we now consider essential in

psychologyJ and

thir~,

it would have been moved, not by the weight of oppo-

sition to Wundt•s laboratory, but instead by an independent,

essenti~

holistic and dynamic leitmotiv.
In terms ol general organization, this stu<J.y comprises three oloselT

inter-related chapters. The first chapter otters a portrait, as against a
mere composite picture, ol Brentano'• lite, personality, and works, and u
such paves the wq for a synopsis in the second chapter of his orientation
and stand on psychological issues.

There logically follows, in the third

chapter, a general appraisal of Brentano'• significance in contemporary psy•
chology.
An annotated bibllograpey of Brentano'• writings and or works bearing

upon his thought is included in the present stu<J.y both as a supplement to
the text proper, and as an independent contribution. As conoei ved and aa
they stand, the annotations are much more extensive as to quantity of infor•

VIII

mation, and much more comprehensive as to quality of appraisal, than those
typically found in the usual annotated bibliographies.

In essence, they

represent the writer's own way of utilizing E. G. Boring's timely suggestion
concerning the value of "a commentary of a kind" in a study of Brentano'•
thought auch as the present one.

But before proceeding with his own "business," there remains an important and pleasant task for the writer.

He wishes to express hi& debt of

gratitude to Professor Frank J. ICobler, u

the inspiring source and inde•

fatigable advisor of this stud;yJ in addition, he also wishes to express hie
appreciation for the help and encouragement given to him by Professors
Vincent Herr,

s. J.,

and Edmund Marx, also

ot

his gratitude goes in memory of Walter Roesch,

Loyola University,

s. M,,

Moreover,

formerly Head Librarian

at the Universit;y of Jla\Yton (Dayton, Ohio), for his invaluable and priceless
assistance in securing many of the sources for this investigation.

For the

typing of the manuscript8 of both volwnes compr.l.sing the present work, the
writer is deeply indebted to Mrs. Loia Cardwell.

Not only her technical

skill, but her devotion to a lengtey and exacting task wu sincerely appreciated.
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I
FRANZ BRENTANO i

A PORTRAIT OF

HIS LIFE, PERSONALITY 1 AND WORK

Franz Brentano,, grandson ot Pietro Antonio Brentano, an Italian merchant
who had resettled in Frankfurt, was born on January 16• 18.38,, at Marienberg,
near Boppard on the Rhine.

His grandfather, a widower with five children,

had married in 1774, at age thirty-nine, the seventeen year old daughter of

Sophie de Laroche, Ma.ximillerme, whom Goethe had met and admired the previous
year during a fev days stay

with her mother, and subsequentq used as a

source of inspiration to write his Werther.1 Three of the children born of
this marriage, Klemens, Christian, Franz' father, and Isabelle,

comma~

called Bettina, were destined to leave a characteristic impress upon German
cultural trends.
Klemens Brentano (1778-1842), poet and novelist, was a leader of the
second movement in Genian romanticism.

.Em.otio~

unstable, he led an

erratic and troubled life both before his "converaion•2 to Catholicism in

l.niere seems to be some exaggeration, for the sake o£ literary contrast,
but also a kernel of truth in the following statements (Angelloz, 1958):
"This loveq and lntelllgent girl condemned herselt to a life among oil casks
and herring barrels at the side of a dull~ homel.T husband. She was delighted
when the poet became an attentive friend Qf . ·the famiq 1 but her jealous hus•
band became anxious, doubtless as a result of domestic scenes, and Goethe was
invited not to return• (p. 61).
2Li.ke his younger brother aud sister, he had been reared in the Cattolio
faith, but this religious training was arpa..."'"elltq stl·ongl.¥' colored by the
maternal grandmother's skeptic:!.am 1n the spirit o£ 18th dentury Enlightment.

2.
1817 and after 1824, the year of the death of Anne Catherine Emmerick, a .
stigmatized nun, whose "revelations" he had laboriously collected over a
five year period (1819-1824) and later on published in twenty-four volumes.
Showing signs of derangement some years before his death, he was asked by
Franz's father to come and live with his family at their home in Aschaf!en•

burg. Four years old when his .f'amous uncle died, Franz must have retained
some personal memories of him.
Bettina Brentano (1785-1859) married Count Iildwig Achim von Arnim, an
intimate friend of her

b~other

Klemens, and like him a prominent figure or

the romantic group of Heidelberg.

She herself was a writer of such vivid

imagination to be called the "Sibyl of romanticism." Of the eleven volumes
comprising her collected writings, probably the best known is Goethea Briet-

_w_ec.,..h_s....e_l !!!,! einem

.!!!!Si

inspired by, and expressing her ideal love with the

poet.
Christian Brentano (1784-1851), although lesa versatile than his sister
and brother, achieved more than passing fame in German Catholic circles aa
a writer of religious treatises.

While showing none of his brother's per•

sonal eccentricities, his dedication to religion, following in the wake ot
his earq adoption, by age seventeen, of •a system of complete determinism,
indeed, materialism" (Kraus, 1919 1 p, 4) 1 is not entireq free fran certain

elements of exaggeration. His late marriage at age ti.tty-one (1835) to
Fanilie Gegner (1810-1881), then o~ twent7•.five years old1 seems to be a

psychological expression of this inner condition.

In this context, it is of

J.
further interest to notice that Emilie herself wu "imbued to the uttermost
with a religious outlook and religious interests" {Stumpf,

1919, P• 97), and

became known as an author of pious books • .3
The cultural contributions made by Franz Brentano's uncle and aunt, and

by his father, undoubtedlY justify the reference, invariably found in most

biographical sketches of his life, to the fact that he was born into a family
of "historical renown" which belongs to the Gennan "intellectual aristocracy
through its tradition."

Need.leas to sq that the task of carrying on this

tradition along still different avenues wu fulfilled to a very high degree
both by him, as will be shown, and by his younger brother I.ujo
the recipient of the

(1844-1931),

1927 Nobel Peace prize, and a well-known thinker in the

history of politico-economic thought.4

In addition, at least indirectly,,

this tradition may be said to be re.fleeted in the complex achievements of his
pupil and cousin, Count George Frederick Von Hartling

l

(1843-1919) 1 as a promi

'

These reflections do not call into question the sincerity of the religious outlook and practice "as a characteristic note of the whole-Brentano
family" (Hemandez 1 195.3, P• 14). They merely raise what seems to be a
justifiable doubt concerning their degree ot inner harmon\Y and balance. A
clarification of this doubt would appear to be an essential component in
&l.\Y study in depth of Franz Brentano 's religious crises, and might throw
significant, and perhaps unexpected, light upon them.
4wi thin this context, it seems ~ertinent to me11tion in passing that
Franz Brentano'e ~ son (born 1888) 1 John c. Brentano, now professor
emeritus at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, has had a succe•••
£ul teaching career in the field of pt\feioa.

nent Catholic philosopher, writer; and political figure.5
Franz Brentano received hie early education from a Catholic priest who
had been hired by hie parents as a teacher for their children, 6 and completed
his secondary education (1855) at the local Gymnasium in Aschaff'enburg, where
the family had relocated the same year of his birth.

During

his years at

this Institute, not only did he excel in the stud,y of classical languages,
but "showed such talent for mathematics that he almost chose this discipline
for his life goal" (Pidoll, 1918, P• 443).

The increasingly important role

that the mathematical concept of probability later on came to plq in hie
theoretical orientation testifies to this latent predilection and to a concomitant natural bent of mind in a way which to some extent parallels the
intellectual development of Descartes and Isibnis.
Fran a psychological point of view, the reason wey Brentano did not fol•
low his penchant for mathematics seems to be more complex than Pidoll lead8

one to believe.

His decision to devote himself to philosophy was apparently

prompted not by a mere matter-of-fact knowledge that this science ranked
higher than mathematics, but instead by the earnest hope and e:xpectation to
find in its contemporary systems a satisfactory solution for a serious re•

;He was the grandson of the youngest sister of his father. His varied
political role reached the highest point when he became Chancellor of the
empire in 1917.
6
In addition to their two sons, Franz and Iujo, Christian and Emilie
Brentano had three daughters: Maria, Sophia and Claudine.

5.
llgious crisis he first experienced toward the end of h.i.s Gymnasium, at age
seventeen.
This attitude and state of mind of Brentano deserve closer psychological
scrutiny.

First of all, one is struck by the very close parallel with simi-

lar experiences on his father's parts in both instances the religious crisis

occurred at age seventeen for

essenti~

the same reasons (centering around

the problem of determinism in general, and the doctrine of original sin in
particular) J and in both instances a solution was first sought through
philosophy but actually found, at th111 juncture, in a new and more intense
conrnitment to the practice of religion.

In the second place, it seem1 impor-

tant to call attention to the fact that Brentano was won over to the Church
"basically through the influence ot his mother and his Catholic friends,• and
that •thereupon he dedicated himself to it with enthusiasm, deciding volun•

tariq to become a. priest" (Kraua, 1919 1 P• 4).
Kra".la strEtsses the voluntary upect of this decision, apparently viewing
it as a decisive factor to be taken into account in &rr3' effort made to understand Brentano•s subsequent separation from the Church

(1874). At best, this

is a naive sim.plification of ooq>lex events in our author's lite.

By con-

trast, one is likeq to gain a better perspective in the matter, if these
events are viewed in the light of a cardinal tra1 t of his personality s a
certain single•mindednesa and intolerance ot ambiguities.

Translated into

motivational terms, this trait enables one to see that both his dedication

to, and separation from the Church had to be 'absolute.

In addition, in re-

6.
apect to his decision to become a priest, this same condition suggests that
it was first arrived at

premature~

without adequate reflectionJ it is al.moat

as if Brentano could not even tolerate the relativ.t:ltl' ot the time factor in-

volved in any decision-making process, or at least the uncertainty unavoidab4" connected with it.
In this will-for-absoluteness one finds again a close parallel between
Brentano and his father.

But while his father apparentl;y found adequate

avenues in a variety of religious undertakings which satisfied his qtiest,
Brentano

him.self, more gifted and more exacting intellectuall;y, failed,, and,

one is strongl;y tempted to say, was bound to tail,

Not even life in a

Domini.cal monastery, which he tried for a brief' period (summer of 1862),
could satisfy his yearning for perfection in practical life.

Viewed from

this perspective, his relentless pursuit of intellectual excellence in his
advanced education in philoaopl'\Y and theology bears an undeniable resemblance
to

an effort at compensation.

However, lest this critical reflection be

taken out of context and misinterpreted aa to 1 ts actual import, it should
be kept in mind that the prime mover of this pursuit waa what Windiacher him•
self (19.36), one of his sharpest cr.itics, called a "deep love-of-truth and a
pure will-for-truth" (p. 9).
In terms of chronology, after a three-semester sojourn at the local

Iuceum in Ascharfenburg, the road to intellectual excellence took Brentano
in succession to the Universities of Munich (1856-57), wUrzburg (1858) and
n

•

Berlin (1858-.59) 1 to the Academy of Munster (1859-60), and to the University

of TUbingen, where in 1862 he was granted his degree in philosopbV, in ab-

- -

sentia, with his work, ,9ll ,!:h! Manifold Meanim;
totle.

£!.

BeiPS accordiJ?i

!2 !!:!!-

Continuing on thie road, Brentano devoted h.imself for the next two

years to the study of theology, moving from the Dominica! monastery in Graz

(Austria) first to Munich and then to the Seminary in wUrzburg, where he was
ordained a priest in 1864.
Although Frederick Trendelenburg (1802•1872), the well•known Oeman
p.hilologist and Aristotelian philosopher at the University of Berlin, and

Ignaz von DOllinger (1799•1890), famous and controversial historian and theelogian at the University of Munich, are usualJ3r mentioned as Brentano•s foremost teachel"'s 1 Franz Clemens (l8J.5-1862) and Ernst von La.saulx (1805-1861)
also deserve this title.

The former, professor at the Academy of MUnster,

highly esteemed by the pupils for his method, depth a.11d mastery of doctrine 1
first made Brentano familiar with acholasticismJ the latter, a. very complex
figure, probably influenced him most directly through his scholarq interests

not only in philosophy, but also in classical philology and aesthetics, and
through his stimulating and d;ynamic teaching at the University of Munich.7

7Seiterich (1936) makes reference to Brentano•• acquaintanehip with
Heinrich Denifle (1844-1905), outstanding medieval historian and Comi.nican
priest, during his st.BT in Gru. It is highly unllkeq, however, to say the
least, that ~ significant intellectual exchange took place between them
because or differences in their level of studies at that time.

B.
The question of how specific the influence of these distinguished thinkera was upon Brentano would necessitate a comparative study of their views.
This study has never been undertaken, and is obvious:cy- beyond the scope ot
the present work.

Ultimateq, however, such a study would seem likeq to

reveal that this in£luence was more general than specific, in the sense

that it fUmished him with a springboard for subsequent independent intellectual elaboration, as opposed to a well defined platform. What is true

ot philosophers across the centurie:s, i.e., that none of them can be con•
sidered as his ideal teacher, seems to be even more true or his real teachers
in actual lite.

In support of this view, let it suffice to mention that

Brentano was barell' haltway through hie advanced education when, in the
Spring or 1860, he first conceived the idea or the four developmental. stages
of philosophy • an idea which seems to lie at the basis of his "absolutell'
doubt-free conviction• that he "waa called fran within and from above"
(Husserl, 19191 P• 160) to be the Rpioneer" of a true Philosgphia perennia.8

6ilrentano himself latex- on told Stumpf (1919, p. 89-90) that the idea
of a satisfactory philosophy of t.118 hiato;y l)f philosophy came to him with
all the impact of "an evident and redeeming" illwrdnation, when, otherwise
perplead at the engulfing oontradict.1.ons existing among philosophers, he
was just recovering from a serious illness. The perceptive reader hari.U¥
needs to be reminded or the close analogy between Brentano and Descartes
with regard to their conversion to philosophy and their concomitant "consciousness of a high mission" toward it. As superbq described by Husserl,
with the passing of time, this consciousness became all-encompassing in
Brentano, being reflected in "every trait, in every movement, in the innerq
and outwardly oriented look or his soulf'ul eyes, in his whole style of ex•
pression" (p. 154).

In terms of published writings, Brentano 1 s originality and independence
of thinking can already be seen rather clearly in bis doctoral dissertation
study mentioned above 1 and stands out even more sharply in his second study
_!h! Psychology!!£. Aristotle, especiaJ.lir _h!! Doctrine!!£.

vous

.IOr..fC<x..c!G

,,
by means of which he habilitated himself as a Dozent at Wurzburg during the
summer of 1866 - a study which went into the official records of the University as "the best work presented to this philosophical faculty in the course
of half a century" (Stumpf, 19191 P• 89).
Brentano received even greater and more specific official recognition
for his Habilitation Theses, being commended for the "keenness of his mind•••
the ease in interpreting uncommon ideas ••• and the man;y-sidedness of his know•
ledge in the field of philosophy and e:xact research" (Stumpf, 1919 1 P• 89).
Although these theses covered traditional philosophical problems, in maey respects they bore the stamp of his personality, as reflected in the "strength
of his convictions," and of his Weltansch.aung, insofar as the latter was to
remain "oriented in two directions - toward the past and toward the future"

(Windischer, 19361 p. 8).

This proved to be especialq true of his stand on

aotenti.fic method, for which he was also off'iciall\r commended.
This twofold directionality of thinking was to remain Brentano•s bane as
well as the major source of his strength thro\ighout his teaching career,
spanning across alr.lost three decades, first at Wmburg (1866-1873) and then
in Vienna (1874-1894). On the one hand, in fact, it great]3 appealed to, and
influenced his young students, for youth has been, and will always be, ehal-

10.

lenged to the very limit of their resources on11' when the wisdom of the past
and the anticipations of the future are brought to bear upon the present.
On

the other hand, however, it aroused the antagonism, more or less overt,

but typicalJ¥ rather intense, of man;y of bis colleagues who stood for either
the uncritical acceptance or the skeptical rejection of the established or-

der.
In general, Brentano•s appeal to youth is clear11' reflected in the large

cl.ass attendance t.o any of the courses he ever

a: f'ered.

Within this con-

text, it may not have been by mere chance that the on11' non-medical course•
taken by Freud at the University of Vienna (1874-1876) were among those
taught by BrentanoJ and, of course, it was not by mere chance that very fre•
quent11' following his lectures maiv students joined him in a "common walk"
for further philosophical discussions.9
More specifioal.q, this appeal is mirrored in the number of outstanding
pupils and "grandpupils" who were inspired by him to become scientists in
the broad sense of the term, and who subsequent]¥ achieved independent stature and renown. .Among the former, in addition to George von Hartling, pre-

9combining in one Aristotle's peripatatio style and Socrates• maieutic
art, these discussions apparent]¥ acquired su.ch a typical character to give
rise to the term Brentanieren (Stumpf 1 1919, p. 146) • Specific reference
to the .f'act that Wfirentano was a master in the Socratic maieutios" is made
by Husserl (19191 P• l.55).

ll•
viously mentioned, are Hermann Schell, Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Franz
Hillenbrand, Christian von Ehrenfels, Alexi.us Meinong, and Edmund Husserl)
among the latter, Oskar Kraus, Alfred Ka.stil, and Franziska .Mairer-Hillen•
brand, well known editors of his works .10
Kraus (1919) is obviously belaboring the issue under consideration when
he claims that one can find among Brentano•s students "all shades from the
extreme right to the extreme left" (p. ll).

However, there is a kernel of

truth in this statement that adds a new dimension to the range of his influence.

Perhaps, it is in the field or religion that we could find the

best apJro:ximation to the two extremes mentioned above, respectively in von

Hertling•s stand as a staunch Catholic figure and Schell 1 s role as the lead•
er of Oennan modernism.

In the field of philosophy, instead, the opposition

between von Hertling 1 s neo-thomism and Husserl•• transcendental idealism can
hardly be conceptualized in these tenns.

At least from the point of view ot

Brentano'• own theoretical orientation, these two system111 as such would both
belong to the extreme right.
In~

respects, and in line with the general frame of reference given

above, Kraus• statement is more readily applicable to Brentano'• opponents
from among his colleagues.

Perhaps the most interesting, and undoubtedly

surprising, thing in this connection is the fact that the opposition to

10To be complete, this list should also include the names of important
thinkers, such as Theodore Ziehen in Germany, James Ward and George Stout
in England, and Francesco DeSarlo in Italy, who openly recognized their indebtedness to Brentano.

12.

Brentano at the University of Vienna followed the very same lines as the

••
opposition to him at Wurzburg,
in spite of the drastic change in his personal life from his status as a priest to that of a la..v professor, and in
spite of significant changes in his theoretical outlook.

At wUrzburg itself, the "liberal circles" within the University consistently viewed Brentano as a 11\YStic, a scholastic, a one-sided Aristotelian,
indeed, as a Jesuit in disguise,ll and successfully fought against his promotion to full professor of philosopl\r, when the academic Senate reconnnended
him for this position in 18721 because he was a priest.

The inconsistency

is quite obvious. On the one hand, the opponents of Brentano-the-priest
would

undoubte~

turned-~

have fought even harder against the retention of Brentano-

even in his lower rank of professor Extraordinarius, i f he had

not voluntarily resigned this positionJ12 on the other hand, these same

l\rentano himself mentioned some of these epithets in a letter to
Stumpf dated February 25, 1872 (Stumpf, 19191 P• 124).
12
H
In this respect, the opposition of Catholic theologians at Wurbburg,
which was first voiced openly in 1872 1 would have strengthened the hand of
the "liberal.a.• A realistic analysis of this situation must have pl.qed a
certain role in leading Brentano to give up his teaching position when he
left the Church the following year. In taking this step, however, Brentano seems to have been motivated basically by higher considerations - a
genuine sense of respect for his old Catholic colleagues and students, and
the conviction that he could not ethic~ hold onto a position which had
been given to him as a priest.

13.
opponents very convenient4'1 it would seem, chose to ignore all evidence
which unmistakab4' ran counter to their too easy and superficial stereotyping.

Among other things, such evidence included Brentano•s basic re•

vision of traditional logic, his extensive treatment of the llhglish empiri•
cist philosophers in his lectures, his published study on Comte (1869), his
open stand against the doctrine of papal infallibility strong4' defended by
the Jesuits, 13 and a trip to England (Spring of 1872) to meet in person the
outstanding contemporary representatives of a theoretical orientation in
which he saw :mu.ch vitality.14

On the race or it, therefore, m,µc~ o:f the

opposition of Brentano•s liberal critics appears to have been actually moti•
vated by deeper underlying conservative leanings .,n their part.

It was not

so much the elements in Brentano•s orientation which looked tcm;;.rd t.he past;
that aroused their mistrust, as instead those elements which were clearly

lJBrentano had been asked by Ketteler, bishop of Mainz and an intimate
friend of his, to prepare a comprehensive stuey of this doctrine in 1869.
This study was published the following year, before the actual proclamation
of the dogma itself by the Vatican Council, with the consent of the German
ecclesiastic hierarcey meeting official4' at Fulda. Although this study was
non-partisan in spirit, in the sense that Brentano based his opposition upon
philosophical, theological, and historical argwnents, "it contained many
errors of information ••• and interpretation" (Hernandez, 1953 1 p, 19).
14Brentano was looking forward especially to a meeting with J. s. Mill,
but was unable to do so because Mill was then traveling abroad. However, he
did meet Spencer, Mivart, and Robertson SnithJ in addition, he also visited
with Cardinal Newman. His plan to meet with Mill in Avignon the following
year was again thwarted, this time by Mill's death (1925 a, p. 62).

setting the stage for a different type of liberalism in respect to both the
overall conception of philosophy and its teaching within the University set•
ting.
Unwittingly, Brentano•s catalytic personality as a teacher, and the role
into which he cast himaelf as a pioneer of a new perennial trend in philosop
contributed to create and perpetuate this atmosphere of antagonism.

The very

nature and dominating themes of his two inaugural professorial addresses, respectiveq,
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an important role in this respect.

That

the first of these two addresses was of such import, as implied here, is
sufficientq proved by the fact that he weaved it anew into a lecture

delivered to the Philosophical Association ot Vienna at a distance of more
than two decades (1889).

Within the same context, the overall impact of the

second address is incisively revealed by the following manifesto laying down
which course of action he was going to pursue and whys "The requisite con•
ditions,• so went this manifesto, "are givenJ the method is providedJ the
path for research is charted" (1929 a, P• 99).

Coming toward the very end

of the address, and contrasting strongq in its laconic brevity with much of

the style ot the previous discussion,, this pronouncement was obviously tine d
to convince the audience of the depth of his convictions and personal conti•
denoe

in the matter.

As if sanctioned by the responsiveness of the students to his teaching,

lS.
Brentano•s convictions grew even deeper throughout his career at the University of Vienna.

By contrast, his confidence seemed to have been put through

the crucible not only by the relentlesa opposition of maey colleagues, but

also by further crises in his life.

The opposition to Brentano at this Uni•

varsity was even more caustic and more sharp]¥ delineated along a left and
ll

a right than at Wurzburg, as clearly indicated by the following labels that

were pinned on hims •a clerical obscurantist" (Brentano, 1929 •• P• l.58, n.
10) 1 •a Scholastic, a Jesuit in disguise, a rhetorician, a monger, a sophist"
(Husserl, 1919, P• 154).15 The further crises in Brentano•s life included
his marriage in 1880 to a Catholic girl, Ida Lieben, with the concomitant un-

avoidable resignation from his full professorship, the subsequent keenly felt
loss

of statua

in his role as a mere Pri vatd.ozent, and fi.nally the death of

his wife and the severance or his association with the University (1894),
which had provided him with at least a semblance or a home for his intellectual lite. 16

l5It seems important to call attention here to the fact that these attitudes toward Brentano were being expressed more than a decade after he went
to Vienna, when Husserl was a pupil of his (1884-1886).

16tt was

through the recommendation of Lotze and the influence of the
Austrian minister of Education von Stemayer that Brentano had received a full
professorship at the University of Vienna on January 22 1 1874, against the
initial opposition of both the &lperor and Cardinal Rauscher. He lost this
position because 1 unable to marry in Austria, and in order to be able to do
so in Samny, he had to give up his Austrian citizenship. Following his
marriage, he returned to the University of Vienna in the lesser role mentioned here, hoping in vain that he would soon be restored to his previous

position.

Although symbolic interpretations are typical.13' quite precarious, one
would seem to be justified in finding a conunon meaning between Brentano' a
final resignation from teaching and his separation from the Church three
decades earlier.

In effect, both of these events in his life represented

for him the collapse of two official vocations: the religious and the philo•
sophical.

As perceptive a man as he was, he could bar~ have failed to

sense this implication, before he took these two stepsJ and no thinker ot
lesser stature than his could have retained as much faith, as he did, in
what these two vocations basically stand for, after he arrived at his decis•
The roads to these decisions were both long and at times tortuous,

ions.

but ultimately Brentano proceeded to their very end with increasing decisive•
ness and determination.
The acute period of Brentano's final religious crisis lasted three years

(1870-187J)r the inner break first occurring in the Spring of 1870,, 17 and the
open separation from the Church on April 11, 187).

In essence, the former

took place because he was no longer able to see "how the absolute certainty,
which befits the act of faith, i• compatible with its lack of inner evidence"

17

Brentano•s religious crisis 1 therefore, {>receded the procla:m.ation of
the dogma of papal infallibility (July 181 1870), rather than developing u
a result Di tt, as wu the case with DOllinger. Th.at this crisis was not
contingent in any significant wq, if at all, upon the course of action of
his former teacher is shown by the following passage in a letter which he
wrote to Stunp.t toward the end of the Winter 1870-711 "I have 'lO close con•
nection with the partisans of the anti•infallabili ty movement. You know
how much I disagree with the doctrine o.f infallibility. However, I nave
no trust in these men" (Stumpf, 1919, P• 122).

17.
(Seiterich, 19J6, P• 19-20),
in due time.

18

and the latter followed as a matter of course

It is easy to see t.."la.t Brentano's double course of action at

this juncture was alreaey governed by the following basic canon in his out•
look formulated later on: "man judging with evidence, 1.e&, the knower, is
the measure of all things, of those which are, that they are, of those which
are not, that they are not" (Kraus, 1930 a, P• XV). While this principle is
far from being itself' evident, it served to justify for him the conclusion
that both faith proper and positive religion were among the things "which
are not," and hence he rejected them,.19 At the same time, however, the same
principle was to be the moving force behind hi• indefatigable efforts through
out the rest of his life to erect a theistic and optimistic world-view upon

a sound basis.
Brentano•s separation from the Church was neither preceded nor followed
by antagonism on his pa.rt.20 By contrast, he "often spoke with bitterness"

l8w1thin the context of his discussion of "The religious development ot
Franz Brentano" (pp. 17·25), Seiterich touches briefly upon some specific
articles of faith which troubled our author. It is hoped that a qualified
writer will undertake a. detailed study of both of these issues, not only from
a theoretico•historical, but also from a psychological, point of view.
~Brentano left the Church as a symbol of positive religions. It is for
this reason that he never joined a:rr,r other denomination, even though he was
urged to do so by his friend8 1 including his brother Lujo.
20Husaerl's testimony in the matter ia worth quot1ng2 "About Catholicism," Husserl (1919) states, "I never heard him talk except in a tone ot
great esteem• (p. l56). It ia to be regretted, instead, that in the contro•
versy which developed concerning Brentano•a marriage in 1880, some elementa
ot the Catholic Press lowered the discussion to the level of unsupported in•
nuendoes.

18.
(Husserl, 1919, P• 161) against the official attitude and prevailing at.mos•
phere toward him

at the University of Vienna, which

resignation.21

ultimate~

led to his

,,

The opposition which Brentano met both at Wurzburg and Vienna coupled

with his strong, and in m&.r:\V' respects compulsive, striving for eJi.Dellence in
his intellectual pursuits, and with his inner travails 1 exacted a heaV)" psy-

chological toll from him at times.

He himself told Stumpf (1919) that the

preparation for some of his lectures at Wurzburg "had strained his nerves in
a colossal wq" (p. 100), and

rt.frequent~

complainad••• about his weak nerves"

(Hu.sserl, 19191 P• 161) during the yeare when Husserl was his student in
Vienna.

The specific psychological components of these stress perioda are

not known.

There seems to be some indirect evidence, however, that rather

deep depressive trends were involved.

in his ,!!!!! Wishes !.!!;. Austria,

At l1rl1' rate, as he himself intimates

this was the case at the time of his depar-

ture £rom Vienna.

Having bidden farewell to Austria, Brentano sojourned for a short while
in Switzerland and Rome, and then took up residence in Florence in J.896.

For

two decades, in striking similarity to the length of time he spent in Vienna,

2lAmong other things, Brentano complained about the fact that, as Pri•
vatdozent, he was no longer able to direct doctoral dissertations. Hadlii
not been handicapped in this respect, it seeu like~ that a number of young
promising students would have wanted to work under his guidance and perhaps
follow him in his orientation or at leut use it as a starting point for
their own independent thinking. Perhaps even Hu.saerl himself might have been
among them. h fact that he dedicated his doctoral dissertation to Brentano,
referring to him as "my one and onl.1' teacher of philosopey," lends some
la.usibili t to this co eoture.

19.
this city, famous not on4' for its rich cultural tradition but also for the
ex.qui.Bite hospi tall ty of its people, gave him a home and a homeland. 22

Per-

haps even more than when he went to Austria, Brentano must have .felt that be
had come to Itaq "with inherited wam sympat.ey for thio land and its people,"
and that. he had "found the most frienciq reception" not

oni.r

in

~ts

intellec-

tual capital, but across the penin:Jula. 23 This plt:lasant circumstance was un•
do\futed4" a welcaned psychological experience for him, at a time when he

needed it so muchJ perhaps even Ita4r's proverbial ttswqru climate helped a
little, in view of his declining p}V'aiaal health throughout this time.

But

again all this came to a sudden end in 1915 when Ita4r entered World War I.
BJCause of strong feelings in the matter, on account of his open pacifist
1

stand, he again felt compel.led to leave his home and homeland and moved to

Zurich, Switzerland.
age

He died there two years later, on March 17 1 1917 1 at

80. Uttered during his very last hours of life, the following word.a sum-

22Dur1ng these years, Brentano maintained a SWl'l1l8r home at SchOnbuhl on
the Darm.be, which he used to call a£:tect1onatel1' hi• "Nev Aachaf.t'enburg."
Both this home and his residence in Florence soon became the meeting place
tor numerous former students and trienda. Among others, tm.sserl visited with
him once at SohOnbuhl, and was a guest or his in Florence in 1908.
2lThe quotations ate taken from Brentano' a Iaat Wishes for Austria (189$
1
P• 9) and, of course, express his feelings tow~tey !n general and
Vienna in particular. That Brentano came to feel equally at home in Florence
and Ita4' is indicated by his regular active contacts with m&ey' contemporary
Italian thinkers, and by the very synpathetic interest that some of these
thinkers showed toward his views. Among other things, this interest led to
the Italian edition of hie Classification of Psychic Phenomena (1911) which
in turn, as Brentano him.sell' indicates (i9D: a, Preface), led.to the Gem.an
edition of the same work.

20.
marize vividly his clear grasp of the drama or his human existence in the
light of his deep sense of the divine: "It is so difficult to overcome the
senses;" "What God ordains, we must welcome.
yon~

Only

at times it reaches be·

our weak strength" (Kastil, 1951, P• 18).
It was Brentano•s good luck that throughout his periods of stress and

biD

crises, just as during the undoubtedly numerous moments of inner peace

and harmony, he remained surrounded by a loyal, though relativezy small,.
group of friends among his colleagues and acquaintces,24 and enjoyed his
student's genuine and warm admiration.2$ In addition, he was perhaps even
more fortunate to find an affectionate and sensitive companion not on}\V in
his first, but also in his second wife, .&nilia Ruprecht, whom he married in
1897. 26 The stabilizing influence of these factors was probably great, thoug

24.Among Brentano•s friends at w{il.zburg, who achieved fame in their own
fields of scientific endeavors, were Adolph Fick (peysiology), Johann Wisli•
census (chemistry), and Frederick Prym (ma thematics) J among those in Vienna,
Marsxow von Fleischl (peysiology), Theodore Meynert (psychiatry>. Franz
Miklosich (philology) and Karl F. Claus (zoology)J and among those who came
to lmow him during his later years in Itazy, Iudwig Baltzmann (peysics and
•thematics) and Cosmo Guastella (philosopey). Breuer was not onl1' Brentano's friend, but his famil\v physician in Vienna, and his correspondent in
"long written discussions on the Darwinian hypothesis and related problems"
(Kraus, 1919, P• 82).
2S11usserl (1919) expressed this admiration most eloquently, stating: "he
himself felt that my gratitude for what he had become to me through his per•
sonality and the living force of his doctrines was indelible" (p. 166).
26Both Stumpf and Husserl offer vivid recollections of this harmonious
relationship. Their testimony addS strength to Kraws' dismissal, as unfounded, of a lone dissenter's opinion concerning the unhappiness of Brentano•s first wife in her married life (1919, p. l3).

21.

not measurable according to standard parameters.27 Basically, however, the
answer for his resiliency is to be found in the "strength of his personality"
(Husserl), his •good heart• (Kraus), and his keen gifts of mind.
Brentano' s strong personality manifested its elf' even in his early child·
hood, according to the testimony of his sister Claudine, 28 and was undoubte
the basic motivating force which led him to charter his life, as much as he
did, according to his intellectual convictions.29 In his everyday life, h<M•
ever, both his strong will and his equall;r strong convictions were greatly
tempered and counterbalanced by the simplicity of the man who

frequen~

interrupted the logic-tight train of thought in his lectures or learned con-

27Kraus (1919) makes reference to •the role of friendship in Brentano•s
life" (p. I) in the index of his stuey, but then fails to develop this theme
as such in the text proper. Yet an investigation of this topic would likely
be very enlightening and very interesting. To be complete such an investigation should include an analysis of available scientific letters which Bren•
tano exchanged with such important thinkers as Ernst Mach, Federico .Enriques,
Vincent Lutoslavski 1 Eugene Rolfes, Gustav Schneider. In addition, it should
be extended to encompass a detailed study of his "strong family sense" (Kraus,

19191 P• 80).
28 •0£ his early childhood," Claudine writes (1918), "I remember his
strong will, which he once imposed in a very categorical fashion" (p. 469).

29.l lesser, but not insignificant, eJCpression of this characteristic
thought-action sequence in Brentano is found in his open and learned challenge
to the views of the Rector himself' of the University of Vienna (189.3 c). That
this feature of Brentano•• life styltt had its inherent "weaknesses" has been
suggested above in the present study, and is recognized by Stumpf' himself'
(1919 1 P• 143). In view of this, Kraus• tireless efforts to underscore al•
ways and only Brentano•s positive traits, inv..a-iably raising them to the
superlatiw level, while undoubtedly well•lntentioned, do not reflect scien•
tific accuracy.

22.
versations with a spontaneous joke or witticism; who found himself equally at
home in his library, pondering over the deepest problems confronting humanity,
as in his garden, tending the soil and watching nature unfold its latent
potentialities; who conversed with equal interest and zest with his learned
friends and with the laborers working around his house, even to the point ot
actually sharing the latter• s toilJ who himself never paid any attention to
life's comforts, but at the same time was ever mindf'ul of the convenience of
others .JO In terms of a broad generalization, one is tempted to say that
Brentano epitomized in his own life his conception of ethical "orthonomy11 (as
opposed to heteronom;y and autonoJl\V').

Certainly1 this ideal was a source of

personal strength in coping with life stresses and a guiding rule in all his
scientific pursuits.

In terms of published works during his life time, Brentano does not rank
high, at least not according to present day criteria of mass intellectual productions.

Yet the little that he put into print shows clearly his originality

and individuality as a thinker, and the unity, within differentiation and progression, of his thought itself.

In addition, even the wrshippera of Bacon's

proverbial idol.a tribus have to reckon with the fact that, under the editorship of Osktir Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska

~r-Hillebrand,

the

methodical and well planned publication of some previously printed works and

30soth StUmpr and Husserl (1919) give vivid descriptions and examples of
the simplicity and good-natured side of Brentano's personality.

2.3 ..

many posthumous manuscripts, since 1924, ha.s already produced fifteen solid
volumea • .31 Even if' duplications in several manuscripts were to be eliminated,
we would still be left with an imposing monwnent of scientific achievement.
With the exception of his four studies on Aristotle

(1862, 1867, 1882,

1911 b, 1911 c), the only complete unitary work which Brentano published waa
his Psychologz

£!2! !!!

Empirical Standpoint (in the original 1874 edition,

and in the 1911 edition of part of it, with the addition of an important
appendix, under the title of Clusification

2£.

Psychic Phenomena),

The other

writings a.re either short single studies (1869, 1874 b, 1876 1 188.3, 1889,

1892 a, b, and c, 189) a, b 1 and c, 189$ a, 1897 1 1901, 1908), most typically
in the original form of lectures, or a composite of several such studies, such
as his ~ ~ Wishes ~ Auatria ( 189S

b) and

Researches

!!!

Sensorz Psycho-

-

logy .32

31The motivation behind Brentano•s "reluctance" to publish

has not been
explored with any degree of accuracy. To cl.aim, as it is generally done, that
the major, if not exclusive, reason for this reluctance was his total lack of
interest in fame is at beat a simplification. Among other things, this view
hard]J' agrees with the simple fact that he always expressed such undisguised,
though llllpresumptuous, satisfaction whenever bis views were given recognition in a work by another author. By contrast, it would seem that perfectionistic trends in bis personal.i ty most likely played a very important role
in this context. Of course, this ~othesis would have to be investigated
in detail along with other possible contributing .factors •

.32

Except for further introductory comments upon Brentano•s psychological
writings which are necessary in view of the basic orientation of the present
study, no effort is made at this point to identify in greater detail bis
other works. ·Sufficient information in this respect is contained in the
annotated references.

24.
Brentano wrote his Pqchology "in the span of a few months" (Kastil,

19511 P• l)) toward the end of 1873 and the beginning of 1874. The Preface
itself bears the date, March 71 1874. Wundt had just published the first

half of his Principles

2.£.

Pqysiological Psychology in 1873 1 and Brentano took

it into account in his work, in effect offering a conception of psychology
radicaJJ\y different from the one advocated by the founder of this science in
its experimental orientation.

Yet, in order to fuil1' understand the meaning

and originality ot Brentano•s point of view, it is important to keep in mind
that he would haw written his book even without Wundt, and that in writing
it he was not motivated to aey significant degree, i t at all, by mere opposition to this author.

The real reason behind his work was that he had some•

thing worth sa;ying in its own right and said it when the time was ripe for

him.
Several factors played a direct, though variable, role in this connection.

Perhaps, very important among them, but most

easi~

overlooked, are

factors in his own personality, his life experience, and his bent of mind.
Suffice it to mention here his inclination to "meditation," his restless
searching for an overall stable course of action, and his basic. conviction
that the fulcrum of the whole edifice of knowledge can only be found in man's
immedi&t,e experience which is "characterized as right."
The above conviction, in effect, sanctioned the marriage between
rationalism and empiricism, with the latter playing the most immediate role
in leading Brentano to lay the foundation for as lasting and harmonious a re-

lationship as possible between them in a science of psychology which was to
be empirical without being empiricistic, and rational without being ration&•

llstic.

His effort to establish the autonomy of such a science in the face

of the reductionistic spirit of either physiologically or sociologically
oriented authors, such as Maud.Bley and Comte, seems particularJ.\y significant
in this respect.

In view of this, his extended personal study of 18th and

19th century English thinkers must be considered as another important factor
accounting for his 1874 Psychology.

His trip to England in 1872 1 in all prob•

ability, served to crystallise his motivation to write this volume.
Still another factor is to be found in the fa.ct that Brentano had twice
(summer 1871, and winter 1872-187.3) taught a course in psychology at wUnburg

in which several basic themes, as found in his subsequent work, were alread;y
clearJ.\y stated and discussed (Stumpf, 19191 P• 13$).
with his freedom from

any"

This factor, together

other activity1 f'ollowing a trip to Paris during

the Spring and earJ.\y Summer of 1873 1 account sufficiently for the short

period of time it took him to complete this work, in spite of difficulties

he met in finding original sources needed for immediate reference.3)
As conceived in 1874, Brentano•s P!Ychology; would have comprised six

"books." Two of these books, dealing respectiveJ.\y with "psychology as a
science" and "psychic phenomena in general," make up the first volume which

33His short trip in November, 1873 to Leipzig, where he called on
1
Weber, Fechner and Drobisch (Stumpf', 1919 1 P• 130) 1 with whom he takes issue
in his Psycholos;y, was probabl\Y prompted m.ainJ.\y by his search for some ot
these sources.

26.
was published then.

The other books, which would have investigated "the

properties and Jaws" of imagination (third), of judgment (fourth), and of
naffective and volitional states" (fifth), and "the relationship between mind
and body,• including "the question of whether it is conceivable that psychic
life endures after the disintegration of the body" (sixth), were never published as such.

The important issue concerning the motives or reasons why

Brentano did not carry this plan to completion apparenti,-, never came up for
specific discussion in his many Socratic dialogues with his favorite and moat
brilliant students, and he himself never expressed a direct view on the matter in his subsequent writings.

The closest he ever came to give us an in-

direct cue in this respect was in his volume, !!!.!,
Right~

Origin~.!!!!.

Knowledge

.5?!

Wrong (1889), where, after presenting this study, as "a fragment

of a Descriptive Psychology" (1902, p. VIII), he in turn presents the latter
"if not as a continuation" (1902 1 p • .52), yet still as "an essential stage in
the further development of some of the views advocated in (his) Psychology

.f!:2! .!?S!

.&npirical Standpoint" ( 1902, p. VIII ) •

The above statements are significant because they show that the basic
idea, if not the basic hope, embodied in the original plan of his Psychology
remained in the foreground of his thinking.

What this idea was, can be in•

ferred rather easily from the following central theme of his 1889 study
mentioned aboves "In order to gain an insight into the true origin of ethical
knowledge it (is) necessary to take some account of the results or ••• researches in the sphere of descriptive psychology" (1902, P• 10).

Brentano

27.
could have added that he was referring to a descriptive psychology of "affective and volitional states.• But this was more than obvious from the context
of his whole discussion.
stand.

Equally obvious for us is the overall import of his

In essence, Brentano was convinced that as a whole descriptive psy-

chology was necessary "to gain an insight into the true origin" of every,
and all types of human knowledge, be it in the realm of metaphysics, logic,
natural sciences, or Geisteswissenschaf'ten.

In particular, as it pertains to

the present discussion, he was convinced that not only the specific problems
of aesthetics, logic, epistemology, and ethics, but the problem itself of
human existence as such, could not be adequately solved without first in•
vestigating their psychological foundation.

It was this conviction which

prompted the original plan of his Psychology.
True enough, in 1874, Brentano had not made explicit the distinction be•
tween "sensory" and "noetic" (intellective) consciousness on the one hand,
and between "descriptive" or "phenomenological" and "genetic" or "explanatory" psychology on the other (1929 a, PP• XIX-XI).

His analysis then cut

across these boundaries so that the lines of demarcation, specifying the
relative roles of the two types of consciousness and psychological investi•
gations remain at times hazy.

Yet he was very much aware that these lines

existed, and let us foresee the blueprint for their further delimitation.
It will be sufficient at this point to state that important as the analysis
of sensory consciousness was originally, and was to remain subsequently, for

28.
Brentano, the major task which he saw )\ring ahead of him in his Psychology
llTaB

the vindication of the inalienable rights and indispensable role of no-

etic consciousness.

In the same vein, as useful as he perceived "genetic"

psychology to be "for the progress of human1ty 1 " he made its very existence

as a natural science dependent upon prior descriptive psychological inquiriesJ
this aspect of his thinking, too, can
reader of his 1874 work.

har~

be missed by the attentive

To repeat, in order to aYOid any possibility of

nd.sunderstanding, in 18741 Brentano did not explicitly use the above term&J
however, the important fact is that he was alread;y aware then of the basic
underlying issues.
F\lrthermore, in announcing four more "books" as an integral pa.rt of his
Psychology in 1874, Brentano did not state that his ideas in the matter had
already crystallized, nor did he commit himself unalterably to model his disouasion of them after the fashion of the first two books.

In view of this,

Kraus is not justified in asserting• without any qualification• that Brentano
did not carry his original plan to completion because "it had become unwork•
able" (1928 b 1 p. XII).

It would seem more correct to say that, had he not

been reluctant to publish, he would have completed the original plan within
the frame of reference of his later explicit distinctions mentioned above.
This view is sufficient]\y" justified by the simple fact that throughout the
rest of his life Brentano retained an active interest in the problems outlined, but left unsolved, in his Psychology;.

29.
Brentano•s efforts to solve the problem of the psychological foundation
of ethics is revealed not on:cy- by his published study on _!!!! Origin !?!_

~

Knowlec!ge 2!_ Right ,!m! Wrong, but also by his posthumous work, Foundation
Development .2! Ethics (19.52).

The content of another posthumous volwne,

Doctrine 2!_ Right Juggment (1956), shows likewise that

he

~

.!!!!

kept alive his

original intent to investigate the "properties" of judgment in a special
book of his Psychology. While this volwne is broader in scope than such a
projected book, in the sense that philosophical problems are de!ini te:cy- kept
in the .foreground, the .f'act that psychological issues are also taken into
account makes it relevant within the context of the present discussion.
The appendix which Brentano himself' added to his Classification

.2!!!:

2!. !!!z.-

Phenomena (1911) contains further evidence of his inteITUpted endeavor

in defining ever more accurately the properties of judgment and of' "feeling
and will," as a means to establish with corresponding certainty the psycho-

logical bases of' epistemology, logic and ethics. In view of this, such an
appendix

~

be viewed as another ":t'ragment" of' that "Descriptive Psychology"

which he had hoped to "be enabled in the near future to publish in its com•
plete .f'orm" (1902 1 P• VIII) 1 but which in effect was never published as such.
Even more than in the case of his ana:cy-sis of the above mentioned fundamental
classes of' psychic phenomena, this hypothesis seems applicable to his further
important studies on "imagination" contained both in the appendix under discussion, and in a second appendix added by Kraus in the so-called second
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volume of Psychology

~

.!!! !'Wirical Stangpoint (1925 a).

Certai~,

Bren-

tano•s keener and more conscious interest in working out a descriptive psy•
chology of this most tundamental (in his system) psychic "faculty" is clear]\y
shown by the "Essentials of a descriptive Psychology of the Intellmt" which
he had obviousq developed with sufticient clarity and details no later than
the years 1884-1886, since he was then presenting them to his students in
some of his lectures (Husserl, 1919, P•

153).34

In terms of a comparable

descriptive psychology of the senses, the same interest is reflected in his
four articles on optical illusions (1892-189)) and in the studies which make
up his volume Researches,!.,!! Sensory Psychologz (1907).

IAat, but not least,

his interest in a complete descriptive psychology, encompassing both the
"intellect" and the "sense•" finds at the same time its fullest confirmation
and most mature expression in his posthumous volume, .Q!! Sensory ,!!!S Noetic
Consciousness (Psycholoiq, vol. 31 1928 a).

Particular]\y significant in this

respect is the fact that Kraus himself entitled the second section of Part
One of this volume "Phenomenognosy (phenomenological psychology) of sensory

and neetio consciousness," and had planned to re-edit in Part Two Brentano•s

1907 volume mentioned above along with new essqs on the psychology of colors
and sounds.

~usserl also mentions that, in the course of his discussion on the descriptie psychology of the intellect, Brentano touched upon "parallel applications in the sphere of emotions." It seems quite possible, indeed very
like]\y, that Brentano incorporated his views on this matter in his study The
Origil! .2£. Jd:! Knowledge £!_ Right.!!!!! Wrong (1889).
-

Jl.
While Brentano's
delve more

deep~

ana~ses

of sensory and intellective consciousness

and more specifical.J3 into philosophical issues than was

the ease with his Pf!Ychology, insofar as they present his views on a descrip•
ti ve psychology of these two types of consciousness, they must be interpreted

as a fulfillment of that part of his original plan which envisioned a detaile
study of the "properties" 0£ psychic phenomena, espeeialq as it pertains to
the phenomena of "imagination."

His other posthumous volume, Principles

Aesthetics (1959), lends further support to this view.

!?.!.

In addition, one of

the studies contained in this volume, but previousq published by Brentano

----

himself, The Genius (1892 a), as well as the discussion of the dis'l:.inction
between descriptive and genetic psychology, in the context of their relation•
ship to aesthetics, show that he also kept alive his interest ih the other
part of his original plan - the investigation of the "laws" of psychic phenomena ("genetic" psychology).

This interest is also reflected in three

articles he published on optical illllsions (1892 c, 189.3 a,, 1893 b).

A.n even

more clear-cut and convincing proof of this, however, is offered by his re•
peated, though unrewarded, efforts to secure for himself an Institute and a
La.'tlora"tol7 at the University of Vienna (1895, PP• 5-6).

These efforts were

motivated by his desire to conduct more specific and more extended researches
in "genetic" psychology, and by his conviction in the high practical value of
these researches; in addition, they were also motivated by a desire to put his
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ideas on "descriptive" psychology to experimental test.35
The preceding discussion, it is hoped, has shown that by and large Bren-

tano carried through the original plan of his Psychology:, and at the same
time haS defined both the sense and the llmi ts of this accanplishment.

Al-

though the latter does not constitute a complete system of psychology, it
add.a sufficient closure

to the original work to justify the claim that "Bren-

tano• a claim to notice to posterity rests largeq on his Psychology" (Eaton,
19301 P• 24) •

3.$Brentano•s direct statements on this matter are substantiated by
Eisenmeyer. On the basis of personal acquaintanship and conversations with
our author, Eisenmeyer states that he would have liked to have "the necea•
sary staff of assistanta who would have investigated factual material in
line with his leading ideun (1918, P• 493).

II
OVERVIEW OF BRENTANO t S STANDPOINT IN PSYCHO.WGY

l.

Introduction: Scientific methodology
ledge. -

~

l!l!, scope

£!..

human !!!2!-

In 1866 at the University of Wi'.irsburg, in open challenge

to Schelling's epigon1 1 but to the great satisfaction of their exasperated
students, Brentano formulated and defended his most famous habilitation the•

sis a !!:! philosophiae methodus null&

.!:!!-.! .!!!!.!

scientiae naturalia

.!!!• l

A quarter of a century later ( 1892) 1 within the context of his conference

.Qa ,2 Future ,2! PhilosQPh{1 after recalling the •very striking impression"
made by this thesis, and how it became the "main target" of his examiner'•
"attacks,• he pointed out that recentl.T Dilthey himself had "risen polemical.lT
against it in a characteristicalq new fashion" in hia -.In_tr.....,.o....du
.......
cti.......,o..-n _!:2 !!!!,

-------

Sciences of the Mind (1929 a, p. 9).

Dilthey'• viewpoint, he added, wu

apparentl.T shared by Exner, his intellectual opponent in this conference.
this, Brentano implied, was a proot of the value of his conception.

ill

In sup-

port of this implication, he even shared with his audience the content of a
personal letter received from Stumpf, in which his renowned pupil pointed out
"how (hia thesis) had been evermore confirmed" (l.929 a, P• .30) since the time

1stumpf gives a vivid recollection of the impact which this thesis made
upon him and his choice of vocation, as well as upon the other students (1919 1
P• 88). Brentano himself depicts (1929 a, PP• 14-l.5) with obvious pride the
contrast between the "bold student" who scribbled the words "Factory of Sulphur" across the door of Franz Hotfmann'a "deserted" p"' 4 ,---;"::-JJ..,,las11room, and
the "eager audience" which he 1 "an immature beginne ., 1f~~~~c;t~tely"
upon starting his teaching career.
· <',:,.' ·
· · · .,

.3.3

I
\,

'
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of its enunciation.
Pointed as some of the e:xpressions in the preceding paragraph might seem
to

be, they actually do not come near to dramatize fully Brentano's own

empathy with his conception that the method of natural science was the method
of philosophy.

Indeed, Brentano felt equally strongly that it was also the

method of all Geisteswissenschaf'ten.2
The two basic issues which must be closely analyzed in order to arrive

at a correct understanding of his position are obvious.

Brief:cy- formulated,

they reach (l) What is the general nature and logical foundation of the
method of natural science? and (2) Is its application to philosopey and to
the "sciences of the mind" univocal or analogous?

Even though Brentano'• stand on the second of these two issues is quite
unequivocal, 1 t has often been misunderstood.

Paradoxioallf, the basic

reason for this misunderstanding lies in the unfortunate use of the expres-

sion "method of natural science" which, taken literally, tend.8 to suggest a
univocal application of this method to philosoph;y and t-0 the soiencee of the
mind. Nolibllla is actllal.q farther .from Brentano 1s true conception.

In fact,

2According to Brentano, philosophy is the highest among the "sciences of
the mind." His reference (1929 a, P• 128) to other Geiateswissenschai'ten,
such as sociology, political science and psychology, as iiphiiosophlCSI dlsciplines" ca.ll.!3 ct.ttentitln to the important and basic philosophical issues involved in these areas of knowledge. In no way, however, it can be construed
to imply that, in other respso~.;s, these disciplines are not independent
sciences, d'i.stinct from philosophy. It is for this reason that L. Gilson•s
effort to use as synonymous the terms philosophy and Geisteawissensohaft
(1955 a, PP• 59..64) fails so noticeably to convince the reader.

...
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according to him, not even in the realm of the natural sciences, can the
scientific method be applied univocally.

Brentano is very e:xplicit on this

point, stating that, far from demanding that we "always proceed uniformly,"
natural science

basica~

"teaches and disciplines us to change our method in

conformance with the specific nature of the objects" of research (1929 a, P•

35).

That the same principle also applies to philoaophy and to the other

sciences of the mind is cl.early shown by his advocacy of "an essentially
nature-conforming method" for the former, and "a method bearing an analogy"
to that of natural science for the latter (1929 a, P•

In an appendix to bis published conference

~

45).

,.!d!! Future 2!_ Philosop91

(1929 a, PP• 75-81), Brentano took great pains in differentiating his stand
on scientific methodology from certain contemporary trends and attitudes
which he considered especially harmful to the advancement of the sciences of
the mind.

As expressed then, his views were

quite modern, and remain in-

structive even for us, in their effective portrayal of the negative consequences stemming from (1) a supr£1cial adherence to the canons of scientific
methodology which only masks an inner lack of' "all earnestness" in the actual
conduct of research, (2) "the dilettante encroachment" upon the domain of the
sciences of the mind by experts in natural science,3 (3) the vain effort to

3As a result of this encroachment, Brentano points out, these e:xperts
tend to "bend. the facts to their theory, instead of reverent]\y subordinating
the latter to the former." Psychologically, the failure of these scientists
outside the area of their specialty is due to factors such as their inability
to become re~ ego-involved in the study of issues in the realm of the mental sciences, their unawareness of the particular "uncertainties and dangers"
inherent in these sciences, and their lack of the required special aptitude•
and specific research habits.

give substance to the sciences of the mind by merely bringing to bear upon
them "excerpts" from natural science,4 (4) the failure to recognize that "the
boundaries between formal learning and scientific and artistic tact" cannot
be ignored,S and (5) "the logical unknowledge" of the true nature and foun•
da.tion of the inductive process, typically found even in those scientists who
otherwise strive to follow faithfully the scientific method.6

4Humorouslyt Brentano compares mental sciences constructed in this f ash·
ion to "the lean hen (which) with the stuffing appears to have become a considerably ratter roaster." This comparison, however, is but a faint metaphor
of the claim, made in all earnestness, that the natural sciences are not "enriched with even a single discovery• through such an approach. The further
claim that "this is what happened in psychology through repetition of data
taken from handbook of plJ1'siology" is significant not only as a historical
illustration of the point under discussion, but as another proof of Brentano's
continued interest in this science.
SApplying this idea to the field of psychology, Brentano wrote with keen
insights "One may learn as much as he wants about psychology, but will not
thereby become an eJq.">ert knower of people ••• if he cannot at the same time
acquire this wonderfully trustworthy psychological tact. He who believes
that the scientific method eliminates those boundaries which, according to
Pascal, are crossed only by the •eaprit fin'J that the 'esprit geometrique•
reigns supreme, is heir to a folly which will degrade him, and perhaps also
his scientific method, in the eyes of other people. 11

6

Turning again to psychology, Brentano called attention to two very unfortunate "errors," indeed "perversions," connected with the lack of knowledge underdiscus sion which had not only marred its image, but had also
hindered its progress: (l) the attempt to construct this science on the ex•
clusive basis of researches on sensory processes, disregarding the "phenomena
of the so-called inner perception, such aa judgments (and) preferences," and
(2) the attempt to investigate "the genesis of psychic phenomena •••without
having first studied and described them in an orderly f aahion. n The latter1
Brentano added, is just aa much of an impossibility aa would be the attempt
"to cultivate plJ1'siology without intensive anatomical studies."

Brentano reacted most vigorousl3'" against this "logical unlmowledge."
Within this context, he reiterated his strong opposition to any "vague, universal conception of scientific-empirical methodology1 " and singled out as
especiall3'" unfortunate the fact that many contemporary scientists "never
sought e.:xplicitly to take cognizance of the theory of inductive research."
In view of this, it is not surprising that he himself devoted so much atten•

tion to these two issues, in an effort to arrive at a coherent and intrinsically consistent conception of induction.
The essential elements of this conception are actually quite simple,
both in themselves and in their mutual relationships.? Brentano begins with
the view that "induction in the strict sense of the term" is a reasoning process whereby we try to "establish general laws starting from the observation
of particular facts" (1929 a, P• 96J Cf. 1925 b 1 P• 81-82). 8 While this is
its most common goal, at times induction only leadS to the prediction of a-

1A. methodical effort to follow in detail Brentano•s several lines of
reasoning on this issue was made by L. Gilson (1955 a, pp. lll-196). While
highly commendable in terms of objectivity and accuracy1 her anagsis is
somewhat deficient in didactic clearness. Bergman's study (1944), by contrast, is of easy reading, but fails to bring out some important aspects of
Brentano•s thought.
8
Throughout most of his life, Brentano held that the observation of
particular facts found its expression in particular perceptions, that is,
according to his terminology, particular knowledges or judgments. During his
last years, however, his epistemological orientation led him to conclude that
no knowledge is entirely particular. In terms of this orientation, there•
fore, induction would consist in a transition from the less general (more
particular) to the more general.

38.
nother particular fact.

In both instances, however, the observation of the

facts which f onns its starting point must be methodical painstaking and detailed (1929 a, PP• 131-132).

Moreover, "induction shows the way to deduc-

tion and gives direction to 1t," and in turn both the "understanding" and the
"certainty• of its laws are strengthened by deduction (1874 a, Book I, ch. 3).
There is thus mutual complementary interaction between induction and deductions "it makes no difference whether we verify (a law) by induction, after
deducing it, or whether we discover it by induction and then explain it with

-

respect to more general laws• (Ibid.).

By and large, Brentano•s conception so far would seem to
the great majority of scientists.

be acceptable to

It is on]J when they became first aware of

its further essential component that basic doubts and reservations are likely
to arise in their mind.

The component under discussion pertains to the fur•

ther role attributed by Brentano to deduction in the inductive process, in
agreement with the logical primacy which, according to him, the f onner possesses over the latter.

Because of this primac7, Brentano held out the po-

si tion that induction is justified and baa value

o~

to the extent that it

partakes in some way of the nature of deduction {apodictic analytical reason-

ing).
It should be obvious, therefore, that the problem of the logical justification of induction had a mu.ch broader scope and deeper implications for
Brentano than for most scientists.

He wae not merely, or even mainly, in-

terested in showing how the deductive method, wisely and timely pursued, con-

39.
sti tubes an important link in the overall processes of inductive research,
strengthening and unifying the results attained by it.

Basical11', he wanted,

and needed, to establish the character ot rationality or intelligibili cy- of
inductive reasoning, so as to bridge the gap between the "asaertorical"
("truths of fact") and the

11

apodictic" ("truths ot reason•).9 Clarifying the

"assertorical" (the factual) by means of the apodictic (the rational) 1 and in
the process giving substance to the latter by means or the formex·-that was

his goa1.lO

9within a historical context, Brentano•s defense of the rationality and
intelligibility of the inductive process, and of the conclusions to which it
leads, represents his answer to, and criticism of, the position of thinkers,
such as Hume and Mach and Avena:riWI, who consider inductive laws as a mere
irrational by•product of habit, or as a simple pragmatic device which facilitates the exercise of memory. "The human mind," according to Brentano, "aspires to general laws, not on account or their convenience, but because ot
their luminosity. And this luminosity is inseparable from its frui tfulnesa J
even the laws established on the basis or a eingle case throw light upon an
infinite munber of cases" (L. Gilaon, 1955 a, P• 141). More in general,
Brentano is arguing against arr,.torm of empiricism "incapable of safeguarding
the authentic demands of reason,• and in favor of •the onl;r ~d empirical
orientation, that which starts from e.xperienca but with the conviction that
experience is fraught with intelllgibili ~, and ponders over the facta in
the light of this conviction" (Ibid., p. J.42).

-

10
It may be useful to recall that hovering over his pursuit of this
goal was •the spirit ot Bacon and Descartes," and that throughout such an
undertaking his own orientation in psychology remained his constant lighthouse. The attentive reader will also readiq see reflected in this under•
taking Brentano'• desire to insert himself in the tradition of the ascending phase of philosopcy.
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Brentano•a path to this goal was that of modern mathematics.
c~,

Specifi•

what characterizes most distinctly his point of view on the issue

under consideration is his effort to justify induction through the calculus
of probability, in the spirit of Laplace's well known probability principles
and

Bernouille's law of great numbera.11 It is because their probability is

established through this d8d.uctive procedure that inductive laws.share in the
character of apodictic propositions, and as such deserve our confidence,

The

degree of this confidence, needless to say, is proportionate to the degree of
probability that the connection of two or more concepts, as expressed in an
inductive law, is a necessary connection, and not merely an accidental or
fortuitous one. And of course, probability itself can never become certainty,
because, by ita very nature, the necessity of the conceptual nems expressed
in synthetic (inductive) lava is never absolute aa in the case of analytical
principles.

Yet, Brentano goes on to say, infinite or extremely high prob&•

billty, for example in the order ot l billion or l trillion to 11 is "prac•
tica~

equivalent to absolute certainty" (1929 b, P• 106) in all domaina-

in the domain of action as well as in the domain of knowledge.12 Therefore,

11rn this context, it may be of interest to mention that, according to
Brentano, Hume would have not been ensnared by his extreme skepticism concerning induction, if he had studied Bernguille's .!!:! cogitandi.

12Brentano calls absolute, apodictic certainty, "mathematical certainty,"
and speaks of "physical certainty" in reference to infinitely or very highly
probable propositions (1929 b1 P• 136). In the strict sense of the term,
only the former deserves to be callsd certaintyJ the latter is so only in
analogy with it. Theoretically, these two types of certainties remain
diistinot.
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not only the suspension of action, but also the suspension of assent remains
unjustified once we arrive at scientific conclusions which enjoy such a
level of probability. We can use these conclusions as a guiCJe in everyda;y
life and as a frame ot reference in our Weltaruschauung, just as the mathema•
tician uses his axioms in his field of endeavor.
So far, Brentano has succeeded in clarifying the aaeertorical by means

of the apodictic, by showing that inductive laws, properq discovi:;red and
justified, are •praotica.lly equivalent" to axiomatic principles.

There re-

mains for him the task of demonstrating that these laws are actual:q operating in the world ot reality.

The principle of contradiction which govema

mathematical (deductive) reasoning is of no help to him here. Since this
principle applies onq to that which is simultaneous, we cannot establish on
its basis the neceaaity of the hypotbesia of a given succession ot events.
To do so we need another principles the principle of cauaali ty.

Brentano ia

thus confronted vi th the new task of ascertaining the validity and universali ty of this principle.

After discarding all purely &•priori and all pureq

empirical approaches to this problem, he derives such a principle from an
analysis of the concepts of "coming-into-being" and •contingent" with the
help of the probability calculua.13

lJ•The truth of the principle of causality manifests itself to us by
means of the concept of coming-into-being which includes the concept of tine
and consequently that of contirmity, as well as b7 means of the law ot great
nwrt>ers ••• • (1929 b 1 P• 149). According to Brentano, contingent, non-caused
becoming is not contradictory, but infiniteq improbable. Hence his appeal
to BemQU.ille•s law. It will be sufficient to mention in passing that,
according to Brentano, the universality of the principle of causality implie1

v
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The ascertainment of the principle of causality opens the wq for Bren-

tano to conclude to the transcendent.

The hypotheses of the existence of .

God and of an outer world, in the broadest sense of the term, present them•

selves to him as "infinitely probable,• and as such possessing "physical certainty.•

And, of course, further specific hypotheses conceming the outer

world advanced by natural science and by the sciences of the mind, when
properly arrived at inductively and du.1;y justified deductively, as previousq
mentioned, enjoy a comparable status.
It should be obvious that, in their most essential aspects, the two
basic hypotheses mentioned above bear upon philosophical issues.

This brings

up the problem of the relationship betwen philosophy- and the other sciences.
With respect to the natural sciences, Brentano•s thought seems to have
evolved gradually from an initial position

(1869, 1874 a) in which he con-

sidered p}\ysics (as the most hignq developed natural science) capable ot
providing us with truly general and infinitel.1' probable laws, to a .final position (l9l5)14 in which he attributed this capability ozicy to metaphysics.

the principle of absolute determiniam. '.lhis conclusion will undoubtedly take
aback many a reader. Even more surprising, however, is bis further claim
that only the latter principle can fully guarantee and justify freedom ot
the will.- Rogge•s work, The Problem of Causali\I in Franz Brentano (1936)
remains the most comprehensive stUdy orth!s issue av&ll8£18 today. less
extensive, but still very adequate treatments are found in L. Gilson (1955 a)

and Seiterich (19.36).

140£.

"Progress of thought in the demonstration of the existence of
God" in On the Existence of God (1929 b).

--

--
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According to this position, therefore, meta.peysic becomes propaedentic to the
natural sciences, paving the way for their specific researches, and shedding
light upon their findings.15
Brentano•s stand on the relationship between philosophy and the sciences
of the mind, by contrast, remained the same throughout his life.

He haa al•

wqs emphasized that the ultimate solution of the problems confronting these
sciences is dependent upon broad guidelines laid down in philosoplw.

Thia

also applies to descriptive or phenomenological psychology in lrl.s system.

This science, however, enjoys a privileged status because it constitutes the

starting point of all scientific endeavors, including philosophJ'.

According

to Brentano, science would be a vain, objectless effort without sound psycho-

logical foundations) and, of course, it would be respectiveq an irrational
undertaking and a solipsiatic game without the extension of these foundat.i.ons

lSThe import of meta.peysics on natural science is both theoretical and
methodological. On a theoretical level, metaphysics is presupposed b;y
natural science because it investigates and explains the existence of the
characteristics (such as spatial continuity and time dimensions) which are
found in material substances, and the existence itself or these substances.
Methodologically, metaphysics is superior to natural science not only because its basic concepts are derived from inner ea:perience which alone yields
"truths of fact," but also because frequently it can req upon the internal
analysis of these concepts to solve some ii! its probl.ems.-Pertinent refet>ences to the existential character or Brentano'• metaphysics are tound in
Werner (1931) and in L. Gil.son (195.5 a). The latter author's "reflections•
on the evolution of Brentano•s methodological approach to metaphysics are
also very valuable.
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through mathematical (logical)l.6 justification and inductive veri.f'ication.
Did Brentano succeed in extending scientific knowledge beyond the realm
of the

psychologic~

given and the mathematically evident? Hugo Bergmann

himself, a •grandpupil" of his, does not think soa "The calculus of probability is an instrument to build a rationalized, objective world.

It can-

not be used to demonstrate the impossibility of an irrational world of pure
contingency.

Thus Brentano's attempt to prove the law of causality with the

aid of the probability calculus fails" (1944, P• 291). And with it fails
his extension of knowledge beyond the confines mentioned above.
For the sake of argument, however, one may grant that such an extension
was successful.

What are, in this cue, its actual limits?

this question is obvious from the preceding analysis.

The answer to

But let us listen to

Brentano once mores •The most important questions of life," he states, quoting
Le.place, "are mostly problems of probability" (1956, P• 242).

The full scope

of human knowledge seems to reach beyond these limits.
2.

P!Ycholog

!!:2! ~empirical

standpoint.-Brentano himself seems to

have felt keenl.1' the constraints of the upper boundary of knowledge in his
system. Within this context, hi• statement that "even if all our knowledge
is piecemeal, nevertheless there is an element of grandeur about this patch•
work" (1926, P• 128), sounds more like a wish•fultilling rationalization than

16
Brentano considers mathematic aa "a part of logic." Ct. his critique
of modern "Attempts to mathematize logic" (19ll a, Appendix).
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a factual expression of a deep intellectual conviction.
Brentano would have been more correct if he had made this statement in
reference to the segment of "truths of fact" contained within the lower boundary-

of knowledge, as conceived by him.

Certai~,

he himself was convinced

that "there {was) an element of grandeur• in his overall psychological standpointJ and the student of his thought will easily agree that his contributions
in this area are, if not grandiose, historically important and significant in

their own right.
The foundations of Brentano'& orientation in psychology were laid down
in his volume, Ps;ycholog;y

~ ,!!!

Empirical Standpoint {1874 a).

It will be

sufficient here to identify briefly the spirit in which Brentano wrote this
work, and the main trends of thought contained in it.17
Af'ter defining the full scope of his complete Psychology, in 1874, Brentano emphasized that it was not his intention "to write a compendium o£ this
science• {p. 1). In line with his conviction that npsychologioal laws possess the character of permanent and important truths" {p.

44),

his goal was

more restricted, but by the same token deeper and more scholarly: to secure
for psychology what other sciences had alread;y attained, that is, "a core of
generally accepted truths capable of attracting to it contributions from all
other fields of scientific endeavor• {p. 2).

In othBr words, he was not con-

cerned with ttthe quantity and the universality of the tenets, but rather
(with) the unity of the doctrine" (p. 2 )J his aim, to phrase this issue in

17specific references to this volume in the present and following sec•
tions are taken from the English trans la ti on.
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still different tems, was to write a psychology in place of psychologies,
not mere]\y' another psychology to be catalogued among the many that had al•
ready been developed.

With confidence, but without arrogance, Brentano cast himself in the
multiple role ot defense lawyer, public prosecutor, juror, and judge.

He

criticized effective]\y' "the opinions or others whenever they seemed to be

erroneousi" but recognized his great indebtedness to them, and told his
audience that he would "readi]\y' and gratefully welcome a:ny correction of (his)
views which might be suggested" to him (p. 2).

Rather than trying to hide

the past sterility of psychology1 he emphasized it, advanced a plausible

theory to explain it, and, displaying at once forensic skill and scientif'ic
ingenuity, found in it the beat "confirmation" of our high "expectations•
conceming the role of this science as "the science of the future" (pp. 38-

44). In a genuine conciliatory spirit, he recognized both the dependence of
psychology upon all the other sciences, and it• indisputable status as "their
crowning pinnacle" and most enduring foundation, in terms of both its "tb.M-

retical significance" and "practical task." (pp. 6-7, PP• .35-38, P• 411).

In

the same spirit, he recognized both the empirical and non-empirical character
of psychology• "MY point of view is empirical& experience alone is ray teacher.
However, I share with other thinkers the conviction that a certain idealccon18
ception is entirel.1' compatible with such a standpoint" (p. l).
Style not-

18Tbe expression "ideal conception" in this passage can on]\y' be taken to
mean a conception of psychology as a rational, i.e., &•priori, science, in
the sense given by Brentano to the latter term. Trying to find in it a concealed leaning toward idealism, as Brightman (19.32) did, is not even a good
exercise in aralo ism.
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withstanding, Brentano moves in and out of the several roles mentioned above
with grace, timeliness and precision.

As already" mentioned, Brentano•s Psychology of 1874 represents the ful•
fillment of only one third of his complete plan.

The reader, therefore,

should not be surprised to find that,, as it stands, this work deals exclusively with the two most basic problems which we find at the threshold of
any science t the problema of the nature of i ta method, L"'ld of 1ts subject

matter.

The second, third, and fourth chapter of Book I define Brentano'•

stand on the first of these two problemsJ the second problem is introduced in
the first chapter of Book I, and treated qstematiaally in the nine chapters
making up Book II.
Brentano was .tUJ.ly convinced that •the progress of science" depends upon
the "progressive increase in the tru.e understanding of its method" (p. 46).
Accordingly, having justified the conception of psychology as "the science of
psychic phenomena (pp. 18•3.3), he set out to explore in detail the nature of
its method, or rather methods, defining at the same time the various"areu"
from which "the psychologist gathers the experiences upon which he bases his
investigation of psychic laws• (p. 67).

The "primary source• or basic

method of psychology is "the inner perception of our psychic phenomena• (p.

46) 1 at

the time

ot their occurrence J its next important tool is "the obser•

vation of past psychic states in memory" (p. 54).

This second method is

important because it introduces into psychology observation, without which no
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science is poasible.19 Yet, Brentano readi'.cy" admits, if psychology were to
confine itself to the use of these two tools and the exploration of the corre
sponding two areas of research, its "experimental foundations ••• would always
remain insufficient and unreliable" (p.

59).

In order to reme.dy this con-

dition, therefore, psychology has to investigate "the externalization of the
psychic life of other persons" (pp.

59-67) in verbal communication, auto-

biographical accounts, "human achievements and voluntary acts," and "involuntary modifications which accomp8J\Y or .f'ollov natural'.cy" certain psychic states"
brief'.cy", psychology needs, and can re'.cy" upon, "objective" observation.

Thia

observation, Brentano adds, should also be extended to include the study of
the behavior o.f' infants, adults in primitive societies, the mental'.cy" ill1 and

animals, and of social and cultural phenomena.

Last, but not least, objective

observation must be focused upon the physiological antecedents of our psychic
states and outer behavior.

19Brentano takes great pains (pp. 46-54) 1n differentiating "inner perception" from "inner observation" or introspectioi1, showing that the former
alone is possible with respect to on.going psychic processes. Humorously,
he empathizes with the plight of some bright "young people" who had only
reaped "a tumult of confused ideas and numerous headaches" from their useless efforts at self-observation, and as a result "had come to believe that
they lacked aptitude for psychological investigation. 11 In a serious vein,
while praising some of his contemporaries (Comte, Maudsley, l&nge) for
recognizing that •inner observation really does not exist," he criticize•
their vain efforts to erect psychology on the exclusive basis of objective
observation. They would not have fallen victim of this "error," he states,
if they had recognized the distinction proposed by him.
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Brentano paid special attention to the nature and role of this last type
of objective observation (pp. 69-104).

He was prompted to do this both by'

historical circwnstances and by personal conviction.

Historicall'1', he found

himself confronted with various reductionistic efforts, i.e., efforts "to
base psychology upon physiology."

Through a ori tioal analysis of the various

arguments advanced by three outstanding representatives (Comte, Horwicz,
Maudsley) of this point of view, he reached the .following two conclusionsa
(1) these thinkers haw "exaggerated the services which pl\YSiology can render
to psychology," and (2) psychology, in order to be an independent science,
must re:cy- upon •the psychological method" proper.

Yet he himself shared the

opinion of his opponents concerning an inherent "weakness of all non-physiological psychology," insofar as this brand of psychology ignores the fact
that physiological conditions in general, and in particular "processes in the
brain exert an essential influence upon psychic phenomena and constitute one
of their conditions• (p. 99).

In more positive terms, Brentano was con-

vinced of the "bi•partite psychophysical character of psychology in its
greatest part, if not in its entirety"' {p.

75). In this sense, therefore,

psychology itself, but not its method, is physiological.

Even when investi-

gating the role of underlying ph;ysiological conditions affecting behaVior and
experiepce, the psychologist cannot use the identical methodology of the
physiologist.

His method rather, to use Brentano•s own later terminology, is

· only "a method bearing an analogy" to that of the physiologist.
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Having solved to his satisfaction this important theoretical and
methodological issue, Brentano turns his attention to the problem of meaaurement in psychology (pp. 105-l.14). He pays tribute to Herbart for having
"first emphastzed the necessity of mathematical measurement" in our science,
while noticir.g "the complete failure of his attempt to discover actual
measurements" (p. 107).

Likewise, while recognizing the great merit inherent

in Weber and Fechner•s attempt to measure "psychic intensities," he points

out certain basic llmi tations to the usefulness of their methodJ furthermore,
he suggests a revision of their "so-called" psychop}\ysical law.

Aside from

this specific issue, he justified the possibility and need of mathematical

measurement "for the exact treatment of all sciences,• including psychologr,
on the ground that •we actually find magni tud.ea in every scientific field" or
at least find in them "some object which can be numbered" (p. 106).20 In the
latter case, i f nothing else, statistical procedures can be used

(p. l.14).

The actual magnitude measured by the Weber-Fechner method, according to

Brentano, is not the intensity of a color as seen or of a sound as heard, etc.
but the intensity of the inner act of seeing or hearing.

It is this distinc-

tion between the psychic act and itsobjeot or content which was basic to his
thinking at the time he wrote hia P!l9hology 1 providing him with the

onq

acceptable basis for defining the subject matter of psychology and the

20
1n this context, Brentano offers a brief criticism of Wundt' s point
of view (pp. 105-107, llJ•ll.4).
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natural science.

"As the proper object of psychology," Brentano asserts,

"we must consider onlJ' psychic phenomena in the sense of real states," acts
or processes (p. lSJ).

By contrast, the natural science studies physical

phenomena, such as "color, tone and wannth,• that is, the "content" or "object" of a particular class of psychic acts-"external perception" or sensation. As such these phenomena "have only a phenomenal ••• existence" (p.

14l). 21
The originality of Brentano•s point of view concerning psychic acts
made it necessary for him to treat this problem extensivelJ' in some of its

21
"We could express the scientific task of the natural sciences," Brentano writes, "by saying that they are those sciences which seek to explain
the succession of physical phenomena connected with no:nnal and pure sensa•
tions (that is sensations which are not influenced by special psychic conditions and processes) on the basis of the assumption of the influence on
our sense organs of a world which is extended in three dimensions in space
and flows in one direction in time. Without explaining the absolute nature
of this world, these sciences would l1mi t themselves to ascribe to it .forcea
capable of producing sensations and of exerting a reciprocal influence upon
their action, and to determine for these forces the laws of co-existence and
succession. Through these laws they would then establish indirectly the lawa
of succession of the physical phenomena of sensations, if, through scientific
abstraction trom the concomitant psychic conditions, we admit that they lliani•
fest themselves in a pure state and without alteration of sensibility." Commenting upon this conception of natural science in a footnote, Brentano adds:
"This explanation does not coincide entire4' with Kant's premises, but it
approaches as tar as possible his eJCpl.anation. In a certain sense it comes
nearer to J. s. Mill's views in his book against Hamilton (oh. 11), without
however, agreeing with it in all the essential upecta. What Mill calls 'the
permanent possibilities of sensation,' is close4' related to what we have
called forces" (pp. lS0-151) .-These rather lenitl\Y passages were quoted
not only because they SUlllllarize well Brentano•a conception of the nature of
natural sciences, but also because they throw light upon the basic difference in standpoint between these sciences on the one hand, and peysiological
and sensory psychology on the other.
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most essential aspects: basic characteristics of psychic phenomena which distinguish them from physical phenomena (Book II, ch. I), their conscious nature
(ch. II), their unity within diversification and active interaction (cha. IIIIV), and their classification into the three fundamental classes of "imagi•
nation, judgment, and feeling and will" (cha. V-IX).
Brentano' s overall conception of the structure of the psychic act will
be discussed in some detail later on in this stuey. At this point it will be
sufficient to comment

brief~

upon his overall methodological approach to

the solution of the various issues mentioned above, and to give an equa.JJ,y
brief factual account or the basic characteric.s of psychic phenomena, as
viewed by him.
At the end of his discussion or psychological methodology, in his
choloq, Brentano wrote (p. ll9)1
Before closing our discussions conceniing the method of psychology let us add a last, and more general remark conceniing a
methodological procedure which often prepares and f acili tatea
our investigations in other fields, but does so especial~ in
the psychological field. I have in mind a procedure which
Aristotle tended to use so readi~, that is, the classification
of the "Aporiae." This classification shows all the different
possible hypotheses, indicates for each of them the characteristic difficulties, and in particular gives a dialectical
and critical apercu of all the contradictory opihions formu•
lated by eminent men or held by the masses. Likewise, in hi&
last essay about Grotes' Aristotle 1 which he published a few
months before his death in the Fo~htifi Review, J. St. Mill
also evaluated with acute underst~ng 118 advantages of this
preliminary investigation. I believe that it is evident why
psychologists in particular can derive even greater profit from
divergent opinions than investigators in any other field. Each
of these opinions, even though it is perhaps considered o~
under one aspect or interpreted erroneousl,y, is based upon some
elements of truth and upon some experience. Moreover, when we

!!!z.-
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are dealing with psychic phenomena, each individual has his
particular perceptions which are not accessible in the same
form to anyone else.
It is upon this method that by and large Brentano relies throughout
Book II of his Psychology to develop his theor,y of the psychic act.

Some

philosophers might view his effort to relate a given author's opinion to
facets of psychological experiencing as a prostitution in the direction of
•psychologism" of an otherwise good procedure.

Psychologists, by contrast,

are likel\r to be overwhelmed by the undeniable subtleties of his argument&•
tions, and as a result to underrate the actual range of empirical data which
constitute an integral part of the methodological approach under consider..

a tion, as used by him.

This critic al comment and especiall\r closer study' of

Brentano'• work itself, should ensure a more objective outlook on this matter.
Ibpirical data utilized by Brentano in this context tall into three
groupBJ historical, linguistic, and psychological.

He explici ~ categorizes

them as such in connection with his effort to identify the main reasons underlying "the misunderstanding of the true relation between feeling and volition•
(pp. 39J-406)J and, without too mu.ch diff'icultq, they can be seen reflected
in the other related investigationa.
Reasoning from these data, in the limelight of "the immediate]\y' evident
inner perception,• Brentano rejects (pp. 131·135, lh4•147) as doomed to fail•
ure all previous attempts to base the distinction of psychic phenomena from
peysical phenomena upon the premise that psychic phenomena "appear without
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extension and spatial localization," and "manifest themselves successively•
as a simple one-dimensional flow of events.

The reasons for such a failure,

he insists, are obvious a on the one hand •certain psychic phenomena also
appear extended• n and on the other "very of ten many psychic phenanena are
present in consciousness simultaneously.•
On the positive side, the same methodological approach yields for Brentano a set or oharacteristics which, in his opinion, truly differentiate
psychic phenomena from physical phenomena.

Two of these characteristics have

already been mentioned incidentally in the preceding paragraphs: psychic phe•
nomena alone "are perceived in inner consciousness" with evidence, and
"possess a real existence" (pp. l.40.144).

Another characteristic can also be

inferred from what was stated above a "the psychic phenomena which we perceive,
in spite of their multiplicity,
148-149).

!J.w&!

appear to us .!.! .! uni!jy:" (p. lSO, PP•

There remains one further charac teristio.

standpoint in

According to Brentano' a

1874, the ":feature which best characterizes psychic

p~omena

is ••• their intentional in-existence" (p. lSO, PP• l.36·140)1
Every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what the Schola sties
ot the Middle Ages called intentional (also perhaps mental) in•
existence of an object. In spite of some ambiguity, we call it a
relation to a content, a direction tovard an object (which is not
to be interpreted aa reall ty) 1 or an immanent object! vi ty. Every
psy-ohic phenomenon contains something as an object w1 thin itself,
ewn though not in the same way-. In imagination something ia
representedJ in judgment something is acknowledged or rejectedJ
in love something is lovedJ in hate something i• hatedJ in desire
sanething is desired.
Brentano used the adverb "undoubted.q" to underline the full extent of hi
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confidence in this early doctrinal point.

Yet, it is on this very issue

that he subsequently became his own sharpest critic.

He was led to this

self-cr1 tique both by inner developments of his own thinking, and by a felt
duty to refute the •erroneous" extensions of his original theory of intentionality in the direction of Meinong's "theory of the object" and Husserl's
brand or phenomenology.
Briefly stated, Brentano aelt-cr.1. tique l.tJd him to assert that the ex•
pression "mentall;y existing object" is merel;y a "systematic" or "co-signi•
tying" expression to which nothing correspond8 in reality.

In other words,

the so-called "mentall;y existing object" constitutes on'.cy a dependent moment
of psychic activity, or better, o.r the psyehicall;y active subject, it coincides in reality with the subject, and consequentl;y cannot be the term to
which the latter refers himself .22
Implied in the preceding self•critique is a sharper distinction between
object consciousness, that is consciousness as given in the fundamental act
or pure "imagining" (representing something, having something as object),
and cognitive consciousness, as given in acts of judgment. Object conscious-

22cr. latkov (19.30) and Kraus (1924, pp~ 24-40) for a detailed exposition

of this new conception and other doctrines connected with it. The Appendix
added by Brentano to the second partial edition of his Psychology; in 1911,
and included in the present translation, contains his direct views on the
matter (pp. 412-431, 4.39-4.5.5 1 462-465). Further statements of, and elaborations upon, these views are .found in some or his posthumous volume• (1928,
19.30, l9S6).
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ness is pure experiencing.

Through it, for example, we experience ourselves

as hearing a tone. We do not experience this tone as an immanently existing
object, in the sense of a copy of a sound existing extramentallyJ nor, of
course, do we experience the latter as such.
represented eludes the

ana~sis

The existence of that which is

of our acts of imaginationJ it is first ascer-

tained in the acts of evident judgments, either in truth or probability.

It

is to be noticed that in these judgments the intentional tendency of the
knower is directed toward the thing itself' (a real sound, for example), and
not toward a mental copy of it, for "otherwise the intending could never become a transcending" (Kraus, 1924, P• 34).
Other specific doctrinal developments subsequent to Brentano•s Pszcho~

are his theories of primary and secondary consciousness, of the modes

of "imagination" (temporal modalities, imagination_!:!! recto and,!!! obliquo),
and of sensory and noetic consciousness.

To some extent, these developments

represent "corrections" of his earJ.T standJ by and large, however, they bring
forth and make e:xplici t the seminal thought contained in it.
A broader theoretical development in the latter sense, which is of
special significance to the basic purpose of the present study, is Brentano'•
distinction between "descriptive" or "phenomenological" psychology and
"genetic" or •explanatory" psychology.
in his PWholos.y of 1874.

This distinction is not found as such

However, the content and general .frame of refer-

ence of this volume clearly imply it.

In terms of its content, the entire

Book II and a good portion of Book I deals with matters of descriptive pay•

chology.

From the point of view of its general frame of re.t'erence, the

distinction under consideration harmonizes statements which, at first sight,
lll8'V appear incongruous or at least not thought out with sufficient clarity

or thoroughness.

Thus, even if the reader succeeded in sharing Brentano •s

enthusiasm, while perusing the highlights of his work given above, he
probabq wondered how and to what extent the empirical and rational character
of psychology could coexist together in any way other than by mere extrinsic
juxtapositionJ perhaps, he was even more startled in learning that psychology
was to be simultaneousq the very foundation of all the other sciences and
their "crowning pinnacle."

In this context, Brentano•s brief reference to

Comte's own admission "that an earlier science (1•) in many ways supported
and elevated by a subsequent one• (p. 411) wu hardq suf'.f'icient to allq all
doubts.

These and other uncertainties, however, are removed as cso.on as one

realizes that Brentano was in effect talking about not one, but two coordinated types of psychological inquiries-the descriptive and the explanatory.
It is the former which constitute the theoretical foundation of all sciences,
including genetic psychology, and as such incorporates in itself both
empirical and rational or a-priori (in Brentano•s sense) elements.

The latter

instead is e.xclusiveq inductive, empirico-experimental, and represents the
"crowning pinnacle" of the scientific edifice both in a retrospective and
prospective senser retrospectiveq, all the other sciences appear as the
"substructures"' which had to be carefulq worked out in order iJor it to be
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born and take shapeJ prospectively, in terms of "the practical task"

~ng

ahead of it, "once it reaches maturity and is capable of effective action,"
it will be its indisputable role to shed light not only upon the other
sciences, but also upon all "practical aspects of life" (p. 42).
As mentioned previously (ch. I, p. 28), Brentano lectured on descriptive

psychology at least as early as the biennium 1884-1886,23 and made reference
to it in print a few years later, in 1889.

He again lectured upon it during

the winter semester of the following academic year under the title of "Psy-

chognosy" (Kraus, 1924, p. XVII).

Without so naming it, he argued on its be-

half' when he published his conference

later.

9! J:l!!

Future

!!!.

Philosop!;y a year

In this context, he criticized the "error" of those who fail to under-

take a serious, methodioal

"~is

of psychic phenomena" as a necessary

preparatory groundwork for their researches in "genetic psychology• (1929 a,
P• 79).

Although Brentano had used the e.xpression "genetic psychology" at least
once before in his writings (1893, P• 67), the above reference to it and the
implicit defense of "descriptive psychology" constitute his first joint
formulation of his standpoint concerning the nature and role of both of these

23
These dates are based upon Husserl's testimony. Kraus was obviousq
not acquainted with this testimoey when he tentatively set the date of Brentano•s first lecture on descriptive psychology during the winter semester,
1887-1888 (1924, P• XVII).

two types of psychology.

The official manifesto proclaiming this state of

affairs, however, appeared two years later in his volume,
Austria (1895, pp • .34-.35).

&

~

Wishes

!2£

It is worth reading in its entirety:

school distinguishes a psychognosy and a genetic psychology
(in distant analogy to geognosy and geology). The former shows
all the ultimate psychic elements which, in combination, account
for the totality of psychic phenomena, just as the various letters account for the totality of words. Its .fulfillment could
serve as the foundation of a characteristica universalis, as
conceived by Leibniz and before ilim by Descartes. The latter
informs us about the laws governing the succession of phenomena.
Since, on account of the undeniable dependence of psychic func·
tions upon processes in the nervous system, these laws are by
and large physiological, it is easy to see how in this respect
psychological researches must entwine with physiological researches. One could perhaps suppose that psychognosy can prescind entirely from physiological discoveries and correspondingly also dispense with all instrumental devices. However,
it is only through the ingenuous and imaginative use of instruments that we can attain essential findings in our analysis of
sensations, whether we are dealing with hearing, or sight, or
the lower sensesJ and this work pertains to psychognosy.
My

This passage is important because it brings forth clear]\y' Brentano' a
general conception ot the nature and role of descriptive and genetic psychology.

Particular4" significant for the present stw:tr is the reference to the

experimental foundation of both of these psychological disciplines.

In effect

this stand represents a further important refinement of our author's views
concerning the empirical character of psychology, as he expressed them in his
original volume, Psycholoejl

.f!2! .!!!

Empirical Standpoint.

3. Genetic~ explanatory psycholoq.24 - Repeatedly frustrated in his

24The term "explanatory" was used by Brentano in place of "genetic" in
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efforts to found an Institute of Psychology equipped with a laboratory at the
University of Vienna, Brentano was not able to undertake any eJq:>erimental research in either genetic or descriptive psychology.

From a historical point

of view at least, it would have been very instructive if he had been in a
position to do so.

Titchner was technically right when he stated that "Bren-

tano, even with a laboratory, would not have been in Wundt's sense an •experimental' psychologist" (1921 a, P• 119).
drawn

However, the conclusion to be

from this is not that he lacked the temper of the eJq:>erimentalism would

have been different, both methodologicall:y and content wise, from Wundt's
prototype.

It is this difference that could have been histC'rica.lly instruo-

tive.
Brentano•s full awareness of the central role of eJCperimentation in
genetic or aJq:>lanatory psychology, and correspondingly of the inadequacy of
pure:cy- empirical studies, is probably the major reason why he did not pursue

to any great extent this second avenue of research that was open to him. As
mentioned previously (Ch. I, P• 30) 1 however, the few empirical essays he
wrote testify to his continuous interest in this science beyond his Psychology
Although interesting reading, these essays do not represent a

sufficient~

important contribution to warrant additional comments besides those offered
in the annotated bibliograpey.

By' contrast, Brentano' s overall conception of

his posthumous volume, Principles ot Aesthetics (19.59, P• 36). Kraus added
to it the adjective "causai,i obtai""'iiing iicausai-e.xplanatory" which brings out
its full meaning, as will be indicated below {1929 b, P• XIX).
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the nature and fields of application of genetic or explanatory psychology is
theoretical~

significant and as such deserves closer consideration.

Brentano 1s genetic or explanatory psychology corresponds to the traditional model of this science.

AB used by our author, the term •genetic"

indicates that this fundamental branch of psychological inquiry investigates
the "law8" governing the •genesis" of psychological processes or states and
their "externalization" in behavior) the term •explanatory" adda the important connotation that the discovery of these lava satisfies all the requirements of a true explanation, i.e., an explanation through understanding, of
man's experience and behavior.25

Such an understanding is not all-encompaa-

sing, but nevertheless authentic within its own boundaries, and

high~

dyna•

mia in terms of the light it sheds upon all areas of human living.
Some effort will be made in the next chapter to explore the theoretical
significance of this conception of scientific psychology in comparison not
on4r with Dilthey 1 a views, but also with pure4r classificatory or symbolic
theories of science.

At this point, it will be sufficient to call attention

to its modern spirit, in the best sense of this term.

Equa~

modern was

Brentano's standpoint concerning the fields of application of scientific psy•
chology.

None of his contemporaries identified with as much precision, sense

2STo be properly understood this statement must be viewed within the
1
context of Brentano•s doctrine of the rationality or intelligibility of all
inductive knowledge, as highlighted above in the present chapter.
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of balance, and foresight, as he did1 so ma.n;y future developments in this
science.
In ad.di tion to "general psychology 1 n Brentano recognized "a special psychology• and an "individual psychology" (pp. 101·102), corresponding respectively to the now thriving field of differential psychology, and to promising
developments in the direction of an •idiographic" or "morphogenio" psychology
of personality, as visualized by

a. w. Allport

(1961).

Moreover, he seemed

to have foreseen subsequent developments in constitutional psychology when he

stated that psychological laws established without taking into account "dif•
ferencee in physical conditions," and resulting "differences in the psychic
life of different persons," are "proportionateq lacking in precision" (p.
101).

The need for an "attentive study of morbid psychic states" (abnormal
psychology) was justified by Brentano on the basis of both theoretical and
practical considerations.

Theoretically, our author stressed the value ot

abnormal. psychology for general psychology.

At the same time, however, he

called attention to the primacy of the latter, stating that it "would be a
mistake ••• to pay equal or greater attention to ••• morbid states than to those
of normal psychic life" (p. 64).
Brentano adopted a similar attitude of critical discrimination toward
the broad field of social-cultural psychology. While recognizing the need
for, and value of, specific psychological investigations of primitive socie-
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ties, advanced societies, and "the outstanding phenomena of art, science and
religion" (p. 66) 1 he again concluded (p. 67):
The observation of psychic phenomena in human society undoubtedly
sheds light upon the psychic phenomena of the individual. The
opposite, however, is even more true. Indeed, in general it is
a more natural procedure to try to understand society and its
development on the basis of what has been found in the individual
than trying to throw light on the problems of indi vidu.al psychology by means of the observation of society.
The specific contribution to general psychology from animal psychology,

child psychology, and a psychology of the "exceptional" individual (the handicapped or the gifted) were also singled out by Brentano (pp. 62-64 1 65).
this context, for example, he suggested that the study of the

In

congenital~

blind could shed light on two important problems which have since generated
numerous researcheaa {l) do the congenitally blind have "the same knowledge
of spatial relations ae we do"?, and (2) what is "the nature of their .first
sensory impressions" following a successful operation? {p. 6)).

In addition,

he stressed the importance of gaining adequate 11 insight ••• into (the) motive•
and preparatory condi ti.on&" (p. 66) underlying the achievement& of the gifted,
in clear anticipation of what was to become dynamic paychology.26

4. Descriptive 2! phenomenological PsychologJ:•- According

to Brentano,

the relationship between descriptive or phenomenological psychology and

26Brentano discussed some of these motives and conditions in The Genius
(1892 a). For a brier summary of his views on this topic the read"E:i'r""is referred to the annotation to this essay in the bibliograph;y.
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genetic or explanatory psychology is analogous to the relationship.between
anatonzy' and plzy"siology {1959, p. 36). Although this comparison is inadequate
in several respects, it serves to illustrate the general goal of descriptive
psychology.

Like anat<>Jru, this branch of psychology aims at describing ita

object ot study--the psychic act, or, more correctly expressed, "the psychical~

active subject.•

As conceived by Brentano, descriptive psychology is
and

part~

an a•priori science.

part~

an empirical

In the ronner role, it ;rielde "truths ot

tact• based idealq upon both inner experience and experimentJ in the latter
role, like mathematics, it arrives at •truth& ot reason," general knowledges,
by means of conceptual analyses.

It ia unfortunate that our author made no

effort to distinguish these two aspects of his descriptive ps;rchological in·
quirie1.

Indeed, it is unfortunate that he did not restrict the eJq>ression

"descriptive psychology" or "descriptive phenomenology'"27 to the etrpirical
portion of it, labeling its &•priori half more

appropirate~

epistemology: or

27Brentano formal~ used this expresaion as a subtitle of his course on
"Descriptive Psychology" taught in 1888-1889. It was not until 1901 that
Husserl first made extended and specific use of the term phenomenology in the
second volume of his Lo!tcal Researches, and not until around 1910 that this
term became identified th his philOsophical approachJ in the meantime,
Stumpf had advanced his own formal conception of phenomenology in his treatis
On the Classification of Sciences (1905). Chronologically, therefore, Bren•
tin01ia8 prlority over'both of these authors not on~ on terminological
grounds, but also theoretical~, with respect to his use of the term phe ...
nomenology.
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theory or knowledge.28 If he had done so, his influence upon scientific
psychology would undoubtedly have been more extended

and

more specif'io.

The task or sifting critically the empirical from the a-priori in Brentano• a descriptive psychology would require a muoh more detailed and more
e.xtensi ve analysis than is possible in a short introductory stud;y such as
the present one.

For this reason, although challenging in itself, this task

is forsaken in favor of a more factual uposition of some of his leading
ideas, as expressed in his Ps;ychologz !!:2!! !!! Empirical Standpoint and other
pertinent subsequent works.
Ex1.stence ,!!l.2 nature

!!£.

"~

psychical.9: active" subject.-•

As

previousq

mentioned, in his Peyohologz, Brentano subscribed to tm .,modern" definition
of this science as the "science of psychic phenomena"' in preference to the
"old• definition of it as the •tscience 0£ the soul.• Hovever, he took pains
in pointing out that his preference in the matter was baaed upon the .fact

28

While epistemological questions constitute the very core of the apriori side of Brentan.0•111 descriptive psychology, metap}\ysical problems-also
find a prominent pl.ace in 1t. This is especial.ly true of his p,osthumous vol•
ume 1 Doctrine o£ Categories (193.3).-· Kastil's introduction to this volume
contains a un11i'ed expos! tlon of Brentano' s thought on this issue• Other
good presentations of this thought are found in L. Gilson (1955 b} and
Hernandez (1953). For some comments on Vanni-Rovighi's (1938) short, but
valuable cri tioal study, the reader is referred to the annotated bibliograpey-.

~that "the new definition (was not) connected with the new metaphysical doctrine" (phenomenalism), did not contain anything "which would not be acceptable to the .followers of the old school" (p. 32}.
Brentano•s life-long intellectual battle against phenomenalistic systems shows that he himself never intended to write a psychology "without a
soul," i.e. a psychology as the science of psychic phenomena, or psychic
acts, without a "psychicalq active" subject. According to him 1 "the problem of the soul bears properly only upon the question of what the subject of
consciousness is, not upon whether in general there must be such a subject"
(Kraus, 1919 1 P• XCII).
Brentano•a learned discussion of "the unity of consciousness" in his
Psycholosz (pp. 242·275) contains his

empirica~

derived evidence that a

subject, the self, underlies "the totality of our psychic life" at any given
moment.

It is the "common belongingness of our psychic acts to .2!:!. real

thing,• he asserts, "which constitutes the unity of which we are speaking"

(p. 251).

So conc,eived, he concludes, the unity of consciousness is "one of

the most important tenets of psycholoa" (p. 253}. The denial of this tenet,
according to him, would defeat all further efforts on behalf of this science,
indeed, of science as such, because it would plunge us into absolute skepticism, 29

29BrenU.no's line of reasoning on this issue is as follows: " ••• immediate
factual knowledge requires not onq that the object of the knower be identical
with the knower, but also that the identity of the knower and the known be
recognized ••• One sees, therefore, the implication of Lichtenberg's attempt to

While the reference of "our present psychic phenomena" to the subject or
self is "immediate]¥ evident" and as such beyond the reach o.f doubt, the
reference of "our past psychic activity" to the same reality is not.

In

other words, the problem of ''whether the persistence of the self is the con•
tinuance of one and the same unitary reality or simpJ.¥ a succession of different realities linked together in such a wiq that, so to speak, each subsequent reality takes the place of the reality which preceded 1 t" (pp. 261)
could be answered either way.

The problem o.f the nature of the subject mt

our psychic acts, present and past, is also a problem which has to be solved
in its own right.

In his Psycholof!l, Brentano admitted as plausible a biological conception of the self 1 w1 th the on]¥ provision that it be organiamic and not
"atomistic." Both the importance of this issue in psychology, and the clearness with which Brentano expressed himself on it, justify the .following
rather long quotation (p. 262):
••• the belief that the self is a corporeal organ which foms the
substrate of continuous substantial changes would not contradict
our previous statements, (on the unity of consciousness}, provided that whoever might hold such a belief admit that the impressions experienced by such an organ exert an influence upon

degrade Descartes• tenet• •cogito, ergo sum.• This author was of the opihion
that, instead of sa;ying 'I think,' we should limit ourselves to saying 'it
thinks.• This conception implies that, in the act of judgment, the relation
of identity between the knower and the known remains unlmown. If this were
the case, the possibility of an imediate evidence would vanish" (1928, P• 6),
and with it would vanish all hope to justify science.
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the way in which it renews itself. Thus, just as a wound leaves
a scar, the past psychic phenomenon would leave as an after-effect a trace of itself and with it the possibility of a remembrance. The unity of the self in its past and present existence,
therefore 1 would be the same as the unity of a river in which
one wave follows another and in1 tia tes its movement. The on~
eypothesis that would have to be excluded by those who might consider an organ as the substrate of consciousness would be the
atomistic hypothesis which considers each organ as an aggregate
of different realities. At best, as DuBois-Reymond did in his
communication to the convention of natural scientists in Leipzig,
the only value that they could ascribe to this }Vpothesis would
be to consider it as some kind of methodological principle in
the field of natural sciences.
While admitting the plausibility of a biological conception of the self,
Brentano in no way subscribed to it.

In terms of personal preference, his

criticism of purely physiological psychologies and his defense of the conscious nature of psychic acts clearly show that he not only favored, but considered as correct only a psychological conception of the self': "the psychic
subject is a spiritual, i.e. a non-dimensional substance."
Brentano did not explicitly state this position in his Psychology of

1874. According to the overall plan of this work, the mind-body problem was
to be discussed in a later section (Book VI).

Although this section was

never writ ten, some essays published posthumously in the volume 1 Religion _!!!2
Philosop}\y (1959, PP• 188-249), contain his essential views in the matter.
For the purpose of the present stuey it will be sufficient to add the fol•
lowing direct passage (pp. 2.31·2.32) in clarification of the short statement
quoted in the preceding paragraphs
Only the hypothesis of spirituality accords with the facta. These
allow us to consider the brain only as the organ of eonsciousness,

but not as its subject. The continuance of psychic life obviousl1'
requires that it be affected anew at every moment. If the brain
fails, the soul does not think and feelJ however, how could it
perform its complicated task except through its complicated structure? The brain, therefore, must interact in all its parts with
a unitary subject. On1;y in this way is its action understandable,
but not on the basis of the materialistic hypothesis, according
to which this complication should already' be present in each single
point of the brain.30
Translating the preceding views into as neutral a psychological frame ot
reference as possible, one could compare Brentano' s doctrine to Calkins conception of the "conscious self which has a body'" (19081 P• 16).

It nothing

else, this comparison brings out the important fact that, according to our
author, psychology is essential.11' the science or 11the psyohicall1' active"
subject, and not merel1' the science of "psychic phenanena" or "psychic acts."
As stated above, Brentano•s pairustaking defense or the unity of consciousness in his Paychologz shows that this was hie true position from the
very start. Subsequent developments in his thinld.ng merel1' confirmed it more
expllcitl1°•

In terms of these developments, in fact, Brentano came to con-

sider words such as •consciousness,• •to represent,"' •to judge," as mere
grmmn.atical abstractions, without independent meaning.

They

become meaning-

ful only when they are understood in the context of expressions such as:

JOarentano 1s critical reflections on several theories bearing upon the
relationship between body' and mind are at times quite original and still
worth reading todq.-Along with the spirituality of the soul, Brentano also
defended its immortality and creation by God. These aspects of his theory,
however, are not treated in detail in the above-mentioned essays.
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someone-who-is-conscious of something, represents something, makes a judgment
about something.

In other words, according to Brentano, it is impossible for

us to conceptualize psychic phenomena, acts or processes without a subject of
which they are accidents or "modes." It follows that what truly exists is
the "psychical]3' active" subject. •Psychic phenOJ11ena" or "acts" are real
"events" 01ll3 in the sense that they express "modalities" of functioning,
i.e. "attitudes," of the subject."
Thus Brentano•s doctrine of "psychic phenomena" or "psychic acta" is in
essence a doctrine of the "psychic subject" or "self.• It is oriJ3 because of
"linguistic convenience" that we prefer to speak of "psychic acts" rather
than "the psychical]3' active" subject.

The latter eJCpreeaion would compel

us to resort to such cumbersome statements ast ttthe psychic subject insofar
as it represents something," whenever we have to specify the particular eype
of activity

taking

place at a given time.

cation of, the activity itself in

every~

Direct reference to, and speci.f'i•
communication as in writing is

perfectl;r admissible, provided onl;r that we keep in mind that the activity
itself refers to the subject, is but an "attitude of the subject.•
General structure

2£. ~

psychic ,!:2! (consoiousness).-·According to

Brentano, the "common feature of everything psychical consists in what has
been called by a very unfortunate and ambiguous term, consciousness, i.e.
in a subject-attitude, in what has been termed intentional relation to some•
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thing.••" (1902 1 P• 12).

It follows that the various "modes of conscious-

ness" or 11 .fundmnental classes of psychic phenomena" are simpl.¥ particular
manifestations of such an "attitude."

The basic task of descriptive psycho-

logy, therefore, consists in ascertaining the various possible "attitudes ot

the subject to the object," or "modes of relation to the object," describing
them, and showing their ct.fnamic interrelationship&.
AB is well known, Brentano distinguished three fundamental classes of

psychic phenomena or psychic acts, i.e. three fundamental types of "subjectattitudes" or "modes of relations: imagination, judgment, and a.ffectivi ty"
(p. 418).

Under the concept of imagination, he included all psychic acts in

which we merel.¥ become aware of something, i.e. all aots of pure e.11periencing 1
whether it be sensing, or imagining (taken in the usual sense of the term),
or thinlc1ng: "We speak of imagination whenever something appears to us" (p.
310).

The term judgment was employed b,y him in the usual meaning of acts

bearing upon •the acceptance of something aa true or the rejection of something as .f'alse,• with the added important qualification that •such an acceptance or rejection occurs also in D18l\V' cases in which the ter.m judgment ia
not used, for eJC&mple 1 in the perception of psychic acts and
Jll).

ill

memory• (p.

Finall,y, he delimited the realm of affectivity by including in it "all

the psychic phenomena which are not contained in the first two cl.uses,• referring to them variously aa "phenomena of love and hate,• "emotions," "feel-

72.
ing

and will,. u and "interest. n31
The following passage (pp. 240-241) which Brentano himself' presented as

a "review" designed to summarize the investigations of two entire chapters
of his Pqcholoa, when properq clarified by a statement of subsequent "corrections" and "additions," expressed well his thought concerning the interrelationships of the various "psychic phenomena" described. in the preceding
paragraph I
Every psychic act is consciousJ it implies the consciousness of
itself'. Every psychic act, no matter how simple, has a double
object, a primary and a secondary object. The simplest act, for
e.xample, the act of hearing, haa for primary object sound, and
for secondary object itself' as a psychic phenomenon in which
sound is heard. Thia secondary object is present in consciousness in a threefold wqs it is represented, it is known, and
it is felt. Consequent]¥, every psychic act, even the simplest,
may be considered under four different aspects. It may be considered as an image of its primary object, such a.a the act in
which we perceive a sound is considered as an act of hearingJ
however, it ~ also be considered as an image of itself', as a
cognition of itself, and as a feeling of itself. In addition,
in the totality of these four relations, it 18 object not onq
of its selt-image, but also ot its self-cognition and, if one
DJa\Y' so speak, of its self-teeliDg. Thus, without any further
complication and multiplication, the selt•image is represented,
the selt-cognition represented as well a.a known, and the self•
feeling represented as well as known and felt.

31rhe dynamic sense in which Brentano used the tem "interest" is well

reflected in the following statements a "The. tem interest is used onq to
designate certain acts of our third class, i.e., acts which arouse our
desire of knowledge or curiosity. Yet it cannot be denied that every
pleasure or displeasure can be described not altogether inappropriateq
as interest, and that every desire, every hope, and every voluntary decision is an act of the interest which we take in something." (pp. 311-312).
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In his Psycholqgy:, having considered "the immanent in-existence of an

object in psychic phenomena" as their essential distinguishing characteristic,
Brentano made their principal class difterences dependent upon "the funda•
mental differences in the modes of immanent objectivity" (p. 309).

In the

same context, he also spoke of "fundamental differences in their mode of relation to the object.• These two expressions were then used as synonymous.
Therefore, when he discarded "immanent objectivity" from his system, in order
to be able to retain the principle that the "characteristic property of
every psychic activity consists ••• in its relation to an object" (p. 412}, he
had to re-define the concept of psychic relation.

The following passage ex•

presses well Brentano•a views on the difference between such a relation and
all other classee of relation• (pp. 412-413):32

While in the other relations both the f'undament and the term
is real, in the psychic relation only the former is real •••
If we think of something, the th1nk1ng subject must exist,
but not necessarily the object or our thoughtJ indeed, if we
deny something, the existence of this thing is neoes~
excluded in all cases in which our denial is correct. The
thinking subject is the only thing postulated by the psychic
relationJ tbe term of the so-called relation need not exist."'
In view of this diff'erence, psychic activity should be looked up as a

"quasi-relation," i.e. •something ... similar to a relation."

"The similarity

consists in the fact that whether we think of a relation properly called or
or a

p~chic

activity, in a certain manner we think of two objects at the

32unless otherwise indicated, Brentano•s "corrections" of, or "additioM"
to previously held views, are taken from the original Appendix to his volume,
On the Classification or Psychic Phenomena (1911 a). Page reference is to the
!ilgID"h translation. -
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same time" (p. 413) •

a

"primary"

and

a "secondary" object.

Correspondingly,

psychic activity involves a primary and a secondary relation, a primary and
a secondary consciousness.
The attentive reader will undoubtedly notice that the difference between

this conception and Brentano•s earlier conception in his P&cholog;y bears up•
on epistemological, rather than psychological issues.

In other words, it is

a different epistemology.3.3 that we find reflected in his new outlook, not a

basioalq different psychology.

In the matter of details, however, we also

find some changes in psychological views.
The most conepicuous change bears upon Brentano•s departure from his
previously held view that the relation of atfectivity accompanies all psychic
acts. For our purpose it will be sutficient to quote the following passage
(pp. 418-419) which brings out very clearly the nature and scope of this

change a
••• a very large number of psychologists believe that every psychic
activity implies a so-called •feeling tone,• which is the sane as
saying that every psychic activity 1 just as 1 t is the object of an
image and of an evident affirmative judgment, it is also the ob•
ject of an inner affective relation. I myself have concurred with

33Brentano•s new epistemological stand.point does not deny the primary
object of consciousnessJ on the contrary, it even emphasizes it, by insisting
that only "the real" can be object of such consciousness. What it denies is
that primary consciousness can raise and solve the problem of the existence
of this object. This problem• according to hi.Jlt. is first posited by secondary consciousness in judgment, and can onJ¥ be solved at this level.
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this opinion in my Pstchology ~ .!!'! .irical Standpoint.
Since then, however,
have changed rrry nd and believe now
that there are Jl18ey" sensations which lack this affective relation, and consequently are not in themselves either pleasant
or unpleasant. Indeed, I think that the whole broad class or
visual and auditory sensations does not possess any affective
characteristic, which does not exclude that they are usually
accompanied by varied and very vivid affective states of
pleasure and displeasure.
Another change in the same direction is reflected in Brentano 1 s subsequent critical reappraisal of the llmi ts within which intensity may be considered a characteristic of psychic phenomena, and as such be utilized to
distinguish one claas of phenomena from another.
him directly also on this issue (pp.

It seems pertinent to quote

431-43.3)•

When I set out to prove in Iff3' Psychol~ that imagination and.
judgment are two distinct fundamentalclasses of the psychic
relation to the object, I referred 11\Y&el.f to the incompar..
ability of the degrees of intensity of these two modes of re..
lation, following thereby the traditional opinion according to
which the degrees of conviction should be conceived as differences of intensity. Subsequently, I have recognized that this
opinion is .false. On this point I refer the reader to my Re'"!'
searches on Senso~ Psychology• In this work I have also shown
that the degrees o preference and the degrees of decision of
the will are not analogous with the degrees of intensity of a
sensation, and especially that it was necessary to discard the
opinion that every psychic relation implies intensity in the
proper sense of the term, since we have images (such as that
of the number "three" in general) which are without intensity~
In contradistinction to someone who asserts something with the
exclusion of a.n;y doubt, another person may believe that it is
o:nl1' probable. The latter does not make a judgment which ia
the same as the judgment of the former, differing from it only
in intensity) on the contrary, he makes a judgment, indeed
several judgments, contentually different from the judgment
of the former ••• It is entirely different for intensity as a
characteristic of sensation. A person who hears distinctly
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is superior, with regard to the reality of hearing, to the
person whose hearing is weak, just as he who not onl3 hears,
but also has touch, smell and taste sensations, all other
things being equal, is superior, with regard to the reality
or sensation, to the one who mere:cy- hears. For this same
reason, a loud sound which existed not onq in the phe•
nomenological order, but also in reality, would have a greater
degree _pf reality than a faint sound under the same condi•
tions."4
These and other "corrections" of past "errors• are actual.:cy- of secondary
importance with respect to Brentano•s overall original orientation.

They

neither weaken it, nor strengthen 1 t. More significant instead are some of
the "additions" to, or further refinementa of it subsequent to his Psychology.

Perhaps the two moat strilcing general feature• under:cy-ing the evolution
of Brentano•s thought, as pertaina to matters under consideration, are (1) hi•
increasing specific emphasis upon the psychic subject or self aa the true
referent point in all psychological inquiries, and (2) his keener -.wareneaa
of subtler nuances in psychic life.

The first trend, alreaey- detectable in

34Brentano had alread,- rejected his previous view that •the so-called
degree of conviction consists in a degree of intensity of the judgment" in
his work, The Origin of the Knowle9£1e of ~t and Wrong. 'Ihe argument he
advanced at'that t!iliecontaina a veii'i 01
r, directed not onl3 against
his opponent, but also against himself, which makes it worth reproducing a
"If the degrees of conviction of 11\r belie£ that 2 + 1 • .3 were one of in•
tensity, how powerful would thia be! And i f the said belief were to be
identified, as by Windelband (p. 186), with feeling, not mereq regarded
as analogous to feeling, how deatructive to our nervous system would the
violence of such a shock to the .feelings prove! Every physician would be
compelled to warn the public against the study of mathematics as calcu•
lated to destroy health• (1902, p. $3).
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.5?f Psychic Phenomena, standS
.Q!! Sensory !!!.2: Noetic Consciousness

the Appendix to the volume, On.!:!!!, Classification
out very sharp:cy- in his posthumous work,

(1928).JS

The second trend is reflected in the important distinction, within

the sphere of primary consciousness, between sensory and noetic objects, and
in the recognition, within the sphere of secondary consciousness of "modalities• ot imagination, "apperceptive• processes (observation, attention), and
abstraction processes (distinguishing and comparing).
Modalities

9.f.

imginationa consoiousness !!!_

!!!!!!•

••When he wrote his

Psychology, Brentano described at some length various modalities of experi•

encing present in the real.ms of judgment and affectivity.

Indeed, he utilized

the existence in judgment of the polarity at.tirmation•negation, in analogy
with the polaricy low•hate in attectivit,.. 1 as a proof' that judgment was
fund.amen~

different from imagination (pp.

343•.348).

By contrast, he then

stated categorical.11'• "Among images, we do not find aey contraries, emept
those of the objects which are enclosed in them••• There is

absolute~

no

other type of opposition in the entire domain of these psychic activities•
(P. 344) •

.3SThe following statement taken from the fomer work illustrates this
trends "the secondary object (of psychic activity) is the activity itself,
or, to be more exact, the psychic agent which encompasses simultaneous1y
both the primary and. the secondary relation" (p. 418). In the latter vol.wne,
there is hardly a page without a reference to the "psyohical:cy active" sub·
ject.
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Subsequent}¥, however, Brentano came to recognize that imagination can
also "be differentiated into special modes ••• in spite of the identity of the
object. 11

Imagination, for example,

~Y

take on a direct and an indirect form

(p. 425)1

The first is always present when we exercise our faculty of ims.ginationJ the second, however, is present along with it every time
that we think of a psychic relation, or even of a relation in the
proper sense of the term. Besides the psychic agent, which I
think in recto, I always think in obli~o his objects; likewise,
besidesthe fundament of the re!a:tlon, Which I think in recto,
I alwqs think in obliW 1 ts term. The modus obli~ i tseii,
moreover, is rei:'rq not simpleJ on the oontr8171 It
several
different forms. It is different depending on whether we are
dealing with a relation of size, or a relation of causality,
or a psychic relation with the objeotJ indeed, it is different
depending on whether this psychic relation is a simple image
or a judgment, and in the latter can, if it is an affirmative
or negative judgment, etc.
These modalities of imagination, according to Brentano, "are important
not on.1¥ in themselves, but also for judgments and emotiona" (p. 428)J and
not on}¥ because they- help clarity epistemological iBSUes, but also because
they represent a true c;\ynamic enrichment of our psychic life.

From the lat-

ter point of view, for example, they make it possible tor us to have a uni•
tied, y-et differentiated and highl3' dynamic, representation (percept, thought)
of a complex object (pp. 4254'26) I
Whenever we represent (complex objects) clear}¥ to some extent,
the relation which is involved in this image is multiple and,
in spite of this multiplicity-, clear in the cartesian sense o£
the term. Thia relation applies not or~ to the whole, but
also separateq to the parts which together appear to determine
this wholeJ this is so, for example, when I distinguish a red
spot as colored, red, extended, situated here, triangular,, etc.

and think o£ it as being characterized by all these properties.
Each of these properties appears then to be connected with the
others as a determining element. Ev-&ry relation of imagination
to one of these characteristics has a special object which, due
to the reciprocal determination of all the characteristics, ex•
plains together with other objects the clear image that we have
of the whole.
The particular example offered by Brentano in the above passage is an
illustration or •an objective whole which possesses ••• intuitive unity.•

The

same thing, however, is true in cases in which "the whole" possesses onl;r
"attributive uni ty•1 for example, when one thinks of "a round square"· (p.

426). In other words, according

to our author, a •complex image" involves

always a true "synthesis of imagesnJ it is never a mere sum of "parts."

The

"parts,• of course, are there, but not in the fashion in which the separate
pieces are found in a mosaic.

To use an expression cherished by many, and

well-known to all contemporary psychologists, we could say that these parts
exist, as i t in a •field."

Correspondingly, "the whole"· itself is not a

static entity, but essentially a relational, highl.1' dynamic reality.

It

seems pertinent to mention here that analogous considerations apply to Bren·
tano•s conception of complex judgments and complex affective-motivational•
voll tion&l states.
The unified and dynamic character of imagination, in its direct and in•
direct modalities, is further reflected in acts of judgments made possible by
it.

Thus, Brentano asserts, "a careful investigation would probably show that

in evecy distinct image we make in some wq a negative judgment, since we
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recognize that the psychic relation to one of the parts is different from
the psychic relation to the other part" (p. 424).

Another illustration of

the diversification of our "cognitive"' lire consequent upon the modalities
of imagination under consideration is brought out in the following passage

(p. 429)1
If I represent or assert the e:x:l.stence of someone who denies
something, I nvself do not de~ this thing in oblin' 8I17 more
than, If I think that a cause produces an e?l"ect,dO not produce this effect m;yselt, even though the indirect object and
the particular modus ob~ by means of which my thinking is
related to it are not in~rent with regard to the content

of 11\Y judgmentJ in fact, it ia on account of this consider•
ation that D\Y judgment is directed toward another object.
With proper changes in wording and frame of reference, the preceding
passage could be used also as an illustration of the influence of the same

modalities of imagination upon emotions.

To this end, it would be sufficient

to sqa "If I represent or aaaert the existence ot someone who loves something, I myself do not love this thing !!!_ obliquo ... • etc.

Brentano did not investigate in detail the full range of modifioatiorus
of judgments and emotions by means of the direct and indirect modall ties of
imagination.36 A phenomenological anal\rsis would undoubted.q reveal other
instances of such modifications, perhaps even more pertinent than the ex•

amples he gave us.

J6

The latter, however, were found valuable because they

His posthumous volume, The Doctrine ot Right Ju9nt (1956), contains
a brief anal;ysis of the classification of concepts aoc~ng to differences
in the modes of imagination (pp. 62-6$).
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illustrate the holistic and field direction of his orientation, just as hi•
stand concerning the psychic subject or self, as previous]¥ described, illustrates its existentialistic vein.
Besides the two modalitie.a just described, Brentano asserted the exis•
tence in imagination of •temporal modes.•

Like the former, these modes also

produce modifications in judgments and emotiona.

At the risk of some repe-

tition, it seems wortl\v to quote in sequence two passages showing Brentano•s
thinking on this issue (p. 428)1

The differences of the modes of inages, just as the differences
of their objects, are important not onl¥ in themselves, but also
for judgments and emotiona which are based upon these images.
This is obvious]¥ true of the temporal mod.es. When I judge
that there is or there bas been a tree, in both cues I assert
this tree, but with a different mode of judgment. The temporal
mode of the image, just like the object of the image "tree,•
modifies not o~ the image, but also the judgment, by introducing into it a temporal differentiation. The same thing
applies when I desire something in the present or in the future.
Both acts are acts ot love, but differ as to time, just as the
images upon which they are based.
In addition to their role in "cognitive• and affective lite, the temporal
modes of imagination play a very important independent role in our consciousnesa or awareness of time.

Brentano could not have e:xpressed himself more

clear]¥ and with greater conviction on this issue than he did when he
asserteda "-7ust as a qualitative mode must be present in every judgment ••• a
temporal mode is also absolutely required for every image ••• This principle
possesses the same degree of certainty as the principle that there is no
image without an object" (pp.

423-424).
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In view of this, one is not surprised to find that, with the exception of
the problem of God, no other single problem took so mu.ch of Brentano' s time
as the problem of times how time is given in experience) in what way or wqa

our eJq>erience of present time differs from the eJCP8rience of past and future
time phenomenaJ what is the ultimate nature of temporal differences.

The

essentials or his final answer to these questions are contained in the following passage (pp. 422-42.3)1
••• temporal differences must be considered as difterent mode a ot
imagination. To consider the present, past and future as objec•
tive dif.t'erences would imp'.q the same error as regarding exis•
tence and non-existence aa real attributes. When, in a speech
or melody1 we hear a sequence of sounds, or when we see a body'
in movement or in the process of changing color, the same indi•
vidual sound, the same colored body, individual4" determined aa
to place and quality, appears to us first aa present, then more
and more aa paatJ at the same time, other things which subsequentq will undergo the same modal change of imagination be•
come present. If we considered these differences as objective
differences, as undoubted:q spatial differences or when we represent something more to the right or more to the left in the
visual field, we could not justii)' the essential differences existing between space and time.
This passage shows that, according to Brentano, we experience time in
imagination, rather than in judgmentJ that temporal diff'erenoea lie in the
way in which events are represented, and not in the wq in which they are
judgedJ and that these differences are not to be construed as objective dif•
ferences.

Also implied in it is Brentano•s conception that, while present

time is experienced directq, the past and the future are given to us onq
indirect:cy-.

To be proper'.q understood, the latter claim must be viewed with•

in the context of the following tenets in his subsequent doctrine: (1) we per-
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cei ve the past and the future in the representations that we have of ourselves as experiencing a given past or future event, and (2) non-present
events are nothing real by themselves and are always dependent upon present
events.37

It will be sufficient to add here that the latter tenet is but an

application of his final epistemological standpoint according to which only
"the real,• in the sense ot a concrete existing being ( 11 thing 8 ) 1 can be the
object of thought.

It should be obvious from the preceding analysis that Brentano' s interest in the problem of time centered around the nature of time and the

31Along

with a more detailed discussion of other aspects of the doctrine
under consideration, these tenets are discussed in an essay entitled "On Time"
which Kraus dated around 1914, as he edited it in the volume, On Sensory and
Noetic Consciowmeaa (1928, PP• 45-52). In this esaq, Brentaii'O prOtessed

his deepest oonVIction concerning his view that temporal differences are "dif'•
ferencea of 1magination111 1 "The more one probes into this question, the more
convinced he becomes of this truth" (p. 49). Psychological:cy-, this realization must have been all the m.ore satisfying to him, coming, as it did, at
the end of a long intellectual searching which had led him in succession to
consider' time differences as oharacteristica of the p}\ysical phenomena themselves, and as modal differences of the act of judgment. The first of these
tMo views wa.• expressed by Brentano both in his study,~ Comte and Positive Philoao. (1926 1 P• ll.4) 1 and in his P~chol?!• (Cf., for examp~
~091 •...
sounda ... appear to us in the
dll'erent temporal characteristics")J the second view was made known by Kraus (1930 b).-- In spite of his
professed self-assurance, however, doubta concerning the problem or time and
the related problem of space seem to have lingered on in Brentano•s mind past
1914. His vecy involvement with these problems just sllghtl3' over two weeks
before his death, and especialq the lack of closure in his views at this
time, lend support to this impression. (On this issue, see his posthumOlls
stu~, Zur Lehre von Raum und Zeit, 1920).

e
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characteristic modality of our consciousness of it.

As shown by the follow-

ing passage, however, he tul:cy" recognized the value and timeliness ot psychological researches bearing upon the measurement of time (pp. 424-425 )t

There is no need to point out e.xpllcitq that the problem ot
the nature of time in no wq coincides with the problem of
the process whereby we measure temporal dimensions and intervals, be it by means of intellectual judgment, or by means
ot habit or by means of an originalq instinctive evaluation.
Although this last problem is of considerable psychological
interest and leads the investigator to teleological consider•
ations concerning, for example, our blind faith in memory,
our habitual expectations and maI\V' natural inclinations and
aversions, we do not have to deal w1 th it here.

In addition to underlining Brentano•s overall openesa and senaitivity to
strict:q psychological problems, this passage also shows which characteristic
approach he would have followed, bad he been able to undertake specific ex-

perimental researches.

In this passage, in fact, Brentano identities the

problem of time measurement as •the problem of the process whereby we measure

temporal. dimensions,• and finds it of •considerable, psychological interest •••
(because it) leads the investigator to teleological,• or, as many psycholo-

gists prefer saying, purposive and d;ynamio, •considerations.•

There seems to

be little doubt concerning the general.ization to be derived from his stand on
this particular problems be it empirical or experimental, according to Brentano, psychology is to be conceived as the science of psychic processes or
acts themselves, in both their static and dynamic aspects, rather than as the

science of their content or •objects.•

Indeed, since the former never exist

apart from the subject or self, psychology, is ultimateq the science of the
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person himself, and in this sense the science of tru]J' human problems, as
they are given in man's concrete existence.

It does not follow from the above that, according to Brentano•s orientation, the psychologist cannot and should not investigate the content or •objects• of psychic processes or acts.

On the contrary, it is easy to see that

he must per1'orce do so, since •the relation to something as object" is one of
their essential characteristics. Indeed, in !ll8n1' instances, "the study of the

psychic act in respect to the primary object (enjoys) a very privileged status,• as compared to the study of it insofar u it is related to itself as
secondary object {Kraus, 1924, P• LIXUX).

The only thing that Brentano'•

orientation denies is the possibility of a psychological investigation of
contents or •objects" without reference to processes or acts, or, more correct]J' expressed, without reference to the subject himseltJ for example, that
it is possible to investigate a thought, a sensory quality, that-which-isloved, apart from the subject who thinks, sees, and loves. One could even
venture to

~

that, had Brentano granted this possibility to his opponent

for the sake of argument, he would have subsequentq brought forward elaborate and convincing arguments to show the lack of value of such a type ot psychologioal investigation.

---------

Doctrine of sensation. -

The preceding statements concerning the limits

within which the "primary objects" of psychic experience can and must be in•

vestigated, according to Brentano's orientation, should not be understood to
mean that the ever-present reference ot these objects to the psychic act, and
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ultimately to the psychic subject, must correspondingly be kept alway• in the
foreground of the discussion, in terms ot linguistic expressions.

Brentano

was well aware that the "econom;y of language" speaks against such an attitude.
What is actual.q required is the simple, yet basic, realization by the peychologist that it is quite impossible to stud1' the objects ot inner eJCPeri•
ence in their supposedly pure "existential• condition, apart from their im•
beddedness in the tunctioning subject. From this point ot view, Titchner•s
effort to give status to "content• psychology by labeling it "existential
psychology" or "existentialimn" wu obv1ousq doomed to .failure from the

outset. Gestalt psychology had little dif:ficulty in showing that far from
being pure existential givens, the •elementary processes" (contents, objects)
recognized by him were in reality the di.Stilled products of elaborate abstractions.

In e!f'ect, Brentano had empnasized this very same point several deo•

ades before the term •gestalt" was .formall\Y' "adopted• by psychology.
Guided by the above-mentioned realization or .frame of reference, the
"act" psychologist or "existentialist,•

jn

the spirit of Brentano's orienta-

tion, can proceed to investigate the object.a or contents o.f experience using

readiq available and pragmatic linguistic short circuits, much in the same
way as a •content" psychologist might do.

Again, Brentano himself had done

so long before Gestalt psychology projected itselt on the hori&on or psychology with all the semblance of an entireq novel phenomenon, as will be
apparent from the following synopsis of his views on "sensory psychology" or
•sensory consciousness.•

The very basic question of sensor;y psychology 1 What is the nature ot sensation? sets Brentano•s orientation apart trom the orientation of practicalq
all of his contemporaries, and a large ma.jorit"T of psychologists during the
next several decades. MIUJ1' psychologists, 1n fact, hold that sensations are
the last elements of psychic life which are not capable of further di vision
and anal.1's1s.

Brentano agrees that sensations are our first and original ex-

perience, and that the richness and diversification of •imagination" stems
from the fullness ot sensory impreaaionsJ according to h1m1 however, this
does not mean that they are the •simplest psychic processes.• On the contrary,·he claimB, they are str11dngq complex e:xperiences, encompassing al-

•BiY• manifold relations or acts of •imagination" and "judgment,• and often
also acts ot •interest.•
Sensations are •images,• i.e. involve •acts ot imagination,• insofar as
something is represented 1n themJ they are at the same time "judgments,• insofar as we naturall\v and irreaiatibq believe in the existence of the sensed
objectJ and otten they are accompanied by an instinctive pleasure or displ.ea-

sure•

All these -various •relationa of consciousmuss• 1n sensation, however,

are indisaolubq linked together, in euch a way thi.t sensation is and alwqe
remains a unified process.

It is on'l1' through careful analysis that the
several •part-relationa• involved in it are first laid bare •.38

38•I have often said that children instincti wq and accord:lng to an in-

born impulse hold as true (believe) what appears to them. Upon closer ecru.tiny, it becomes evident that thie instinctive belief 1• clearq inaeparable
:f'ran sensation. This sensory belief, if I may so express myself, which is
also at the basis of our immediate belief in the external world, can be sus-

..
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As revealed by ana]¥sis, the two basic •moments" or dimensions of a:rf1"
sensation are its quality its spatial determination.

In respect to the

latter characteristic Brentano is decidedly a nativist, in th.at he defend.a
the view that all our sensations, without exception, are

origina~ spatia~

determined..39 Furthermore, sensory (perceived) space is conceived by him as
a •continuum" which may be either uninterrupted or show more or less empty
spaces.

Indeed, since it determines its own characteristics, and since sen-

sory quality derives 1 ts characteristics of extension, density and continuity
from it, sensory space is a 11prima.r,y continuum."
It goes without sqing that, according to Brentano, perceived quality
and perceived space are completel;r inseparable parts in every sensation&
where no space is sensed, there is al.Bo no quality, and vice versa.

It fol•

lows that every sensation, indeed, every sensory element, ia indi vidua.ted
through the simultaneous presence of space and quality.

This universal prin-

ciple of individuation of sensory experience is the consequence of a "law ot

pended, so to speak, through higher knowing (judgment), but it can never be
eradicated. It is not a superimposed act ••• On the contrary, sensation is a
unif'ieduiJ' which encompasees two simultaneoua inseparable parts 1 naznel;r1
the Int
on of p!J;tsical henomena and the asaertorical af.f'irmation (judg•
ment) ot thesephenomena• in tr&Us, 19.30,p. 16) •

f

.39

Brentano•s thought on this point evolved from an initial neutral
position in the battle between empiricism and nativiam (1907 1 PP• 54-57)
to a final position in his posthumous works, as described here.

sensation" which our author called the "law of impenetrability"s •Just as in
the spatial world a substance is impenetrable to another substance, so in the
sensory (perceived) space a quality is impenetrable to another quality"

(1907 1

P• 57).
According to Brentano, the "law or impenetrability" accounts not onzy for
the individuation of sensory eJCPeriences, but also for their intensity.

He

arrived at this conclusion through a comparative analy'sis of several possible

ways in which the sensory field may present itself in experience and the corresponding laws governing our observation of it.
field several alternatives are possible.

With regard to the sensory

A given sensory field may be (1)

completely' devoid of sensation (such as in the case of absolute stillness),

(2) filled uninterrupte~ with a quality (such as a homogeneous red surface),
(3) partly tilled with a fuality and partly empty (such as a sequence ot
sounds and pauses), and (4) filled with mixed qualities.

In terms of laws of

observation, these several alternatives in the sensory field suggest that (l)
in same instances we somehow sense weak impressions, but do not observe them,
(2) in other instances we cannot sense separately the smallest parts of our
sensory field, even though each makes an impression upon us, and (3) in still
other instances we can observe the total sensory field only in a confused, unclear fashion.

The latter oase, for example, is given in our observation ot

a violet sur.facet here, the red and the blue are given in the global impression that we have or the sensory field, but only' in a contused, unclear manner.

When considered in relation to differences in degrees of qualitative
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"fullness" or "emptiness• of the sensory field, these laws of observation
aocowit for the changing intensity of our sensations, as suggested by the
following generalisation: the intensity of a sensation is simply the waxing
and waning of the "densi ty 0 or the •qualitative fullness" of the sensory fiel
which we observe in our sensory experiences.

This generalization applies to

all sensory fielda.

It follows, according to Brentano, that the sensory acts themselves must
partake ot the intensity of the sense objects, in such a way that the richness of all the "relations o.f consciousness" involved in them is entirely de•
pendent upon the "quantum of sensation," 1.e. the "density" of sensory objects• the greater this quantum or density is, the more "bul.lcy• and 11 inten-

sive" they themselves ere. In comparison with these acts, Brentano addll 1
conceptual acts appear weak and ezr.pty1 since they lack intensity and complexity.

40 It

i• easy to see how wide the cleavage is between our author and

those sensory psychologists who consider sensation as the moat simple and most
empty psychic process.
For the purpose of the present synopsis, it will be sufficient to add
that Brentano also devoted close attention to two other "moments" or di.mensions of sensory eJCperiences

40

satura~ion

and brightness, in an eftort not

onq

According to Brentano final orientation, it is only in •noetic consciousness" that we can attain •pure" images, judgments, and Ainterests.• It
is only on this level, for example, that we attain "images• which are not
enmeshed with judgments and affective processes.
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to define their nature, but also to show that they were general properties of
the whole sensory field, i.e. corrmon characteristics of all sensations.

In

the historical context in which he was writing, this position was, i f not
novel, certainly progressive.

Perhaps even more so, was his use of the term

"field" in reference to other sensory domains besides vision.
Brentano•s stand oh the problem of the .fundamental classes of sensory
qualities and the senses is worth mentioning at least in passing, because of
common~

its striking departure from the

accepted view.

only three such classes& sight, hearing, and

Our author recognized

a third class encompassing all

other sensations and sensory qual1 ties. While recognizing that many quali tie•
of this third class coalesce together to form a variety of subclasses or subgroups {taste qualities, olfactory qualities, etc.), he claimed that the dit•

f'erenoe between them is not
new •species or quality.•

sufficient~

great to place each or them into a

He was led to these views by his assumptions that

the basis f'or the classification of sensory qualities and senses into funda-

mentaJ.l¥ different species ought to be sought not in anatomical considerations, but in a psychological
brightness.

ana~is

of their intensity, saturation, and

It is because the intensity, aaturation, and brightness of sound.a

and hearing bear

o~

an analogy

to the corresponding dimensions of colors

and sight that we are entitled to consider them as fundamentalq different
from one anotherJ by contrast, all other sensory qualities and correlative

senses must be classified together into a single fundamental class because,
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supposedly, the above mentioned dimensions have a univocal meaning for all
of them.41
Human "interests." -- Eisenmeier (1918) himself recognized the weakness
of several aspects of Brentano's doctrine of sensation.

In spite of this, he

concluded: "in his doctrine of sensation Brentano has dug more deeply than
most of his contemporaries" (p. 493).

This conclusion would seem to be more

justified in respect to his views concerning the nature of affective-motivational-volitional states and their role in the economy of human existence.
Of course, even in this area such a conclusion would

o~

bear upon the

quality of his doctrinal tenets, rather than upon the quantity of the evidence
which he brought to bear upon them.4 2 Writing in an era in which on the one
hand scant attention was paid in official psychological circles to affective
and conative processes, and on the other hand several concerted efforts were
made in philosophy to divorce these aspects of human experience from cogni-

tion and correspondingly to build a complete Weltanschauung upon them, he
came forward with a point of view which simultaneously safeguarded their
importance, complexity, intra-relationships and intelligibility.

41.Jror a slightly different view, see his posthumous volume Principles of
Aesthetics (1959, PP• 199-206).
42

The essentials of Brentano's views on the topic under consideration
are found in his Psychology (1874). Some important new developments and
some minor corrections of these views are found in his study, ~ Origin of
the Knowledge of Right~ Wrong (1889), and in the Appendix of his volume,
Classification £! Psychic Phenomena (1911). By contrast, his posthumous
work, Foundation~ Development .2f Ethics (1952) contains basically o~ a
restatement of his position, as expressed in the other works mentioned here.
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In general, the importance attributed by Brentano to affective and

conative eJq>erienoes in human life is well reflected in his common reference
to them as "interests.• No matter how primitive and undifferentiated a
pleasure is, and no matter how lofty and complex a desire is, they are both
an expression, and in this sense an •externalization,• ot "the interest which
we take in something.• In line with a modern eJq>ression, one could say that
they are manifestations ot •ego-involvement.• The onl¥ danger in using the
latter term is that, in its commonl¥ accepted meaning, it is too narrow to
describe the full scope of e.xperiencing which Brentano had in mind. For,
according to our author, the generalized state of excitement or contentment
of'

the new-born, no less than the achievements of the genius, implies ego-

involvament.
This facet or Brentano's doctrine is likely to be overlooked because of
his conception in descriptive psychology that "imagination" is the simplest
•relation of consciousness" lying at the basis of all other •psychic phenomena.• A superficial interpretation of this conception might lead one to
conclude that, According to him, pu:i'.'Et cngnitive experiencing (awareness) ia
also time-vise, developmentally, the first and most fundamental type of

psych!~

functioning. What was said above concerning his doctrine of the nature ot
sensation clear]¥ shows that he was convinced of the oppositea "genetical1'Y1 "
i.e. development.all¥. psychic life begins with the most complex acts.
will be sufficient to add here that "emotions

or

It

pleasure and displeasure,"

even more than the instinct! ve or "inborn impulse to hold as true what ap...
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pears to them,• play a dominant motivating role in the life of infants and
children.

It is only with progressive growth and maturation that cognitive

e.xparienoes (imagination, judgment) come to assert themselves1 and, as
mentioned previously, it is onq in the higher conceptual life ofthe mature
individual, i.e. in •noet1c consciousness," that they first appear in their

purest forms.43
The upward development of cognitive lite, in turn, is accompanied by a

parallel development within the realm of atfective-conative experiences, cu1minating in acts of "right love" and free acts of will.

This general upect

ot Brentano•s thought contains several leading ideas which deserve closer
~sis.

In asserting the "unity of the .f'undasnental ol.&5s of feeling and will,•

Brentano did not imply that feeling and will, and the countle•• pheno.r:iena

43The

character of •ego involvement• of all a.ffective-conative experi•
ences is well reflected in the following passages (pp. 385-366) a "without a
specitio experience of volition, we could not represent adequately to our•
selves this phenomenon in its proper nature by the simple statement o£ the
characteriatica attributed to it •• .,.No definition of hope or fear could give
a f'ull understanding ot their intrinsic distinctive characteristics to an
lndi vidual who would only haw e:xperienced .feelings of joy or sadness. This
observation applies as well to the case ot different kinds of jo.va the joy o.f
a good conscience and the pleasure of agreeable warmth, the joy- pro<hl.ced by
the sight of a beautiful painting and the pleasure of eating a palatable
food differ in quality as well as in quantity, so that without a specific experience the simple definition ot the special object could not give us a
perfectq adequate knowledge or it.•

which cover the distance between them, were alike in all respects, but mere:cy
that their fundamental "mode of relation of consciousness to the object (was)
essentially kindred" (p. 367).

He expressed himself very clear:cy concerning

the nature of this kinship {p. 370).
• ••• just as in judgments we deal with the truth or falsity of
objects, in an analogous manner in the phenomena of this
class we deal with their goodness or badness, their positive
or negative value. It is this characteristic relation to
the object which, in "It1:f opinion, is revealed by inner percep•
tion in desire and will, as well as in all that we call feel•
ing or emotion, in a manner that is both immediate and evident.•
At the aam.e time, however, he singled out equally clearq the undeniable
"qualitative differences between the special modes of (the phenomena of)

love.•

While not "fundamental,• these differences must be taken into account

in a more refined classification of these phenomena into special classes.

Within this context, far from being opposed to a distinction between emotion
and motivation, Brentano readiq recognized 1t.

According to him, in this

domain of consciousness, just like in the domain ot "consciousness in generalJ

unity does not 1mp:cy elementistio simpllci ty 1 but holistic complexity and
dynamic interaction.

Such a stand is altogether consistent with recent de-

velop1'1ents in psychology which recognize simultaneous]\r the distinction and
close interrelationship between motives and emotions.44

44 '1'h1s general historical perspectivet along with further specifications
of it, in the next fw paragraphs, is offered at this point rather than in
the following chapter because it enhances the meaning ofBrentano•s viws.

Particularq significant in this respect is the increasing in.terest

shown by many contemporary psychologists concerning the role of emotions as
motivational factors, and a growing trend toward a pluralistic conception of

motives.

The leitmotiv underqing both of these developments can easiq be

found in Brentano's orientation.

Indeed, in respect to the latter, one could

say that our author's conception of motives is ae extremeq pluralistic aa
Lewi.n's•

His very broad conception of aftective-conative processes as hwnan

"interests• certai.nl\v matches this author's all-encompassing use ot the term

"need.•
Carrying one step .further this comparison, it would seem that Brentano'•

concept of "interest• is even better suited to a genuine •field" orientation
than Levin's concept of "need," because it bring• out more clear]3 both the
character of active participation on the part of the subject and the character

of value of the field objects, consequent upon such a participation. In this
respect, ltlrrq•s vector-value scheme of motivation (1951) and Iotfka's conception (1935) of the •ego• as an integral part of a person's "behavioral
environment"

~

be said to come closer to Brentano•s standpoint.

The nature of the subject's participation in "phenomena of love" or

"in-

terest,• as conceived by Brentano, is of interest in its own right. In essence, such a participation involves an act ot "valuation.• Consequent upon,
and

in line with underlying cognitive processes, this act of "valuation• is

either "blind• or •insightful.• In analogy with evident judgments, the latter yields a knowledge that something is truq and realq good, and, as such
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constitutes the foundation for true

human

behavior--ethical behavior, on

both the individual and social leve1.4S
Implied in the preceding doctrine: is Brentano•s recognition of two
broad levels ot afteotive-cona.tive processes: "lower" or "sensory" and

"higher• or "rational" feeling, emotiorwi desires, and motives. As alreaczyr.-.entioned, according to him, free volition reprsss11ts the highest and most
complete form of psychological tunctioning in this realm of experience.

In

terms of historical comparison, free volition 1n his system corresponds
close'.q to the concept ot ego autonoD\Y which has found its way into contemporary psychology in a varietq- of wqs1 the creative self' (Adler), functional

autonom;y (All.port), primary ego autonaq (Hartmann), responsibility (existential psychology). Al.though advanced by outstanding authors of divergent
orientations and from the vantage point of varied theoretical as well aa
practical interests, this concept's right to existence in psychology have
been, and still are, challenged.

In addition to system•iJlspired arguments

brought to bear against it, a common source ot misapprehension in this matter
seems to lie in the mistaken notion that tree volition or ego autonom;y is a
monolithic and hence unanalyzable quantum in human behavior which, if accepted
would forever torecloae the road to two ot psychology's main goals as a
science--prediction and control.

The attentive stut\Y ot Brentano•• thought

4SBoth Sana (1948) and Most (19.31) give a good e:xposition and critical
appraisal ot the epistemological basis and metap}\ysical implications of Bren·
tano•a theory of •right love.•
·
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could be ot value in clarifying these uncertainties.

In fact, our author

haS emphasized both the rich •nuances" and imperceptible merging of the

realm of volition with all the other facets ot psychological functioning,

and its inherent "lawtu.lnesa.•
According to Brentano, •volition consists in a particular relation of
the psychic activity to

an object insotar u it ia good or bad" (p • .371)1 "It

is not simply a ct.sire for something to happen, it is a desire for something

to be produced u a consequence of the desire itselt" (p. 396). This is not
equivalent to SB\Ying that all volitions enjoy "tull treed.om,• undisputed

autonoJl\Y, and that this freedom or autonomy is not found 8.DfWhere else in
the domain of

11 aftectivity11

or "interests.• On the contrary, as shown by the

following passage (pp. 391-392), volitions come in different "nuances" and

are continuous with other "af.tecti ve" phenomena•

• ••• Let us admit the actual existence in the domain of the will of
this tull freedom which, in each cue, makes it appear possible
tor WI to have an act of willing, non-rilling, and willing the
contrary. It is certain that this full .freedom does not extend
to the whole area or volition, but perhaps only to those instances in which either ditterent kinds of action or at least
acting or non-acting, each in its own way, are considered good.
The moat eminent defenders ot the freedom of the will have al·
waya expressq recognized this. There is another point, however, on which they have perhaps been less categorical, but
which nevertheless unmistakab~ reflects their convictiona 1
I am reterring to the .fact that there a.re also tree acts among
psychic activities which cannot be characterized as volitional,
and which are included among feelings. Th.us the grief engendered by remorse for a past act, malicious delight, and many
other phenomena of joy or sadness are considered acts which
are as tree as the resolution to change one's life and the intention to do harm to someone. MalJ1" thinkers, while reserving
the terms of merit and demerit to free activity, go so far as
to put the contemplative love ot God above services volun-
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tari]\y given to the neighbor. It, in spite of this, they speak
only in general ot the freedom ot the 1ll, it is because of
the following reasons: ancient philosop ers, as we have seen,
have broadened the meaning of the term will and applied it
identical]\y to feeling and volition in the strict sense of the
termJ modern philosophers, instead, have often added other
equivocal te:nu which have interfered with their investigations.
Locke, for example, has never clear]\y distinguished between the
faculty ot executing or refusing an action according to whether
we want or do not want it, and the possibility ot wanting or
not wanting it under the Bame circumstances. It is consequently
certain on the one hand that, it freedom exists in the domain
of love and hate, it does not extend only to voluntary acts,
but also to certain affective manifestations, and on the other
hand that not every voluntary act, 8J:I¥ more than every afteo•
tive act, can be called free. This is enough to show us that
the affi:rruation of .freedom does not widen the gap between feel•
ing and will, ••• •
In terms

ot its broadest implication for the purpose of the present

stud;y, the preceding passage indicates that •volitionB" or other •interests•

a.re tree or autonomous to the extent that they stem directly from the

sub•

ject•s own •attitudes" (or •relations to the object"} rather than from the

numberless and1 trequent]\y1 nameless factors which
basis of these attitudes.

"genetic~"

lie at the

Therefore, tar trom being uncaused and unmotivated,

they bear the imprint of what could be called par excellence cause and motive a
the subject himself (efficient cause} acting on the basis ot his "attitudes"
(final C&UBe} •

It follows that an adequate knowledge ot the subject and his "attitudes•
would enable one to ltpredict• his choices and the behavior consequent upon
them; within the limits of this prediction, "control• would alao be possible."

Ot Course, this presupposes that the •genesis• itself of these attitudes is
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"lawful" in its own right.

Brentano has not failed to bring this out, as

-

reflected in the following passage (pp. 390) bearing upon "the laws which
govern the succession of' (the) pheJIOllena" under consideration•

These phenomena are not independent either from the laws of
imagination or f'roDl those relative to the origin and BUccession ot judgrnentaJ but, with regard to their succession and
evolution, they also present special underivable laws which
torm the psychological basis of' ethics.
Brentano ha.a not investigat&d

~xhaust1ve11'

and in det.ail the spacial

laws governing our "interests" J and one m;q- ·U"ery well questiori some of the
laws which he did establish and/or the theoretical considerations leading
him to establish them.

not

o~

Theq tacts do not lessen his great mer1. t of ba:ving

de.fined an essential area ot pSychological research, but also pro-

vided psychology with a valuable frame o£ reference within which to pursue

'lb.e passage just quoted above called attention once more to an important

- The

positive aspect of Brentano•s orientation• the dependence of all human "interesta" (&ffective-conative phenomena) upon cognitive processes.

contrast

between this conception and McDougall'• and Freud.'• parallel conceptions is
obvi.011S.

It will be su.fficient to add that, however, our author was not un-

aware ot tacts in human experience and behavior which led these two thinkers

to their respective viewpoints.

'l'hia is

partia~

reflected in the following

passage (pp. 438-439)•
•·•• •there are cases in which we prefer a certain action, which is
judged beautiful, above all others and nevertheless, under the
8WfJ'3 ot passion, we want and do the opposite. Perhaps these oases
can best be interpreted according to Aristotle's conception that

101.
passion does not allow the higher love and higher judgment to
elEpre&s themselves properly, that it prevents them from developing to their full extent, since it completely dominates them •
. Although the quest for sensuous pleasure is not consonant with
the dictates of reuon, nevertheless rational deliberations come
to the assistance of passion and suggest the means that will
help us to secure pleasu..'l"'ft J thus the love and pleasure which
are connected with preference becaae mere means and lead to
action, while the opposite noble preference remains without
influence. I.t we consider this situation from this point ot
view, we find ourselves in the presence of a oonplex set ot
relations. The aftecti ve phenomenon is connected w1 th images
and judgments, as well as with other acte of lnve in w!tl.~h we
desire something as a means, and finally with the external
act ••• •

In general, aa suggested

by this passage, Brentano fulq recognized (1)

the independent role ot impulsive ("instinctual," "hormic•) a.ff'ecti ve-cona•
tive processes in human life, at timea directly, a."l.d at other times indir-

ectly, insofar as they do not allow the "higher• processes "to express them•
selves properq" or prevent them •from developing to their full extent,• and,

(2) their added power

or

action on account ot the "assistance" given to tbm

by •rational deliberations."

While on the one hand we are in no way justified.

to concll;ide trom these statements that he wu referring to such specific

CV'•

namic processes as repression, regression or primitivization, rationalization,
etc., on the other we cannot fail to see that there is adequate room in b18
system

for them.

'l'he preceding paragraph also calls attention to the fact that, according

to Brentano, the impulsive and the rational, the cognitive and the oonative,
may unite together in such an intimate

fashion as to form •a complex set ot

relations• (or "subject's attitude"} ultimately leading to the "externe.l act"-·
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behavior.

'lbe holistic character of this view is unmistakable.

In addition,

as a high:cy' dynamic attitude of the subject, Brentano•a "complex set of relations• strongly resembles McDougall's "sentiment."
Creative

~ination ~

noetic consciousness.-- When he wrote his

f!z•

cholot.Q' in 18741 Brentano included in the domain of imagination all instances

of simple awareness a at the level ot sensing, imagination proper, and think·
ing.

However, he talked mostly about sell8ing and thinking, rather than

imagining (in the usual sense of the term).

To all appearances, he was then

satisfied with the view that the "images of imagination• did occupy a well
de.tined position, half-wq between, i f not entirely' equidistant from, seMing
and thinking, and that the term "imagination• could be applied equally well

to these three realms of experiencing. Accordingly', he found in this unified,
though multivalent, •subject's attitude• (faculty) the basis for the experi•
ence of the beautiful46 and for the doctrine of aesthetics.
Although Brentano never wrote the third Book of his Psycholoq which

46"Each fundamental class of psychic phenomena baa a type of perfection
proper to it which manitests itself' in the inner reeling that accompanies, as
we have seen, every act. In addition, there is a corresponding noble j07 inherent in the most perfect acts of each tundamental class. The highest perfection of t:fina.tion is the contemplation of the beautiful.J it is of little
importance tha this contemplation be sustained by the object or that it be
independent of it. It is this contemplation which affords the highest enj07•
ment which we can find in imagination• (p. 402).
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would have investigated all the problems relative to 11imag1nation,• a decade
later (1885-1886), in his lectures on •Selected questions from psychology and
aesthetics.47 he turned his attention to its role in our e:xperience or the
beautiful and in our scientific efforts to develop a doctrine of aesthetics.

By this time he was convinced that imagination proper or •phantasy• constituted the cornerstone of such a doctrine (1959 1 P• )6). Correspondingly, be
attempted to delimit more accurately' the domain of phenomena belonging to
it.48 In so doing, he also redefined his stand on the problem of "imagi•
nation• as a whole.

His overall position can be briefly' summarized as tollowsi {l) only per•
ceptual or intuitive images, i.e. images "which form the foundation of per•
ception" are images in the proper aense of the term, (2) non-perceptual
images or concepts are images only' in the improper sense of the term, and.
{3) images of imagination proper are non-perceptual images which approach

perceptions, insofar as they b.clve •a perceptual core.• It follows that the
boundaries of the latter- are undefined and fiutd.

Indeed, Brentano concludes

(19.$9, P• 87)1

47Published in his
. posthumoua volume, Frinciples E!fLestnetios {1959 ) •

46Brentano 1s "brief

historical overview• {1959, PP• 46-68) of the most
important opinions concerning the nature or imagination, from Aristotle to
Wundt, is excellent in many respects and as such worth reading.
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From our research it follows that there is no specific doctrine
of the images of imagination. According to our definition, they
tall sometimes in the domain of perceptions, and sometimes in
the domain of concepts. According~, for both of these domains
we must first ot all describe u accurate]\r as possible the phe•
nomena. (descriptive study), and subsequentl;y investigate their
genesis and course of development (genetic study).
This new viewpoint ot Brentano m.ust be understood correct]¥.

It is easy

to see that negative]\r this viewpoint implies the rejection or the conception (which he himself had previous]\r held) of ims.g1nat1on proper as a half'·
wrq house with its own distinct domain ot phanomenaJ by contrast, it is not
apparent at first sight what, i f a.ny, is its positive import. Closer anal•
ysie <Jf thie iseue indicates that in effect our author was (1) advocating the
existence 1n our eJCperience of complex phenomena involving the synthesis of
both sensoey•perceptual and conceptual-abstract processes, and (2) arguing in
favor of an accurate study of these phenomena at both levels, and from both
a "descriptive• and •genetic"' (explanatory) standpoint.
Thus delimited, Brentano•a domain or imagination proper or phantaq correspond81 or is closeq allied, to the important domain investigated by con•
temporary psychology under the various l"llbrics of "creative imagination,•
"proc:hlctive thinking (Wertheimer), and (tested) •intelligence. 1149 The similarity between Brentano•s conceptions and these contemporary viewpoints is
reflected not

o~

in the general nature of the phenomena investigated and o!

49Psychologists who may have been wOlidBr.ing about the epistemological
issues underl;ying the use of these terms could find an answer in his theoretical orientation.
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the methods of investigation themselves, but also in the importance attri•
buted to research findings in this area.

Our author's stand on the latter

issue is quite modern and as such. undoubted]3' acceptable to modern psychologists.

Speaking of the import of researches in the domain of (creative)

imagination, he stated (1959 1 P• J6)1

uu that pertains to this (domain) is not onl,y of the greatest
importance tor aesthetics, but is of far-reaching significance
for the l.U'e of the artist aa well u of the scientist (including
the mathematician), indeed, for the life of every man. Accordingly, the invea~ation of the lite ot ~ination ranks
amongst the inostortanttaSka OT'PsY'ChOC>gy. Of' course, we
are not dealing here with onl,y one problemJ rather, we are con•
fronted with many and varied problems.•
In still another respect, Brentano•• thought find8 echoes in scientific
psychology. During the period when he was trying to clarify the problem of
imagination proper, he was alao working toward a solution of the problem of
noetic consciousness. Apparently, it wu his desire to secure for this type
of consciousness a specific and permanent domain of phenomena which prompted
him to de-emphasize the experiential origin of concepts and correspondingq
to emphasize their abstract character.

This seems to be the meaning of his

position mentioned above that non-perceptual images or concepts are images

onq in

the improper sense

ot the term.

This position came very near to a nominal1stic conception ot concepts
similar to the standp:>int, subsequent]J' adopted by many psychologists, according to which concepts are mere "mental constructs.•

never satisfied with such a position.

the posthumous volwne,

~Sensory~

Brentano, however, was

In his final stand, as expressed in
».oetic consciousness (1928), he re-
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emphasized again the foundation in experience of abstract concepts or ideas.
It was probabq on account of this concem that he retained for them the

more general term "image" (Vorstell.upg) in preference to the term "idea.•
Critique of language.-- Brentano•s lite-long interest in several linguistic problems (structural aspects ot language, semantics, language as an
expression of psychic phenomena)SO is closely connected with his effort to
ascertain ever more accurately the experimental basis of the tools - concept.a 1
t\YJX>thesia, laws • used by science in its efforts to develop an authentic
Weltanschauppg.

The historical significance of this aspect of his thought

was expressed w1 th unusual clearness by the cidi tor of his posthumous volume,

!h!, Doctrine!!.!.. Right
Long

Judgmen~

(pp. VI-VII), Franziska Mqer-Hillebrands

before the neo-positivists and logisticians showed the need

tor a logical analysis of language, it was Brentano who took into
his band this analysis ••• In ll'18IV' respects he went even further than
the neo-pos1t1vista, but without ever giving up the conviction that
we can arrive at necessary and general knowledges.

Even after discarding those aspects of this analysis that were inspired
by some of his specific philosophical doctrines, one is left with a nunt>er

o£

important reflections and a general standpoint which can be of value to con•
temporary psychologists.

50H1s Psycbow and his .Appendix to the volume, Classification of f.!z·
chic Phenomena (19 a), contain several specific illUStrations of thl'i -rn:;
terest. FUrther evidence of it may be found in most of his posthumous works,
and especially 1n his volume, The Doctrine ot
Judgm!nt which contains a
rather extensive discussion of-uie llngulstIC pr ems mentioned here.

Riff

III

BRENTANO•S SIGNIFICANCE IN PsYCHOLOGY:
A?f, HIS'IDRICAL PERSPECTIVE
It was the conviction that Brentano• s standpoint in psychology con-

tained important perennial •truths" for this science which motivated the
present stud;y' and the translation ot his volume,
Standpoint.

Psychology~

!a Empirical

Such a conviction, however, in no wq involved, as a premise,

the major contention of this stud;y'--that Brentano•s actual accomplishments
tor which he deserves posterity' a permanent acclaim, and which will secure

tor him a truly prominent place in the history ot scientific endeavors, do
not lie in the field. of philosopl\v1 but in psychology.
The "valldityr• of this overall appraisal of Brentano as a thinker1

ot

course, will ultimately rest upon the nature itself ot bia psychological doctrines.

As given in the preceding chapter, the overview of these doctrinea

is sutticientq coq:>rehensive to enable the reader to form an independent
personal judgment 1n this matter.

To this end, however, it seams essential

that Brentano•s views be cut into proper historical perspectiveJ for, without such a frame of reference, the full import of bis overall standpoint
might not be apparent.

It was on account of this fact that in a few instances

as prev.iousq indicated, the direct presentation ot some aspects of his
thought was complemented with the formulation of a partial historical context.

In Ule remaining pages of this stud;y', an effort will be made to .fur-

ther extend this approach.

The lines of discourse that are going to be pur-
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sued will serve to delineate such an approach in some of its important
dimensions. As such, they are illustrative rather than comprehensive.
i.

Brentano, atructurallsm,

~ ~

•Third Force"

!a ;psycholosz.-

In this vriter•s opinion, Brentano•s thought deserve• consideration in any

stuc:tr ot contemporar;y philosophical trend.a because ot his existentialist
metap}V'sics and hi• critical realistic epistemology.

The former, howernr,

would only constitute a relati veq minor chapter in an owrall detailed treat-

ment of existentiallsmJ and the latter should appear in &rt1' comparable study

ot epistemological trend8 in the contemporary world not because it is attuned
to the general spirit which permeates these trends, but rather on account ot
the valuable counteracting weight that it could exert upon them.

.lt'urthermore,

there is no sign on the philosophical horizon that exiatentialimn will tum
its clock pack to where Brentano set it, or that present

~

epistemologista

will avail themselves ot his iMights to regain a better perspective oh the
value and actual limits ot •aoientitio" knowleege.

In view of this, one

could sq that our author is a guest, and not alwaya a welcomed one, among
contemporary philosophers, rather than a cbarterPd memberJ or, if' one pretera,
a spectator ot, rather than an active participant in, the on-going philo•

sophical

~

(no matter how discordant it WV' appear at timea).

The situation looks quite different when one tuma his attention to Bren-

tano' s standpcint in psychology.

Here 1 upon closer scru. ti:rv1 one finds that

prtnciples snd ideas parctll ellng close!¥ those characterizing such a stand-
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point have subsequently been championed by eminent psychologists of varied

interests, and that within the last three decades a theoretical re-orien•
tation incorporating several of these principles and ideas has been gaining

increasing momentum in American psychology.

The fact that this re-orient.a•

tion has taken place in this country enhances its value.

If it had developed

in Europe, without direct involvement of American psychologists, the latter

would have undoubtedly looked upon it a.a but a resurgence of continental
leanings toward abstract problems.

By contrast, European psychologist• can

hardly attribute this Amerioan movement to diminished concern with scientific
cogency and practical issues.

On the contrary, it wu the will for greater

fidelity and adherence to "fact" in both pure and applied research fields ot
psychology which inspired it.l

Extending Allport'• (1961) characterization of his conception of person•
ality, one could describe the movement under consideration as a trend toward

an "empirical" and "humanistic" psychologys enpirical, in the sense that it
reaches beyond u:perimental methodology to utilize all other "valid" sources

ot psychological knowledge (of which phenomenology is but one example), while
working evermore asaiduously to

e~and

both the range and the quail ty of ex-

perimentation itseltJ humanistic, because its starting, as well as its final,

referent point is the humab personality, taken in its bio-psycho•sooial indi-

1
Allport•s volume, Personali!!• a Psychological Interyretation (1937) 1
may be viewed as the first ottic!
landmark of this movement. Ei!J?lorations
in Personalitz (19.38) by Mu.rrq and his collaborators, and Lewints A Dynamic
"l'heorz
Personalitz (19.35) shou1d also be mentioned in this context.

i!
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viduality and existential context. Perhaps, some misunderstandings will be
avoided by making explicit these and other features of the above-mentioned
trend, and corresponding}¥ portraying it as an empirico-experimental, holis•
tic-~tic,

understanding-explanatory, phenomenological-existentialist,

structural-dynamic, and humanistic-1>9rsonalistic psychology. Of course, it
is important to keep in mind that these features to some extent overlap with
one another, and that not all of them appear in the thiDld.ng of authors who

could be mentioned as representati'V9 of the trend in question•

In retrospect, to use Maslow'• well-knovn characterization,. this trend
may be viewed aa the "1'hird Force• in psychology which developed in oppoeition

to

psycho~is

and

behavioriem, even though it benefited from both of

these earlier •revolutions,• usimilating their positive conquests.

Such a

trend has .found and is still finding impetus tor growth and development in

contemporary enmtsJ at the same time, however, it is also

ide&UT

and dy'•

namicalq connected with antecedent movements and orientationa.

It may be worthwhile to mention in passix.ig 1 as illustrations, that psycho~is and beharloriam (indeed, psychology in general,

according to

Ebbinghaua • famous dictum) haV9 "a short history, but a long past."

In the

case ot behaviorism, Boring (1950) has given a vivid picture ot antecedent
trends l.aading back to Descartes• conception of an1mal8 as mere automataJ as

to

psyaho~sis,

in his volume, !!!!, Unconscious before Freud, Whyte (1960) 1

has traced skill.tul.lT the histo17 of buic

ideas underl,ying Freud's psycho-

analysis back 200 years to 1680, that is, to a point removed by onq three
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decades from the death of Descartes, who had given conscious mind its moat
conprehensive "bill ot rights.•
A similar situation holds true with regard to the movement which is under
consideration here.

Thus, for example, contemporacy interest among psycholo-

gists in phenomenology and existentialism reaches back to similar interests
on the part of earlier phenomenologists and exi.stentialistsJ in turn, the
latter shared the interests of earlier thinkers.
Wbyte•s introductory critical reflections (19601 P• VIII) on the nature
of the relationship between Freud and his 11predeoeasors" are worth being
quoted here, because they can easily' be extended to de.tine the historical con•
neotion in which we are interested:
••• the ear]J thinkers are not •predecessors" who "anticipated•
Freud. Tbe71 and Freud, and countless others are participants
in a tradition which is being slow:cy- enriched. The7 did not
"lead to Freud,• tor some of them knew much that Freud, rightly'
for his own purposes, preferred not to emphasize. Hence one
way of improving current ideas is to recall what was thought
and said in earlier times. The aim is not to proJeot our ideas
into the past, or to dazsle ourselws with the prescience ot
early' thinkers as wise as we are, but to recognize where they'
knew more ••• Freud is not :tinalJ he is the most influential
figure in a succession of thinkers, all recognizing aspects
ot the truth. And Freud himaelf mq be the anticiparr of a
more balanced doctrine that still lies out ot sight.
Like the thinkers who came before Freud, Brentano is not a •predecessor•
who •anticipated"' the re-orientation that has taken place in psychology during

2
It miq be 0£ interest to notiee that, six 79ars earlier, Stern had
visualized the "mov•ent toward personalia• as an expression of "a more
balanced doctrine• referred to here by Wqte.
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the last :tew decades, or leading ideas advanced by other thinkers (such as
CalTd.ns,

w.

Stern, Wertheimer, Koffka and Kohler, Spearman, etc.).

But he has

been a participant in the Zeitgeist underqing the origin and varied fortunes

ot these ideas and re-orientation. Although silent at first,

and

always un-

obtrusive, his role in this •spirit ot the time" has been increasingly felt,
especi~

since Boring took pains several decades ago to bring it to the

attention or the other participants, delineating inciaiveq its major teatures.
Without slight to these other participants, one could

s~

that Brentano

"knew much that (tbey) ••• pre.f'erred not to emphasize"J and corresponding:q

that the latter have come to know much that

he

never emphasized in detail.

But perhaps the details are·less important than the general frame ot reference, in the sense that they would be meaningless without it.

In this re-

spect, it is certainly to Brentano 1 s credit to hav. formulated as broad and
meaningtul a frame of reterence as he did.
Brentano expressed himself very clearly upon the empirico-eJCPerimental

character of all psychological investigations, whether phenomenological ( dascripti ve) or "causal-explanatory.• I.f' Titchner had taken the trouble to
read all of his works published before 1921, he probably would not have
written his article on "Brentano and Wundts empirical and experimental pay•
chology11 (1921 a), or at least would not have written it in the same win u
he did.'

)This article shows that Titchner was acquainted with Brentano'• Psycho-

l.lJ.
Ultimately, 1.f he admitted that "experimental psychology is in the broad
sense empirical, and a psychology which is in the narrow sense empirical may
still have recourse to e:xperiment" (p. lll), it was because he wanted to en-

hance the status ot Wundt's psychology which he characterized as "essentiall,y
a matter ot description" (p. 111). By contrewt~ he stated, "Brentan~•a psychology is essentiall;y a matter ot argument" (p. 111) 1 1.e. •a rationalization

ot mind in use• (1928 1 P• 176}.
According to Titchner the "empirical" psychologists of Brentano'& tem-

per1 who studies "mind in use• (acts, processes)..!! ,!!2! a scientist because
in so doing, "like the rest

ot

the world, who are not psychologists," he

merel;y takes "mind as he finds 1 t •••acti vel,y at work in man 1a intercourse with

nature and his fellow-man, as well as in his discourse with himself" (1921,
P• ll.9). Furthermore, such a ·psychologist cannot be a true scientist in
Wundt's sense. Supposedl;y, the latter is a true scientist because his "pri•
mary aim

is to describe the phenomena or mind as the p}\ysiologiat describe•

the phenomena of the living body" (19211 P• ll8), and because he "falls back

on •genetic elq>lanation' on]\r when some phases or the traditional subjectmatter of psychology proves to be indescribable" (1921, P• 116).

logy, hia The Or.I.tin or the Knowledge of Right and ~. and his Researchea
SenaoffI8I.Eho oft;-but had either never readbiewt Wishes for Austria.
0r ?orgo
out e clear statement which he made~ about U'le
need for experimentation not onl,y in •genetic" but also 1n "descriptive" psychology.-For a follmr•up discussion of the general issue of empirical and
experimental psychology• see Titcbner (l92S), Carmichael (1926), and Boring
1n

(1928).
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As is well known,
of psychology•

and processes.

11

the phenomena of mind" or •traditional subject-matter

ot which Titchner speaks are the "contents• ot psychic acts
Just like the p}\ysiologist studies samples ot tissues taken

trom the "living• body with the help

of the microscope, the psychologist

should study •contents• apart from the "living" mind ("mind in use•') with the
help of what Titcbner came to call •trained introspection• (a "device"
roughq comparable to the microscope, in that it is intended to sharpen ·l;he

"eye" ot

the mind).

At first sight, such a conception aeena to have a certain aura ot plauaibili ty 1 and most definiteq baa "the air of simplicity," in that it "simplifies so greatly the problems that lie betore the student ot psychology • .4

Upon closer

~is 1

however, one soon realizes that by the time the psycho-

logist gets to them, the •contents• or "phenomena or mind"' are twice "dead,•
having
Hs

11

died• the first time when they were divorced f'rom the acts or procea-

to which they re.f'er, and the second time when they were put under the

highq filtered and artificial light ot •trained introspection.•

Titclmer is

technic~

Certe.1..nq,

correct when he describes this type or introspection

4

These statements are taken .f'rom The Battle or Beha'rioriat An !.x,posi•
~ ~ .!!! Eacpoeure (1929 1 P• 41). Tiiit ih8i are-applicable In O'Ur case i•
shown by the !act that McI>oQgall always viewed Wundt and Titchner's variety

ot introspective psychology aa but another type ot "mechanical psychology,•
just like behaviorism, and invariabq directed his critique simultaneouaq
agiinst both types ot conceptions.
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as an "observation or an Is• (1899, P• 291), but has no right to label his
"structural" psychology "existential," since the •Is,• as a mere distillate
of anal\f'sis, is 11.f'eless.

The Gestaltists emphasized this very point when

they described it as a "brick-and-mortar" type of psychology.

It al8o follows that, as conceived by Wundt and T1tchner1 structurali•
yield.8 neither explanation nor understanding.

Like the architect, the tra-

ditional structural psychologist can onl\f inform us about the nwnber and
type of the various co11¥?onent elements mald.ng up the "structure" he con•
ceived, and the particular •position" which each ot them occupies in such a
structure. Furthermore, in the strict sense of the term, such a psychologist cannot speak or the "role• or "roles• or either the separate elements
or the resulting •aggregate.• Correspondingq, his psychology cannot be in
any wq a "ctYnam!c" psychology. Even when, out ot sheer despair, he "ralla

back upon •genetic explanationu (taken not in Brentano•s broad sense or the
term, but in the restricted sense of an appeal to peysiological processes),

such a psychologist does not ofter us aeything dynamic, explanatory, or or an
understanding nature because the proposed solutioh lies outside his reference

system.
J. few word.8 will suffice to bring out the marked contrast between such a

conception and Brentano•s standpoint. Some of the most essential characteristic• of a genuine psychology, which are so manitestl,y absent in the former,
stand out in high relief in the latter.
"Mind in use• is certain]¥ an existential given.

As

such it has not

onl.¥ a characteristic stru.cture but a lawful mode of functioning. · Through
accurate phenomenological description, by means of empirical

~is

experimentation, the former can be "understood"J and the latter, when

-

and

proper:J\v investigated, can be "explained.• •Understanding" and "explanation,• however, are not mutuall,y exclusiva modes of knowing in Brentano••
systems insofar as they contribute to the 111ntell1g1bil1ty" of that which
they study, they impq one another, in such a way that to understand something is equivalent to explain it, and vice versa.

tional• given,

"mind.11

is

eminen~

Furthermore, as a "rela-

dynamic not onq 1n it11 functions, but

al.Bo in its structure.

The terms "mind• was employed here in order to retain the continuity of
discourse with regard to Titchner 1 s critique of Brentano. Aotuall.1'1 we know

that the true referent point according to our author's orientation is the
•psychic~

active subject.• This is so in the case of •e:xperi.ence" or psy-

chic acts properJ in the case of "behavior" instead, the referent point is
man in his e:xiatential condition of a selt-which•hu•a-boey.S Such a holia-

tic and humanistic-J>ersonalistic frame of reference, by contrast_. is absent

.SThe extent to which the latter view might not be reconcilable with his
metaphy8ical doctrine of the mind-body relationship needs not be investigated 1n the present stuct,y. For our purpoH• the important thing is that,
according to our author, behavior reflects the unitary functioning of the
whole man, and is the proper object of psychological stuey. Titchner, instead, relegates the science of behavior to the province of biology.
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in claasical structura1.i8Jll.

The humanistic•personalistic aspect of Brentano••

standpoint is further enhanced

by the fact

that

Of rnan as the "carrier of history• (1892 1 1959).

he

used to cherish the vision

The existentialist over-

tones of this vision are also obvious.
It is not necessary to re-emphasize at this point the similarit7 be•

tween Brentano•s standpoint, as brie.tq SUDl'D8.rized above, and the overall

frame of reference which inBtigated, and is presentq sustaining, the "Third

Force• in paychology.6 The similarit:,y between such a standpoint and some
other independent thinkers or orientations will be brought out in the en•
suing discussion. In view of this 1 it would seem that Titchner was unw1 tt•
ingq a prophet against him.self when he stateda "P97chology •••mq gladq con-

tesa .her debt to both (Brentano and Wundt). Yet one must choose either ones
there is no middle wq between Brentano and Wundt" (1921, P• 108). It almost looks as :1.f Ti tchner saw "the handwriting

vain to erase what was being wr1 tten.

on the wall,• and tried in

For, as we have seen, m&lV' contempo-

rary psychologists have "chosen" Brentano over WundtJ by contrast, while

revered as the founder of psycholoa, Wundt is no longer a source or inspiration and influence.

6
Brentano• a stand concerning the variety ot specific methods to be used
in psychology and his views on the several tielda ot psychological investi•
gation constitate other areas ot agreement..

ua.
2.

Brentano

~

.!S!!. 2.£. his contemporaries.--During his litetime, Bren-

tano did not have the advantage of an active school with active students

working toward expanding, refining, and putting to e:xperimental test his

ideas in ps.ycholoa.7 Furthemore, a tew students of his (Stumpt, Meinong1
Ehrentels) who achieved renown in this science soon developed their own frame

ot reference and correapondingq pursued independent theoretical and research
interests.a

In spite of this, the revolt which be started against associationism
gained impetus, influencing •moat of the important writers of tut.books or
systematic treatises in the last twenty 7earaof' the nineteenth oentuey• (Flu•
gel,

1951). Chief among these wt'iterl were Lippa, Ward, Stoudt,

and James.

In all instances Brentano•s influence was selective, rather than •totali•

tarian.•
Lippe• insistence upon the essentialq active character ot the
and the importance

•minci•

ot the Ml.rs bis interest in space perception and eathe-

7Tll8 "school• to which, as mentioned in the first chapter, Brentano himself rerere newr grw bqond the germinal stage of a certain ideal classroom atmosphere.
8
Ebrentela will be mentioned again briefq in the following pages. By
contrast, no .further reference will be made to Stumpf and Meinong, since an
e:xposi tion and comparison of their views w1 th those ot Brentano is not essential to the historical context which is being delineated here. The interested reader who might wish to follov this line of stu<.V" is referred to

Boring•• clusical work (1950), to stumpt•s own studies (19191 1930),
to Spiegelherg•s (1960) and Eaton's (1930) investigations.

and

tics, and even bis doctrine of empatq all bear the imprint ot Brentano••
views and theoretical interests.

On a theoretical level, the latter doctrine

seems to be an extension ot his conception that sensory eJCl)eriences are complex unitary act in which •imagination• is inextrincab]¥ blended with, and

enriched b71 an immediate belief (blind judgment) and an eciuaJ.l1' immediat.41

•interest• in the HDSed object-•a feeling into• (linf\1bluns, empathy) such
an object, according to Lippa• terminology. On the research level, Lippa
arrived at this doctrine through his studie• of optical il.lusions in which,
u we know, Brentano himself' had been interested. (1892 c, 1893 a, 1893 b).

Ward alao aaai.Dd.lated from Brentano two ot the buic concepts in his own
system, the concepts of the activity and unit¥ of the self', and transmitted.
them to Stout.

From here they filtered down to McDougall.

Stout's syete, the concepte under diBCUBsion were

mi~led.

AB present in
with element.a de•

rived from usociationi8Jll. While Stout personal]¥ seemed to have considered.
such a mixed marriage a auoceaa, Md.Dougall obvious]¥ thought otherwise. .U

a hypothesis, it seema probable that the latter author was first motivated to
develop his.purposive psychology by the inherent conflict which be saw in
Stout's tvbrid orld.tation-a contlict which, in terms of contrast effects,

must have

s1m.u.ltaneoua~

convinced him of the buic inadequacies of uaocia-

tionism and the noble virtues of an activistic type ot psychology.
James, of course, had preceded McDougall, with his sharp critique of
association1st1c ("domino•) psychology and._ a corresponding emphasis upon the
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unity and personal character of consciousness.

While his views in the mat-

ter were large1'Y' the product of independent thinking, he did not .fail to

~

tribute when he first published his Principles g!_ Psychology in 1890 to Brentano for having championed a similar orientation. Specifical.4", he stated:
"Altogether ••• Brentano•s (chapter) on the Unity of Consciousness is as good
as anything w1 th which I am acquainted" ( 1907, I, 2401 n.).
Theodore Ziehen1 who also recognized bis indebtedness to Brentano (along
with Helmholts 1 Hering, Fechner, Spencer, and Mach), is worth mentioning in
the present context.9 As described in his "Autobiography" (1930) 1 the

general plan of his psychology includes many tenets reflecting the influence
of Brentano•s viewa. 10 It seems worth listing some of them because they
bring out our author'• standpoint• (1) introspection and objective observa•
tion must work togetherJ (2) an essential, indeed, indispensable element in

the development of the science of psychology ia th• experiment, although it
is not the on~ methodJ

(3) "psychic" and 11consciou•" are identical

in pay•

9The reason, for discussing this author is partia~ due to the fact
that he was a protege of a kind of Binswa:nger who ha8 recen~ {1963) made
his appearance on the American scene with all indications that his presence
will be increasingly felt among both psychologists and psychiatriats.-Ziehen was himaelt a psychiatrist who turned into a salt-made psychologist
and philosopher.
10
That Ziehen in several respects differs basical1'1 from Brentano should
be obvious from the mere listing of the author• who influenced him. One basic
difference lies in his ostraciem of the •subject• from psychology.
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chologyJ (4) without the least detriment to applied psychology, we might remember the relation ot psychology to the t.beoey of understanding in the sense
of a prim& philosophi&J (5) the phenomenological principle is of paramount
importance for the entire psychology.

The meaning and import of this last

tenet is brought out clearly in the following passage (p. 488):
In every psychological investigation, determine first ot all the
facts pure and simple, i.e. add nothing to them and tbink nothing
of them, and consider those facts as the foundation upon which
you are to build and construct. We admit that it is often di.ffi•
cult to follow these directions in full measure. That does not
impair the practical s1gn1.tioanoe1 the formula indicates the
directions we are to follow. Belt-evident as this phenomenological procedure seema, still even toda3" it is rareq carried out
properly) general.13' the phenomenologiats as such are slighted
and their description is al.rea<V' fli18d with all kinda ot theeretical suggestions or imaginings.
Ziehen•s extensive investigations of problems in logic and epistemology
bearing, among other things, uPOn the indispensability or a psychological

foundation of these two disciplines, also fall in line with two or Brentano'&
major interests. And one is tempted to view the author's studies 0£ native
abilities in music and mathematics as e:iramplea of stuiiea that Brentano him•
selt might have wanted to carey out, i.f' be had been provided w1 th the proper
means.12

llxn this context, Ziehen apeciticaJ.l3 states that be is not referring

to phenomenology aa understood by Husserl and Stuapt.

12Brentano•s own giftedneaa for mathematics and his theoretical utili•
zation or it have been mentioned previousq in the present study. For a
partial uposi tion or some ot his views on msic, see bis volume, Principles
2!., ~sthetics (1959 1 PP• 216•224).
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Alfred Binet is being mentioned in this section of our historical per-

mainq,

spective

i t not exclusively, because Soucek ( 1924) took the trouble

of comparing his views to those of Brentano.

For the purpose of the present

study, it will be aut.ficient to mention that the similari't11 between theee two
thinkers• standpoint does not seem to be any greater than a flatus vocias
they both speak of •acts

and "ptv'sical" phenomena.

or

knowledge" and "objects o.f knowledge,• •psychic•

How far Binet•s views actually are .from those o.f

Brentano is clearq illustrated by the following two propositions which he
uphold.81 (l) "psychic• and "peysical• are not opposed, are not two different

classes of phenomena, but rather

exempl.1.f'y mere:Qr the

dllallty o.f mind and

matter found in all psychic phenomenaJ (2) it is necessary to suppress from
consciousness the notion of the subject, for such a notion would "d.enat'Ul."811
the psychic event.

The so-called subject is nothing but a bundle of "sen•

sations• (as stated by Taine, Ribot, Mach and Titchner).

Even prescending

from this second proposition, it is easy to see that the •relational" charac·

ter of the act itself, which is cardinal 1n Brentano'• tbinld.ng, is entireq

missing in Binet•s conception.

-------

J. Brentano

and Freud. -

a student of Brentano.

As mentioned in the first chapter, Freud

The question as to whether or not his thinking was in

any wq influenced by his only non-medical teacher, was
by Merlan

(194.S, 1949)

wu

brief~

who gave an aftirmative answer to it.

investigated

Since that Um,

it has become customarr tor moat writers of history of psychology textbooks
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to make reference to it.

By and large, whether affirmative or negative,

their attitude in the matter has been
Basic~,

such an attitude

largeq perfunctory.

8e«n8

to be entireq justified, for to

approach the solution ot such a question at 8.1\V" level ot depth would involve
at least a small independent treatise dealing with the by-no-means simple
problem

ot whether or not

Freud's paychoana.qsia presupposes an underl;ying

philosopq, and it so what type ot philosophy. Certainl\r, the answer given
to this problem will atfect drasticall1' the wq in which the question under

consideration is approached and solved.
Even aside trm thi1 issue, such a question would be more pertinent in a
study of Freud• s thinking than 1n one dealing vi th Brentano• s viewpoint. With

regard to the latter, the onll' relevant issue, which could and should be
raised, is whether or not our author's strong stand. against unconscious acts

or processes implies the absolute denial of the existence of arq unconscioue
factors under:qing human behavior and uperience.
cult to solve.

This issue is not diffi·

For, if on the one hand Brentano has alwqs asserted that

psychic acts or processes b7 their very nature are conscious, on the other be
has also aonsistentq

recognised that the •dispoai tiona" underl¥1ng these

acts are most typicall1' •unconscious. •14 It will be suff'icient to add that,

14Brentano distinguished between •innate• dispositions (man's basic
•attitudes" or modes of functioning) and •acquired" dispositiona. The former
are by nature unconsciousJ the latter, by contrast, may be conscious or un-

conscious, depending upon the situation confronting a given individual.

according to his thinking, "dispositions• are the equivalent of the modern
concept of "set.•

4. Brentano

-------

and tunctionalia. -- In tvo lengt}\y articles, Titchner

dealt in detail w1 th the problem of the relationship between functional psy•
chology (1921 a), aa found in I.add, Angell, and Judd, and act ps;ychology(1922) 1 as eJCpOUllded by Stump!, Lippa, ffuaerl, Messer, and Witaaek.
latter context, Brentano came up for diaouasion

mai~

In the

in reference to a

brief summary of Munsterbergts and Husserl's criticiams of some of his doctrines.

Obvioua]\f, having previously (1921 a) written a specific article

comparing our author's orientation with that of Wundt, Titchner telt that he
could by-pus him in the present general discusnon o:t act psychology-.
Titchner•a e21>oaition or the views of the separate authors whom be in•
vestigated is quite comprehensive and still worth reading today.
bis

111.ntegration•

By contrast,

or general synopsis of the two trenda and bis critical

evaluation of them are highl.1' subjective.

As rrt/1.1' easily be expected, he does

not see much, it any1 worth in these trenda 1 "They represent what we may call
an art of mental lite,--a general•appl.ied' psychology' that is logicalq prior

to the special •applied psychologies• ot education, vocation, law, medicine,
industry• (p. 82).

Relatively speaking, however, he saw more value in the

act variety ot •empirical• psychology than in its functional counterparts
•There is no seed of lite in i'lDlctionaliam compared w1 th the paver of perennial self-renewal that inheres in intentional.ism" (p.

79).

125.
Pursuing further this kind or logic, Titchner found it easy to dispose

of functionalism as "the parasite ot an organism doomed to extinction." He
proceeded somewhat more

diplomati~

in the cue of intentionalism, but in

the end the verdict was the same, as shown by the following passage (p, 81}:
The one complete and positive replT to intentiomlism is the
existential system, the system that is parti~ and oonfusedlY'
set forth.• .in the works of Wundt and ICulpe and F.bbinghaus •••
If we can build psychology upon a definition that is scientific
as the word "science" is to be understood in the chapter of the
whole history of human thoughtJ and if we can follow methods and
achieve results that are not unique and apart but, on the contrary, of the same order as the methods and results of p}\ysica
and biologyJ then, by sheer shock of difference, the act-systems
will appear as exercises in applied logic, stamped with the personalities ot their authors. They will not, on that account,
languish and die, because "mind in uae• will alwqs have its
fascination, but they will no longer venture to offer themselves
a.a science.

These value judgments seem to be a further illustration of the hypothesis
advanced above that Titchner was in effect foreseeing the end of an era in

psycholoa and tried in vain to fight back the tide of history in psychology.
The tact that he saw behaviorism pr1maril71 it not exolusive17, as a system
which got •1ts motivation...from dissatisfaction with the psychology or function" strengthens such a hypothesis.

From

a historical point of view, in

tact, it is well known that Watson directed hi• open critique especial.lJ'
against Wundt and Titcbner'• type of "psychology

or

consciousness,•

With regard to act psychology, Titchner 1 s views mentioned here should
enhance the contrast between Brentanp

*• conception and classical strucb.Jra•

1ism1 as portrqed in the preceding pagea. With regard to functionalism, hi8
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blunt condemnation seemed to have challenged H. Carr, the last chartered
member of functionalla1 into action.

In fact, in his vigorous defense

ot

this system (l92S) he was apparentq bent to prove that 1'1tclmer was wrong
when he opposed functionalism and act psychology.

The latter, he seemed to

argue, was but one •first conception• ot f'unotional psychology as "the paychology ot mental operation.• As such, he continued, it was •an easential

propaedeutic• to two other truer conoept.ionss functional psychology as •the
psychology ot the fundamental utilities of consciousness,• and as "psychophysical psycholo1r3.•' His justification of the premise in this line ot
reasoning, and the conclusions to which he arrived, are worth quoting (p.

4S4)s
It raaina ••• to point out in what manner the conception of tunotionalism as concerned with the basal operations ot mind is correlated with the other concept.iona ••• certainq i£ we are intent
upon d..1.scerning the exact manner in which mental process contrl•
butea to aocomodat.ion efficiency, it is natural to begin our
undertaking by determining what are the primordial forms ot expresaion peculiar to mind•• .Again like the biological acoamoda•
tory view, the psychophysical view of functional psychology in•
volvee as a rational presupposition some acquaintance with mental processes as these appear to reneot consciousness. The
intelligent correlation in a practical wq ot p}\ysiological and
mental operations evidentq involves a preliminary knowledge
of the oonsoioua differentiations both on the side of conscious
.tunctions and on the side of physiological functions ••• In view
of the considerations of the laat few paragrapb.B it does not
seem fancU'ul to urge that these various theor.l.ee ot the prob•
1- ot functional psychology real.q converge upon one another1
however, divergent mq be the introductoey investigations
peculiar to each of the nveral ideals. Posalb~ the conception that the fundamental problem of the functionalist is one
ot determining just how mind participates in aceomodator.y reactions, is more nearl.7 inclusive that either of t.he others, and
so may be chosen to stand tor the group. But if this vicarious
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duty is assigned to it, it mu.st be on clear terms ot remembrance that the other phases ot the problem are equally real
and equall\v necessary. Indeed the three things hang together
as integral parts of a common program.

Except for

the emphasis upon the second conception of' functional psy-

chology as being "more nearly inclusive than either of the otaer," Brentano
would not have found mu.ch to object against in these views: the first and
third conceptions of functional psychology, as defined by Carr, are

ac~

found in bis system, and the second is entirely consistent with it, even
though

he

himself did not advance it e.xplicitly.

however, involves .t'urther specifications

ot

Brentano•s psychology,

the "functional• program beyond

those recognized by classical tunctionallam•

••
5. Brentano ~ J:!!. Wurzburg
School. -· In fol.loving

the preceding brief

synopsis of T1tcbner 1s articles on •Functional psychology and the ps.ycholou
of act,• the reader may have noticed that Ku*lpe, the reputed .foubder of the
W\lrzburg School, wu presented as an advocate o.f structural psychology.

Thia

again creates the 1mpresaion that Titchner was trying to stop the 11 handwriting
on the

wall,•

this time by conveniently overlooking the fact that KUlpe had
Cl

progressed beyond bis pre-Wurzburg structuralist stand, coming to recognize
the distinction between acts and contents, and the existence of

11

imageless

th.ought,• and more in general to reject two or the cardinal tenets of
Wundtian-Titohnerian psychology• sensationalism and associationiam.
No explanation is needed to show that these main features of the W'tlr.burg
School are found in Brents.o•s orientation. Brentano•• direct influence upon
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the development or this school, however, does not seem to be as great aa it
might appear at first sight. First ot all, acts and contents were not conceived by members of this school in quite the same manner as Brentano did•
the acts appear to have been viewed in a less d;vnamic and "relational" con•
text, and the contents seem to resemble more the "objects•

lists than the "objects" of Brentano.
8

or

the stru.ctura•

In the second place, the concept of

1mageless thought" was not derived from Brentano•& concept of •noetic con-

sciousnesa• because his views on this issue were not

public~

known at that

time. Perhaps it is the anti-associationistic bent in our author's orienta•

,,

tion that exerted the most direct influence upon KUlpe and his pupils.
In terms of immediate historical <ierivation, the Wunburg School took

its concept o! act as distinct from content from Hu.saerl (Ronco, 1962) rather
·'

than from Brentano.

On the one hand., however, this School basicaJ.lT added

acts to contents, and new contents to the traditional contents, as "elements•
of psychological study, rather than integrating them in a unified synthesis.
In view of this, one could say that the resulting qstem is oriented more

toward "content psychology" than •act psychology" propers it is almost as if'
the lineaments

or

Brentano•s orientation (through Husaerl) have been super-

imposed upon the still clearq discemible background ot Wundt•a viewpoint.D

lSBoth Humphrey (1951) and Ronco (1962, 196~,) have called attention to
the intermixture of the old and the new in the WUrzburg School. From the
point of view of general information tor the reader, it seems worth mentioning that Ronco•s study is the best available exposition and. critical appraisal
ot this School. The fruit of a one year research project at the Institute of
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According to Ronco (196.3 1 PP• .30-39) 1 the term "imageless• (unanschauliches) underwent a gradual transfomation awq from Wundt•a sensationalism
et

in the Wurzburg School. Ach and Watts, for example, used this term in the
sense of •active, but unconscious images.•

The existence of •imagelesa

thought• proper was first recognized by Schultze and BUhler. However, eve
for BUhler1 the "'thought• or •concept•

or

a giwn object is (merel,y) the

BWll

of the relationB linking this object with other objects which belong to the
same order.• The obvious difference between this conception ot "imagelese
thought" and Brentano•s concept of "noetio consciouanesa• further underscores
the tact that the former was developed independentq from the latter.

Of

course, this fact far from lessening the historical signif'icanee of Brentano•a
standpoint, it enhances it.

Our author, in e.:f"tect, "anticipated• by almost
~c

three decades the leitgeist which animated the WUrzburg School.

J.6

Psychology of the Uni wrsi ty ot Bonn, made possible by a grant from the
Ale.xancler von Humboldt-stiftung Foundation, this study takes into account
Hunphrey 1 s investigation (1951) 1 correcting and supplaenting it in several
respects.

16tt seems important to mention that this earl.¥ Zei;tgeist through th8
1

works of Selz, A.oh, Spearmann, Lindworski, and Duncker, bu extended ita influence to our time. More reoentl,y it ha.a found e~resaion in Bruner, Goodnow and Austin's volume, !Jiuf !!!.. t~l957)-the outcome or half a
decade ot researches ident e u •tl:ie
d Cognition Project.• It is
not within the scope of the present study to pass judgment on the experimental "technique•" used in this study. By contrast, it is worth noticing
that theoretical:q the authors• conception of "a concept as a (mere) network
of significant inferences" (p. 244) is even more inadequate than Btthler•a
conception in safeguarding the true nature of thinking. Were the authors
themselves aware or this implication when they described themselves u
"empiricists"? (p. 246).
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••
The WUrzburg
School was more successful in, and brought to a more complete closure, its anti-associationistic stand than its anti-sensationalistic
However, even in this respect there occurred an evolution of think•

intent.

ing (Ronco, 1963, PP• 25-30).
definite~

Thus, for example, "associationism was not

overcome" by Ach and WattsJ and Messer went

on~

a step further

when he "placed at the center of the critique of associationism the factor
of 1volition'•"

,,

Biihler, although convinced of the existence of the thinking

subject as such, did not dwell specifically upon this theoretical posi tionJ
it was
~uch

o~

'~
....
with Kulpe,
in his systematic, post-Wiiraburg
development, that

a position was consciou1ly' and unequi vocaa.q formulated in a way which

echoes very closely Brentano•s thought.

1lilpe apecifical~ raised the issue

of the •legitimacy of' a psychology •in which sensations, images, with their
affective fringes, are the
in which

1 it

I think ••• • -

~

contents of con5ciousness ••• • 1 a psychology

---

would be more exact ·to sayr it thinks (es dankt), rat.her tbana
In (his) opinion, such a psychology would be an imaginary con•

struct which contradicts the results of recent researches, according to which
activit,. has become the most important thing, and reactivity and the mechanie of images have become of secondary concern.

The activity in question 1•
el

the activity of the thinking subjects the tasks, Kulpe states, are not pre-

sented to sensations, to feelings or to images, but to a subject, whose
spiritual nature, and whose spontaneity alone can assimilate and eaoute the
instructions•• (Ronco, 1963 1 P• 29).

In view of the virtual identity ot

this stand with Brentano• a conception, K'Ul.pe 's accusation of' positivism
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leveled against our author is all the more surprising.

By the same token•

however, this tact shows once more that, while Brentano did not influence the
~It

Wurzburg thinkers

direct~,

be preceded them in their main conclusions b;y

several decades.

6.

Brentano, ~ Austrian School,

.!!!.2-

Gestalt psycholoq. -- Ehrenf'els

and Meinong, both pupils of Brentano, were undoubtedl¥ the most articulate
theoreticians of the Austrian School.

It was not through them1 however, that

Brentano'• orientation entered into psychology.
this f'actualJ¥ 1 if not
and Benussi.

intentio~1

The credit for having achieve

goes to two students of Meinong, Wi tasek

In effect, their experimental work showed that 'most of the

data o£ perception can be e:ipressed in terms of acts• (Boring, 19501 P•
By contrast, Ehrentels •torm-qualitiea,• although

448).

apparentq borrowed

from some of Brentano•s views, are less consistent with the spirit of his

overall system than Wertheimer, Koffka, and Ko~r•s Gestalten, which were
not so borrowed.

The "relational• and unitary character of psychological

processes, as conceived b;y Brentano, also seems to be better preserved in
Gestalt psychology proper, than in Ehrentels• system.

Again, however, it waa

•the spirit of the time" and their own inventiveness which led the .founders
of this school to their characteristic point of view, rather than Brentano'•
direct influence.

This seems to be true not onq of their

ear~

doctrines,

but also of subsequent developments, such as Wertheimer•s concept of

11

pro-
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••
ductive thinking,• Kohler's
concept of 8 insighttul learning,• and Kof.tka 1s
concepts of the ego and the behavioral environment.
There seems to be undeniable similar:ltiea between Brentano•s views on
the "psychopbTaical character" of psychology and the Gestaltiats• conception

of the •psychological field• u a llpaychopbTsical field."

tano'•

Certainq Bren-

standpoint allows for the various types ot •forces• or 8 d3'namic re-

lationships• recognized by this conception, be they intra-object, objectobject, object-Ego, or pure Ego-forces. The similarities in question are
not l1mi ted to a certain general agreement in principle J frequentl.1' they are
reflected in a harmony of opinion on specific issues. The following views
eJrPreaeed by lCof.fka (1935) are presented as illustrations of this point1
(1) •the persistence of the F.go is ••• not a matter of memory-, but of a direct

persistence through time•J (2) "the F.go ••• is co1"ple.X, consists of a variety
of' ••• sub-systems• which "do not simp:q exist Bide by side," but "are organized
in various ¥8\V&•J (J) •the original Ego-environment relation (is) not •••a
purell' cognitive one, in which the B:go :nereq takes cognizance of objects,
but•••a conative one, in which the Ego adapts its behavior to the environment•J (4) •the closer the qynudc relationship between the F.go and the objeot,...the more likeq•••will recognition be ••• Thus whatever baa interested
us, attracted our attention, is relati veq easill' recognized" J (5) "remembering appears to be more deoisiveq an aftair of construction rather than one

ot mere reproduction" (after Barlett)J (6) "the problem of personalit.Y i• one
or the intrinsicalq greatest problems of all psychology.• In addition, a
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comparative stuctr would show that the Gestaltists• evaluation of the status
and role of psychology (Koffka, 1935), and their critique of empiricistic

associationism (Kohl.er, 1929) echo many themes found in Brentano•s com.parable analyses.
The simultaneous presence of basic differences between our author• s
orientation and Gestalt psychology are also obvious.

It will be sufficient

here to mention that, even in Koffka•s synthesis, Gestalt psychology does

not safeguard some of the essential personalistic and existentialist aspects
of psychology, such as may be found in Brentano•s conception.

Postscript. and work,

and

Just like the port;.rait of Brentano•s persone.lity 1 life

the overview of his standpoint in psychology, which were pre•

sented in the first and second chapter of the present study, the historical
perspective an his significance in psychology delineated in this chapter
could be supplemented with other considerations or finer details.

In par•

ticular 1 this could be done vi th bene.fi t in respect to important similarities
which seem to exist between Brentano•s overall standpoint in psychology and

the orientation of Spearman on the one hand, and that of early personalisti•
ca].4r oriented psychologists on the other.

Rel.ative to Brentano•& payohologicaJ. ideas the greatest single merit of
Spearman, along with the representatives of the Wurzburg School, the Austrian

School, and Gestalt Psychology, may be said to lie in t,he fact that through
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them such ideas penetrated into the mainatream or experimental psychology.

Furthermore, in addition to providing experimental verification for specific
aspects or his thinking, these authors came to share with him, and correspondingly to further in psychology1 a personalistic outlook.

This orient&•

tion developed most slow'.q and remained most inccmplete in Gestalt Psycho•

logy17 J by contrast, it was achieved more rapidq and more conscious:Qr within

,.

the context of the Wurzburg School.

University of wlirsburg in

19061

Spearman who spent three months at the

coming to respect Kilpe and to admire

Blihl.er,18 followed in their footsteps. Although less outspoken on this issue
than KU:lpe, on account of his acientU'ic stature, he undoubted:cy- exerwd a

greater influence upon psychologists. Certainly-, his claim that "the general
tide of psychology seems to have arr1 ved at conceiving the principle of mind,
the •psyche,' as an Individual who Feels, Knows, and Acts• (1937, II, 287)

did not go unnoticed when it was first made and since that time.
The specific merit for having emphasized a personalistic conception

psychology, however, goes to Mar;y Calkins (1900, 1901, 19091 1930),

w.

or

Stern

17All

late as 19301 Calldna rightly reproached Gestalt Psychology for its
failure to take into account the •supreme illustration of the Gestalt" - the
self. It was onq five years later that loffka first made an attempt to
integrate the Ego or selt into the Gestalt systemJ and, as mentioned above,
such an attempt remains defective in several respects.

18He called Buhler
·~
"one of the living psychologists to whom I feel most
in debt• (1930 b, P• 305).
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(1930),

w.

McDougall (1923 a, 1923 b, 1924, 1930 a, 1930 b), T.

(1924 1 1939), and A. Oemelli (1924 1 1942).

v.

Moore

Of course, one need not agree

with the particular brand of personal.ism advanced by these thinkers to P8'Y
th.em this tribute.

Likewise, dissimilarities in details between their stand•

point and that of Brentano do not lessen the significance of the conviction
they all shared with him that "the study or psychic functions leads to the
very heart or personality" (Gemelli, 1924, P• 271).
In retrospect, these personalistioalzy oriented psychologiets may be

said to have carried Brentano 1 s standpoint to the threshold of the "Third
Force" movement in psychology. In turn, as previouszy stated, the latter
has extended it to our generation.

This uninterrupted continuity of thinking

further enhances the significance of our author's contribution to this
science.
The term "contribution" was

purpose.tu~

tributions.• In faot, Brentano•s great merit

used in preference to "conessentia~

lies in the "gen-

eral point of view" which he bequeathed to psychology ·- a point of view
aptzy characterized by Maslow (1954, p. 27) as "holistic rather than atomistic, functional rather than taxonomic, d;ynamic rather than static ••• purposive rather than simple-mechanical."
'lhe experience of studying as complex a thinker as Brentano is enriching,
in spite of the fact that strong disagreements and agreements are likel.;y' to
be aroused in rather quick succession. Ultimatel;v', however, a reasonable

1)6.

balance is established.

The writer hopes that the presel1t study will be of

assistance to the reader also in this respect.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOORAPirrl

A. B.

Review of the 1924 edition or Brentano• s Psychologie .!!?!! e!J?irischen
!!!.!• Philos., 1928, JS, 613-614.

Standpunkt.

Pictures Brentano as a "true intellectual aristocrat" and •a great
tounder of a school," who has emrted a profound influence upon both
philosophy and psychology. Mention is made or Brentano•s early role
in "shaking the yoke ot associationism,• and of the eseential difference between hie descriptive psychology and Husserl's phenomenology.

lwinie on the one hand. these annotations are clarified and made more
meaningful by the text proper or the present study 1 on the other they themselves supplement it (by way of bringing out contentual or contextual de•
tails, or peripheral value judgments, which, i t expressed there, would have
made the work cumberaan.e and fragmented). Indeed, in ~ respects they m11.7
be said to represent an independent contribution, with a value and right to
existence of its own. They were purposive]¥ cast into this role, so as to
enhance their usef'u.lness as a sounding-board..· It is hoped that in this re•
spect they will spare f'u.ture students ot Brentano•a thought duplication of
efforts (where the upenditure of energy and time would far outweigh the returns}, or by contrast encourage them to even greater endeavor (when securing
and caref'u.lq stud11ng a given work might easily spell the difference between
a mediocre and an excellent investigation). These reflections, together with
the nature itself of the several studies under consideration, help explain
why at times a minor or incidental stu<V"1 which might be out or print or out
of easy reach, or a stuc.:tr which was only mentioned in passing in the present
work, is discusaed at greater length than a more important and/or more pertinent work. That there is a certain risk involved here, it's quite obvious.
The writer is the first to recognize that his evaluatiom 1 whether factual
or judgmental, carry with them a greater or lesser degree of subjective
selectivity. Thi• risk cannot be eliminated altogether. A tacit compromise
between the writer and arI3' given reader, therefore, seem.a to be the best
that can be hoped tor a just as the t ormer does not U1 ve to present hia
"findings" dogmatically1 the latter should not accept them blindly. They
are merely broad guidelines 1 and will best serve their purpose when they
are so considered and used.
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Allport, F. H. Theories 2!,.
Yorks Wiley, 1955.

perception~!!,!!

concept££_ structure.

New

Places Brentano•s orientation at the beginning of "the history ot
ideas leading up to Gestalt psychology.•
Allport,

o.

1938.

Personality• .! paz;chological interpretation.

Allport, G. Pattem
Winston, 1961.

~growth!!!

personality.

New Yorks Oxford,

New Yorks Holt, Rinehart &

Angell, Je R. The province ot functional psychology. ~. Rev., 1907 1 l.4 1
61-91. Also in w. Dennis (Ed.), Reaa.s .!!! ~ ~
p91choloq.
New York 1 Appleton-Centur,y-Crotta,
1 Pp. 4l9-456; --

21.

Angelloz, J. r. Goethe. Translated from the French by R. H. Blackley.
Yorks Orion Presa, 1958.
Bakan1 D.

Will psychologists stucJT human probleJU?

20, 186-191.

!!!!•

New

Psychologist, l.96S,

Barba.do, P. M. Introduction a la llico!1ia merimental. (2nd ed.. ) Madrid:
Conaejo Superior de Inve'itiga one• !en1 c u , 19'43.
In adclition to being quoted several times on specific topics, Brentano'•
viewa are briet31' considered and evaluated as a whole (pp. 310-Jl.6).
Among other things, the author praises Brentano'• critique ot associationia, and his succeas!ul ettort to relate the study of psychological
issues with that of logical and metapeyaical problems. On the negative
side, he takes issue w1 th Brentano' a doctrine ot the psychic relation
as a distinguishing characteristic of psychic phenomena.
Barclay1 J. R.

Themes of Brentano 1 s psychological thought and philosophical
overtones. !!!!, !!! Scholasticism,. 19591 3.3 1 .300-318.

Discusses in se~cmct (l} Brentano•s methodological approach to psycho•
logy (as ot 1874}, (2) his views on ti ve basic distinguishing characteristics ot psychic phenomena (listed and briefl,y described separately),
(3) his conception of judgments and emotions, and (4) his theory of
truth, values and consciousness. Philosophers reading this article
will be disappointed at not finding the promised "philosophical overtones,• at least not to the extent of their rightf'ul expectations.
Psychologists, instead, not being primaril,y concerned with this issue,
will find such an article instructive.

l.39
Bergman, H.

2a1-3arz.

Brentano•s theory of induction. Philos. Phenom.

!!!.••

l944,

5,

Highlights the central features of Brentano•s theory, and places it
into historical perspective in respect to the •epistemological issue•!
which was first raised by Hu.me ta denial of the validity of (inccaplete) induction, but which •surprising~ did not diSquiet most ot
the logicians of the l9th century.• While concluding that •Brentano•s
attempt to prove the law ot cauaallty with the aid of the prob&•
biliv-oaloulua tails,• the author asserts that both his idea o:r
connecting the theory of induction with the calculua of probability,
and the foundation g1 ven by him to the application o.t induction to
probl.sna of mathematics are of "lasting intereat and value.•

Boring, 1.

a.

Empirical Ps,-cbol.,

!!!!.!:• i.•

Pqchol., 1927, 38 1

475-477.

A clarifying eonnentar;y on the isaue ot experimental versus empirical
psychology first raised b7 Titchner (19211 1925) in regard to Bren•
tano•a and Wundt•s orientations, and subsequentl;y restated by Carmichael (1925). Considering ••empirical. psychology' u sanething
broader than ellperimental psychology, something which include• •experimental psychology•,• the author concludes that, strict~ speak•
ing 1 "in such a sense it cannot be opposed to •experimental psychology•,• while .granting a relative value to the oppoaition between
these two types of p87chologioal approaches, u defined by Titchner.
It is of interest to notice that, whila in his subsequent stand
(l928) on the matter under diacusaion Titchner aeema to have taken
into account tM clarification ottered by his moat illustZ'ioue pupil,
he does not make &!J3' direct mention of it.
Boring, I. a. A histo.g; of e~erimental pqchologz.
Appleton-C8ntur,. ron&,9.56.
-

(2nd ed.) New Yorks

The anthor seems to be too kind to his old teacher when he stateaa
"Titchner bas done more than arrr other writer to introduce Brentano
to Amer.l.ca:na• (p. 380). Thia is especiall;y so if we consider the
cue of knowledge which is interest-arousing. Titcbnerian Brentano,
in tact, would never have caught the attention of the American public.
B;r contrast, Boring's Brentano has done so to a very large extent.
Since the volume under consideration is a standard classic not onq
ol .American graduate students in psychology, but alao for arrr edu•
cated psychologist, no attempt is ma.de here to give a briet synopsis
ot his portrait ol Brentano. Suffice it to say that by and large his
portrait of our author hall been copied, with onl1" minor changes, by
most other subsequent American wr1 tera ot history of psychology text•

books.
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Brennan, R. E. . ~ !l!, psychology .f!2! ~
York: McMillan, 1945.

s~int

!?!. !

Thomist. New

The author makes brief reference to Brentano 1 s 0 act11 or "intentional•
psychology (adding to the diamq of future historians, "perceiving•
to Brentano•s sacred trilogy or fundamental cl.uses of psychic phe•
nomenaJ and seemingly over-emphasizing the similarity between his
conception of intentionality and that of scholastic thinkers). The
opposition o:t Brentano•• conception to Wundt 1s •content• psychology,
and its influence upon Stumpt, Husserl and tlw Austrian School
(which in turn inf'luenced Gestalt psychology) are called to the reader's attention. In addition, the author asserta, but does not prove,
that both American functionalism and Spranger•s •understanding• psychology are analogous or closely related to Brentano 1s act psychology, and that the c\v'namiC approach in psychology stemmed from Brentano•s orientation.
Brentano,

o.

Jungend•Errinerung an meiner Bruder. Padagogiacbe Monatshef'te,

19181 68, PP• 469-472.
Containa some inkling of Brentano•s brilliant mind, •good. heart," and
"strong" personality.
Brentano, F. Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Scienden naob Aristotelea.
Freiburg 1.Br.1 Herder, 1862.
Dedicated to Trendelenburg, this first work of Brentano clearly shoo
his outstanding ability for detailed anaqsis and keen synthesis, portrqing his underqing procrlivity to use the forum ot history to rethink in an original fashion or revitalize theoretical issues. Specifically, Brentano•s concern with the status and future of metapiv"sica
JIUQ" be detected in this work.
Brentano, F. Ad Disputationem 2 tlwse11 ...pro l;netranda venia docendi ...
def'endet et adhir81eciionem inav.g-ilr&lem pUb cam••• Invi tat Franciscua
Brentano.-A&c tenburg1 SChlpner, 1&>6.
In sequence, these theses deal with methodological questions (1-4),

ontological and metapeysical problems (5-11), issues in philosophical
psychology (12-15) 1 logical and linguistic inquiries (16-21) 1 ethical
investigatiollll (22-23) 1 and esthetics (24-25). The most important
o£ these theses, the one that became Brentano'• theoretical slogan,
ia the fourth one 1 Vera tilosofiehiae met.hodua nulla al1a nisi scientia.e
naturalis est.- Thetrt
t se tlieses, ?ollowedeyaCo"IlBll8ntary
and critic&rnote for each one of them1 was published by Kraus (1929 a).

or
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Brentano, F.

Die Psychoiafie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom

voV'f. .:1'"we~1~·

nzi''ltrchhihl, 1Bl>7.

-

This work, through which Brentano "habilitated" himself to the faculty

ot pjrl.losophy at the University or Wurzburg, is his second one. Fol-

lowing in the wake or his first study or Aristotle, and showing the
beginnings ot his lif'e-long goal to assure philosophy a sound and undisputed scientific footing, it presages the future central role
assigned by him to psychology in this respect. In terms ot its actual
content, one could single out again the thoroughness with which Bren·
tano attempts to establish the validity or his interpretation of Aristotle •s doctrine of the "active intel.la ct.• A final judgment on this
matter, however, must be le.t't to the historian of philosopl\Y.
Brentano, F. August Comte und die positive Philosophie.

Chilianeum, 18691 2.

Brentano's first published work following his 1867 study or Aristotle'•
psychological doctrines. It was basically written for the purpose of
convincing a Catholic intellectual audience that the spirit of positivism was not inco~atible with theism and metapb\Ysics. In this article,
Brentano also attempte to harmonize Comte•• philosophical view of history, and this author's conception of the hierarchical organization ot
sciences, with his philosophical interpretation ot the history of
philosophy.-Re-edited by Kraus (1926).
Brentano, r. P&ycho1ogie .!!:?!! 5irischen Stand.punktl X.ipziga Duncker & Humblot, 1874. (a)
Brentano 1a first, but by no means his last word in psychology.
present translation•
Brentano, F.

See the

..

Uber die Griinde der &tmutigung aut pbiloaophiscbem. Oebiete.

Wiena BraumnI1ir,'

1:874. (b}

-

Brentano•• inaugural professorial ad.dress delivered at the
University ot Vienna on April 22 1 1874 (~ sllghtl.Y over a month after
the publication or his Paycholof)• It contains an analysis of the main
objections or positivism agatnS philosoph.T, followed by •a proof ot ita
strength and rightful claim" for a place and tutu.re among the varioua
sciences. Surpriaingly enough, however, .Brentano here rests his case
on behalt of philosopbT upon Comte's poaitiviatic conception of a hierarchy ot sciences. Disregarding this inconsiotency, later on recognized
by Brentano him.self, his views on the dependence of 11Sociology and all
other branches ot philosopbT" upon psycholo8f remain in the mairustream.
ot his thinking.-Re-edited by Kraus (1929 a).
Origi~
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Brentano, F. Was fur ein Philosoph manchmal Epoche maoht. Wien a Hartleben,
1876.
--Originalq an address to a student's club at the University of Vienna.

It contains an e.xpoaition and critique or Plot1nus 1 philosopb;y, with
the specific purpose of showing its str1.ld.ng similarities to certain
modem philosophical conceptions (especialq Schelling's conception),
all being presented as concrete illustrations of that phase or decline
in philosopb;y which Brentano called mysticism.-Re-printed by Kraus

(1926).

Brentano, F.

-t\

_

__

Uber den Greatianismus des ......
Aristotelea.
.......,.......
Wiens Tempsky, 1882.

An exposition and defense of his interpretation ot Aristotle, according
to which this philosopher would have asserted beyond the shred or a
doubt the di vine origin ot man• s soul, and hence its apiri tuali ty and
immortal! V•

.,

Brentano, F. Miklosicha •Subjektlose S&tze. •
Nov. 1883, vol. 1.3 and 14.

Wiener A.llgemeine Zeitung,

ure

Reprinted by Brentano himself, tirat in his Von
s1 ttlichler
lrtcenntnis (1889) 1 and then 1n his Von der KIU'sif' aon der PsyC h!schen
PiLOitlene (l9ll), and as such includid Iiltfie present trana-ii'tion.
Brentano, r.
blot,

Van U!'8J?l".!!DI sittlichl.er Erkenntnis.

l8ar.-

lAipzigt Duncker & Hum-

an address delivered before the Vienna Law Society on January
231 1889, bearing the titles Of the Natural Sanction tor Law and Moral•
~. In printing it, Brentanocbanged this Utli •tn order t'Obrlng
Iti general purport more clear]¥ into prominence,• added a preface and
seventy two reference• or explanator;r notes (in et.feet doubling the
entire study), and appended his previousq published essq on Miklosich's
Subiectless Prolosi tions. Content wise, this essq deals w1 th three
bas c issues• ( ) the nature 0£ value judgments as determiners ot rules
ot dond.uct, (2) the ultimate rightness of these rules, and (3) the recognition ot the right.ness of these rules. It seems important to mention
that Brentano himself considered this work "the ripest product" of all
that he had •hitherto published,• and more specificalq as •a fragment"
ot his •Descriptive Psychology."-·Subsequent editions (l9ll, 1922, 1934,
Or1gi~

1955).

Brentano,

r.

---

Du Genie.

Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1892. (a)

Originall,y an address delivered to the Vienna Sociev of Engineers and
.Architeote. Its central and recurring theme is that "genial activity
differs from the non-genial alw~s in degree, but never in ldnd.u Proceeding methodological]¥ "from simple to more complex cases," and cast•
iDg the whole discussion into a .tairq adequate historical pers~ctive,
Brentano develops this theme as it applies to •geniuses" in the field
of •games," the acientitic field, and the field of tine arts. Diacounti.Dg as •at the ver:r least premature• U\Y attempt to explain "genial
phenomena• on the basis of •a special peyaiological constitution of the
brain,• he advances instead a psychological explanation, viewing than
as the "fruit or habit, or practice ••• according to conaon ps;yohological
laws" (such u the laws of •interest,• "participation• - including both
feeling and will-and "imprinting"). With a genial touch of his own,
Brentano concludes1 "What. was divine in (geniuses) lives also in ua,
even though it does not burn with such a bright flame, and this is exactq what makes us like them." In essence, this small treatise mq
be viewed u a chapter in his "genetic• psychology. Re-printed in
Gr!ffidsUg• ~ iesthetik (l9S9).

v. Du Schlechte alB
J.ipzig I 'fSiiioker & lfliiiblOi,

Brentano,

°ift•Mtand
dichteriaober DarsteJJ.u.!!1.
92. (6 J
-

Original.q an address d£livered to the Vienna

Socie~ of the Frieilds or
Literature, and recent]¥ reprinted. in Qrundzlige &tr A.athetik (1959).
Basioall,11 in this essq, Brentano ch&iienges an"d""Litriguea bis audience
to reconcile •the .tact• that •tbe representation of evil predominates
in poetey• with "the J.awlt that •tba representation of that which is
better ~ more value than the repreeentation or a lesaer good, or o.t
e'V'il.• Preaenting cOlllledl' u "the the8i• 1 " and traged1' u "the arsis
ot the soul" (in opposition to Ariatotle•a conception ot the latter
.. •catharsis•), be develops the theme that "the special value or a
representation is not dependent e.mlusiwly cm the goodness of that
which is represented.,• but also upon the extent to which it portray•
man-this •highest carrier ot history"-in its actual ex1atent1al con•
dition with its light and dark sidea.-In terms ot minor details, the
student ot personality theories might be interested in appraising
critical]¥ Brentano•s cl.aim that Moliere "gives onq a static picture,
and not the d;ynamics of human characters•1 and the student of Brentano •a personality, more likely than not, will detect a biographical
ring in the following statement: •There mq be tragedies without sad
outcome, but there cannot be Bn1' tragedJ' without sharp tragical conflicts, producing such a shock which still shudders the soul at the

end. 11

••

Brentano_, F. Uber ein optisohes Paradoxon, Zei tsch. Psychol. u. Pbyaiol.
Sinnesorgane. Leipzig, 18921 31 '349-358. (c)
Dellghttul.l\Y intrigued, almost as a c bild would under similar circumstances, when a friend physiologist first acquainted him with the now
classical Muller-Iqer 1l.lu8ion, Brentano undettook to prove, in this
article the eJCPlana tion which he had offered on the spur of the moment.
I.a against his friend, who was inclined to att.ribute this illusion to
kinesthetic sensations trom 979 movements or to some form of •associative" processes (whereb7 the end strokes of the center line are considered u belonging with it in one case, and u its extension in the
other), Brentano viewed it •as the conafltquenae of the law of the overestimation of smaller, and undereat:lmation of bigger angles.• He illus·
trates. his interpretation through sewral interesting s119JJ fications
and variations of the stimulus pattern in the illusion under discussion, and a few other stimulus combinations (including the Zo"'Uner figure).
t•

Brentano, F• Uber ein optisr.hea Paradoxon.
Sinnesorgane, 18931 51 61-82. (a)

Zei tschr. Psychol. u. Pb.,yeiol.
-

This second article of Brentano on optical illusions vaa prompted. by
the attention that Theodore Lipps bad given to his f:trst one on the
ver'Y' next isau.e of the same journal (ot Which he 1f&8 an editorial consultant). Deepq pleased (u he alvqs vu when hie vieva were publicq
recognised) that bis first article, though quite extemporaneous, bad
alread,y toll.owed in the .t'ootatepa ot babent sua tata libelli1 Brentano
aeema to have no ditticulty in dispos!iii ol biibJIPpai Ob3ectiona
against hi.a interpretation ot the Muller-~r illusion, and the solu•
tion be bad ottered in i ta pl.ace. As a by-product ot this further diac:mUion, however1 he realises that the
be bad inwked to explain
this illusion 1f&8 actualll' but an application ot a broader law ot
•genetic pqchology•...,.hich accounted for the tact that such illusion
varies depending upon changes in the stimulus pattem, as well aa upon
pS)"Chologioal or ptvsiological factors in the obeerwr.

•la•

C'9

Brentano, F. Zur Lehre von den optischen Tausclmngen. Zeitach. Psychol. u.
S1nneaorgane 1 1893 1 61 i-1. (b)
Brentano•a continued involvement with this problem was motivated by the
fact that not only had his first article 8l'OU8ed the interest of German
student• (through Lippa), but it had already' produced echoea in Frenchepeaking countries through a au.mar;y and critical d180U811ion ot it b7
J. Delboeut (Revue acient1tique 1 l.953 1 52 1 237 tf.). Needless to say
that Brentano was immesurabqpleased about the summary1 and found no
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difficulty" in answering Delboeut's criticisms and suggested explanation.
Ultimately1 while agreeing that "many- causes may be involved in producing the one and the same optical illusion," he insists that nevertheless •the factor invoked b)F him. is the most important."
~t

Brentano, F •

.YE!!~

Zukunft

2!!:

Philosophie. Wien1 Holder, 189). (o)

Originally a lecture delivered to the Philosophical Association ot
Vienna on March 22 1 1892 in refutation of the position taken b7 A.
Exner, Rector of the University' of that city", in his inaugural address
the previous ;year that (1) "philosophy has forfeited its sovereignt7
without 8n1' hope of ever regaining it,• and (2) the method of the
natural sciences is inapplicable to the Geieteawisaenschatten. In its
printed form, the lecture i tselt is suppmnt8d with an iiitroduction
and an appendix by' Brentano himself' .-Re-edited b7 Kraus 1 along w1 th
other studies, in a single volume bearing the same title (1929 a).
Die vier PhaHn der Philosophie
Stuttgartl&'t'ti; 1895. Ci/

Brentano, F•

.'.!!!!! ~

augenblicklicher Stand.

···

Originally an address delivered b7 Brentano to the Literar,r Association
the most complete single
expression of his philosophical interpretation of the history ot
philosophy. The essential ideas of this interpretation, however, are
quite simple. According to Brentano, in the three great period.a of
its history-the Greek, the Mediaeval and the Modern• philosoptv' baa
toll.owed a similar evolution, rwming through tour successive stageaa
a stage of aacendance, and three stages of progressive decline. It
will be sufficient here to point out that Brentano•s ultimate goal in
this context was to show that thia history needed not repeat itself
forever, i.e. that philosopl\}r, if properly conceived and baaed upon
sound foundations, could attain the same state ot progressive development that can be observed in all other sciences. Not only b7 implication, but ey direct statements, he perceived himself' as just the man
th.at would start philosopcy on its road to success.

ot Vienna on November 28, 1894. It contains

Brentano, F. Heine letzten wUbaohe fur Osterreich. Stuttgart• Cotta, 1895.
(b)

-

Reprint of articles published in the Vien Neue Freie Presse (December 2,
5, a, 1894), with a preface and two "supplements• tcontaLilng the critique ot the stand he had taken in those articles °bl' "eimr regierung•
f'reundlicher Prease,• and hi• i.,l1e1 to it). The articles themael"V8B
contain Brentano' a critical as SB&sment of ( 1) Austrian laws on marriage
(with special reference to his own case), and (2) the intellectual
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atmosphere and certain specific policies of the University of Vienna
(in general, and in particular as they related to his ef.f'orta to insure treedm of thinking and teaching, rejuvenate philosopb;y, and
turnish the young psychology tha proper media for growth and development - an Institute, and a Laboratory). •Accusations,• Brentano
tells us, were directed against him on both counts, especiall\v' the
tirstJ and he did not hesitate to •detend• h:imselt. Ultimateq, the
claim ot this booklet for scientific status seems to rest ~. it
not e.xclusiveq, upon Brentano•s views on the value and need for experimentation in psychology, and his distinction between "descriptive"
and "genetic psychology.• In terms ot historical context, Brentano
wrote his La.at Wishes upon re.signing his post at the University of
Vienna. 'l'ii.9'"reuona leading him to take tbia step, together vi th the
deep pathos and nostalgia connected with it, are well reflected in the
following statementaa 11 It hall been twenty years aince I came to Austria,
to Vienna and its University. I have come with inherited warm symp&•
t}W for this land and its peopleJ I have found the moat triendq re•
ceptionJ and u one of the noblest daughtera ot Vienna extended her
band to me u wife, I felt even more closeq united in brotherhood
with 'lfl¥ new people. Now fate hu it that tbia 1• the very reason
wb1'1 tailing in health, overwhelmed (with sorrow) and tettered in MT
best views for the common good.1 toc1q' I am thinldng or leaving
.A.wstria.•
u

9'·

Brentano, 1 • Uber Ind1v1duation1 lllllltimle
'·
Eracbe~. MUriC&m1 temua.n,

\l

Quall ti.'t

i-

-

uncl Intens1tat ainnlicher

Or.iginal.l1' a paper read at the third International Congress of Psychology

(Hum.ch, August 4·71 1896), this •tuc:V' •on the doetrine ot sensation•
wu subsequentq reprinted by Brentano (1907).

Brentano, F. Uber
" voraussetsnngslo;;e Forsehung. Muncher Neuesten Nachrieh-

!!!!1

December, 19011 vol. 131 No. S7l•

Reprinted by Kraus in his l926 edition of Brentano' s Die vier Pbasmi.
For a brie.t conment upon 1t, see the annotation to thisVOIUie.

and.a·

Brentano, '· The oriS!j of the knowle~ of ri~
. from the llerman,
th&i!'sraJ?liIC note,. 'Ce'
. Archibald CoJJ;>mv, 1902.

. •

Translated
Westminster•

As of now the onq work of Brentano translated into English. The translator seven-page long Bi9hical note actual.q refers primaril\v' to the
biOgrapiV' of Brentano•• 1fJ19ctUa.T'di'velopment, u expressed in his
published works.
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Brentano, F. Von der psychologischen Analyse der Tonqualitaten in ihre
eigentlichersten Elemente. Paper read at the fifth Intern. Congresa
Psychol. Roma, 1906.
Reprinted by Brentano in his Untersuchungen .!'!!!: Sinnesfsychologie (1907).
Brentano, F• Untersuchupgen ,!.!!: Sinnespsycholosie.
blot1 1907.

Leipzig i Dmoker & Hum-

Contains tvo papers read by Brentano respective~ at third and t1f'th
International Congress of Psychology (J.897 1 1900) 1 as mentioned in tm
iresent reference list. Several e21>lanator.y notes were added by Brentano to their publication in the present volume. Aleo included in this
work is an address Uber du phanomenale 0.., delivered by Brentano before the Vienna Philosophical Society on January 291 1893. The appen•
dix Zur ~ vom P~nalen a:rUn is in ettect a ltrewr1 te• of the
esseiiiI'arpirta ot this &aaress';Ttelding •a more concise, yet at the
same time more comprehensive conception, due to the addition of new
conaiderationa.•- For some reference to the content of the studie•
comprising the present volume, see the text of thia introduction.

Brentano1 F.
l90Ue

Thomu von Aquin.

Neuen Freien Prasse (Vienna), April 181

Written on the am:dveraar;r ot St. Tbomaa' death for the benefit of the
general publio, this article 1a largeq descriptive in nature and simple
in presentation, and as such of no special tJcientitic interest. A8 a
whole it present.a St. Thomas u ocCUJ>11.ng a a1•1lar position in Mediaeval thinking u Aristotle did in Greek Philosopey. This ia obviousq
the reason wb1' Kraua reprinted it in his 1926 edition of Brentano••
Die vier Phaaen.

------

Brentano, F. Von der Xlaae1t1kation ~ psychischen Ph&nomeue.
Duncker &T~t, 1911. (a)

Leipzig i

In et.feet the second edition of Brentano•s Psyoholo~, as authorized and
irepared by Brentano ·himself'. It contains
fut ive chapters ot
Book II, dealing with the broad problem ot the classification of psychic
phenomena, and an important Appendix (included in the present translation).

the

Brentano, F. Jriatotelea' Lebre vom Ur!J>!"WJi des menachlichen Geistee.
Leipzigt flet & comp,

l§u. m

t•

--

-

Reprint, with some changes, of his study Uber den Greatianiamus dea
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Aristoteles (1882), and of his Offener Brief an Herrn Professor Eduard
zeiier (lBB.3), which contains Brentano•s repJYto the critique or hli
Interpretation or Aristotle by this famous scholar ot the history of
Greek philosoph:,y. This controversy between Brentano and Zeller is well
known to the historian of philosophy.
Brentano, F. Aristoteles und seine Weltanscbauung•
l9ll. (c)
-

Leipsig: Quelle & Mayer,

Contains Brentano•s overall interpretation of Aristotle, bringing together and in part correcting the presentations ot his previous studies
on this author. Gives a detailed treatment and appraisal eapeoial.q of
Aristotele•s doctrine ot God.-It seems appropriate to mention here in

passing that Brentano muat be recognized aa one ot the best studenta
of Aristotle 1n mod.em times, though not necesaariq the most unpreju•
diced writer on the matter.

Brentano,

----

r. Zur Lehre von Raum und Zeit. 1Cant-Stud1en, 19201 24, 1·23.

Dictated on February- 291 1917, just slightq over two weeks before his
death, this
is a clear testimo!\V' to Brentano•s continued interest
throughout most of his life 1n thia problem, and at the same time a sign
of residual dissatisfaction on his part concerning his successive efforts to find a complete:q satisfactory anaver to it. 'l'he general make•
up of the present e!fort (sixteen pages devoted main]¥ to a cr:1 tique of ·
several doOtrines on this probla from Aristotle to linsteinJ one page
to a 8Wlll1ary of •positive• tinding•J and the zwiaining five pages to a
prevent! ve rebuttal of anticipated objections) and 1ts lack of closure
seem to lend support to this impression.

••881'

Brentano,

r.

Die Leh.re Jen und ibre bleibende Bed.eutung.

1922. ,.,-

-

-

-

-

Leipzig• Heiner,

The-preface to this work throws some light upon Brentano•• inner relig•
ioua crisis. As a whole, this little volume shows that Brentano re•
tained tht'oughout his life, after his separation from the Catholic
Church, a simple Christian faith.
Brentano, r. Vom Urap!!!!i sittlicher Erkenntni8. Edited, with an Introduction and Cormnentaf.Yby 6. Kraus. Leipziga Heiner, 1922. (b)
In addition to Brentano'• original (1889) stuc:t_y (less ~oine of its footnotes, eubsequent~ published by the editor 1n Wahrheit und Evidenz),
this vol\lllle contains a tew other brief •treatises• deaUng with ethical·
epistemological theory and problems in •Practical Philoaopey.• - Subsequent edit.ions (1934, 1955).
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Brentano, F. Pcuhologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Vol. 1. Edited, with
an Introduc on and Comenta.ry, bY 6. Kraus. Leipzig: Meiner, 1924.
Contains Book I and the first f'our chapters of Book II of Brentano•a
original Psycholo&f_.-Available also in a subsequent unchanged edition

(Hamburgs Metner, 955).

Brentano, l. P;t!hologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Vol. 2. Edi ted1 vi th
an Introducon and Commentary., by lJ. Kraus. Leipziga Heiner, 1925. (a)
Besides Brentano•s 19ll Classification of Psychic Phenomena, this volume
oont-Jrl.ns a second appendix, added by: tl'ieediiOr, under the general title
of Uber Ansohauungen, Begriffe und Verstandesdinge• It may be ot
some interest to note that one "Orthe lour •easqs• coq>rising this
appendix was dictated by Brentano on March 71 1917 1 o~ eight days
before his death.-·Available also in a subsequent unchanged edition
(Hamburg• Meiner, 1959).

Brentano, F. Versuoh llber die Erkenntnis. Edited, with a Commentary, by
A. Iastil. telpzig'IM8rner1 !925. Cb)
Contains several studies (mostq in the nature of "dictations"') ex•
tending roughl1' over
last twentq years of Brentano•s lite. The
title may have been chosen by the editor with the conscious intent
to put this volume in direct line ot descent fran I.ocke'a and
Leibniz's epoch-making
and from Laplace's less well known,
but equal11' important, Phi sophioal esff!mon probabilities. In
essence, this volume !s a theory 01' epls iOrOgy, and more apeci!ical.J¥ a theory ot induction, with definite "psychological overtones.• Its longest single essay (dated 1903) ia entitled: "Down
with Prejudices: a word ot exhortation to the present world to free
itself, in the spirit ot Bacon and Deaoartea, ot all blind a-priori."
Supplemented with additional studies, this esaq forms the core ot
a four-part treatise, touching upon: (l) scientific philosopbT and
philosophy ot prejudice, (2) the logical character or mathematics,
(3) the problem of induction, and (4) the universal principle ot
causalitq and the imposaibilitq of absolute chance occurrence for
an;ything which ia or was or will be. A twenty-page long easq on
probability (dated 1916) completes the text of this volume.

the

Eam•·

Brentano, F. Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stan<J'•
Edited, with an Introduction and Comment&rY; rro::itraus. Leipzlga
Meiner, 1926.
In addition to the study Die vier Phasen (l89S)proper1 and the studies
on Comte ( 1869) 1 Plotinus""'\I8lO'T; and Thomas _!2!! Aquin ( 1908), appraised

1$0
separate~ in the present reference list, this volume contains three
more studies: Uber Kants Kritik d.er Gottesbeweise (19u..1912), Sch~fen•
hauer (19ll•l9nJ; and tfber voraUiietzupgs!Ose Forschw'Jj (1910). O
ill these studies, the last one, at best, bears oiili an indirect re•
l.ationahip to the central theme of the volume as a whole, and far less
theoretical value than its title would lead one to believe.

Brentano, F • Vom sinnllchen und noetischen Bewusstsein. (Psychologie 1 Band
IIIJ. Edltid, with an Introdu.ctlon and Commentary, by o. Kraus.
Leipzig: Meiner, 1928.

As ooncei ved by Kraus 1 the third volume of Brentano' s Paye hology would
have included two parts. The second part, to be en ti tied Untersuchf8en
zur Sinnep!f§holpsiiimeand consisting eesentia]4r of a new edition o
lirentano•s 67 vo
bearing this title, together with new "essqs•
dealing more speeifical~ with the psychology of colors and sounds, wa.a
act~ never published.
The present volume includes on4' the first
part, bearing the subtitle: Wahme~, lmpfi~, ~· It is
in tun1 divided into two sections,
&ringrespecveliWilfi (l) basic
issues under~ing specific problems in the psychology of sensation
(inner perception in the sense of secondary consciousness, inner perception in the sense of seconc:Ja.1'7 consciousness, irmer perception in
the strict and broad HDDe 1 possibility of sensory deception, distinction between perception, observation and comparison, perception and
apperception, perception in modo recto and modo obllquo, time perception), and (2) phenomenologiCirpsychology OT"'iensory and nootio con•
soiousneas (analysis of eensol"T and noetic objects of inner perception,
the process of abstraction and the universal character of all perceptions and sensations, especial3'1 time and space perceptions, consciousness of absolute ti.me and of its concrete manifestations). The philos•
opher will undoubte~ recognize this landscape as familiar territoryJ
but let him not forget that the psychologist, too, has a right to move
within its boundaries and pass his own value judgment upon it. - For a
comment on a projected fourth volume ot Brentano•s Psyohology, see the
annotation to his Religion ~ Philosop!:>z ( 1954) •

.,

Brentano, F. Uber die Zukun.tt der Philos3hie. Edited, with an Introduction
and Commentary-;1)y
krau8,( 2iid ed. Ieipzig 1 1929. (a)

o.

In addition to the original.. stud;y bearing the same title, thia volume
includes the reprinting of Uber die Gri'inde der &itmut~ aut Philosomschen Gebiet ( 1874), a.'iicr'o.t"Brentano' ·~ ltabilltiOn""'T!ieses
(l ), and the first printing of a lecture Uber Schelling PhilosGhie.
Delivered by Brentano to the Philosophical Association O? V!enna
1889 1 this lecture incorporated part of the text of his "habilitation"
address at the University of Wurzburg in 1866 under the title of Uber

-

lSl
Schelling PhiloCrthie in ihren verschiedenen Phasen: Dartestellung und
rrlti<12:e• The
tlqueof' SChelJliii•s phllosopt\}r, omltted In i'ilsiB'B9
!ecture, was reproduced by Kraus in the present volume. It is worth
mentioning that Brentano 1 s choice of a topic for his "habilltation•
address waa probab~ motivated also by the fact that Schelling hirrself'
had taught at Wurzburg from 1803 to 1806, and had left behind considerable influence. The reason for bringing together into a single volume
these disparate writings is the fact that they- all throw light upon
Brentano• s views upon "scientific• methodology.

Brentano, F. Vom Dasein Gottea. Edited, with a Preface and Conmentar,y, b)'
A. Kast11;-Lelpaig a Reiner, 1929. (b)
Although not labeled in this manner, the volume may be said to include

two main sections, reflecting respectively Brentano•a "earlier• and
•later• views on the problem ot the existence of God. The first and
main section (44.$ pages out of 490) 1 bearing the tiUe of the book it•
sell in the table of contents, presents his thought on this problem, as
developed in his lectures both at the Universiv of Wurzburg and at the
University of Vienna (1868-1891) 1 but basically aa fouhd in a manu•
script of the year 1891. Theae lectures e:xpresa his •earlier• views.
His "later• views on the problem under consideration are contained in
a short study bearing the title "Progress of thought in the demonstration of the exietence ot God,• dictated b7 Brentano 1n 191.S, and
printed for the first time in the preeent volume. To clarify the labels
•earlier• and •iater,• as uued here, it will be sufficient to point out
that the evolution of Brentano•s thought on the problem under discuassion
doe"' not imp~ discoctinilty, and still leas opposition, in his basic
'!lllder].;ving pbilosophical attitude. Content wise, after an introduction which underlines the theoretical and practical interest of the
probiMtm of e:d.stence of God, Brentano•s •lectures• are divided into
two main partss (1) Prellmi~ researches (establishing the need for,
and posaibilitQ ot, demonatrang the eilatence ot Ood1 aa against the
stand ot both those who assume that the existence of God 1• selt-evident, and those who asswne as equaJ4r self-evident that it is undemonstrabl.e), and (2) Proofs of the existence ot God (contining a veey extensive, detailed exposltl'On'"Ol' the teieol.Ogi'CiI argument, from the
vantage point of the cri ti 111• advanced against it by several modern
thinkers, and a brief anaqsis of other traditional argumnts). In
terms of the several •steps• in the demonstration of the existence of
God outlined in the study mentioned above, it is of interest to notice
that the point of departure ot Brentano•a analysis of "temporal con•
tinu.1 ty• (on which be bases himself to justify the principle of sutf'i•
cient reason, and through it the principle of causali t7) is derived
from one of the theories of his descriptive psychology• the theory of
the "temporal modes" of imagination.

1.52
Brentano, F. Briere on A. Marty, und Krauss gegen entia rationis•
by- Kraus. Philos. Hette, 1929 1 2. {c)

Edited

Reprinted in Wahrheit und Evidens (pp. 87-11.3). For a general statement
of their meaning, Withinthe context of Brentano•s intellectual evolution, ••• the annotation to this work in the present reference list.
Brentano, F. Wahrheit und Evidenz. Edited, with a Preface, Introduction
and Commentari, by.0. Kraus. Ieipziga Heiner, 1930.
As indicated by the editor himself, the several •treatises" comprising
this volume "do not constitute the qstematic exposition of one and
the same theory-, but instead present Brentano'• thought in its ext.•tential evolution.• This is reflected in the nature and sequence of
the four parts into which the present work is divided• Early' doctrine,

Transition to the new doctrine, Exposition of the new doctrine in let•
ters, Exposition of the new doctrine in treatises. Of the six treatises
making up the first part, six are mere reprints of footnotes f'ound in
the first edition of Brentano•• Vom Ur:!&iiif sittlicher Erknntnia in
1889 {nn. 211 22 1 23 and 27)J of the re
ng two, one (iOli the concept of truth•) is the text of a lecture delivered b7 Brentano to the
Philosophical Association ot Vienna (March 31 1889) 1 and the other
(•Being in the sense of the True•) a "fragment,• dating around 1902.
The eonmon theme underl\ring these treatises is Brentano'• modification
of the Aristotelian concept or tru.th {truth does not consist in an
adequatio rei et intellect.us, but in an ademtio ot our judgment with
G 6elng ornOri.OSelng Ol something, i.e. Vi L existence or nonexistence of its object), and his consequent adoption of the theo17 of
so.called "being of reason," aubsequentq rejected b7 him. Thie rejection is ushered in by- Brentano•s critical studies of linguistic
expressions, though which he tries to ahow that all "abstracts" nouns
(such as being, non-being, possibillqr, imposaibillty-1 etc.) are mere
denomi:nationea extrinsicae i.e. mere "co-signifying" {mitbedeutende)
worda. I 18tter to his pupil A. Mar'tiy' dated March 1901 (*Grammatical
abstract nouns as fictions•) and two other short treatises (1904, 1905),
making up the second part ot this volume, are illustrative of these
studies and or Brentano•s orientation during his period of "transition
to the new doctrine." The last two parts present this "new doctrine,"
as found respecti vels' in a ser·ies of nine ·let~ra wri ttcsn by- Brentano ·
to A. Marty, o. Kraus, and F. Hillebrand over a ten year period {1906•
1916), and in six treatises dated 1914•1915. In e asence, this new
doctrine represents but a logical step beyond the previous two phases,
reflecting his absolute conviction, now, that so-called "ideal objects"
were mere "fictions 1 " and his equally' absolute confidence in the correctness of his doctrine ot "evident• judgments or judgments "charac-

terized as right." Two letters of Brentano to Husserl (dated
January 91 and April JO, 1905), added in an appendix to this volume,
retain a value of their own, above and beyond the relationship of
their content to the basic issues debated in it.
Brentano, F.
by

JCategorienlehre.

Edited, with an Introduction and Commentary,

A. Kasili. I.elpzlg1 Heiner, 1933.

In comparison with modern subjectivistic conception of the categories
as mere modes or· knowing, Brentano•s stand that "the doctrine of categories (is) one or the most important parts of ontology" represents an
obvious "return to Aristotle.• Thi• tact alone is sufficient to alert
the reader to the underqing thread connecting the various treatisea
comprising this volume (most of them written during the period 1907•
1916) with his first work Von d.er annitache::i Bed.eu. . des Seiend.en
nach Aristoteles publisbediiiOre than torty years ear er~hat
!reiitano•s Aristotle in the laat decade of his life differs signitican~ from the Aristotle ot his earl.T adulthood. is indicated by a
special section in the second part of the present volume •Concerning
the understanding and critique of the Aristotelian doctrine of categories,• and by a conatant effort throughout the other eaaqs to re•
interpret the views of this thinker in the light, and in function, of
bis own intellectual evolution. Elements of "linguistic clarifications"
and epistemological considerations (prominent in the first part of this
volume, but again present throughout its contents) asaiat Brentano in
both his historical and theoretical task. The latter is perhaps best
expressed in the third part entitled "The last three outlines of the
doctrine of categories.• An appendix bearing upon "The nature o£ the
corporeal world in the light of the doctrine of cateeoriee• completes
the vol.um6s work.

Brentano, F. Vom Urapru.ng si ttlicher Erkenntnis. Edi ted1 with an Introduc•
tion and C'Ciimintar,y, by

o. Kraus.

L8lpz!'.g1 Meiner, 19.34.

Third edition, augmented by a treatise entitled Vom Lieben und Ha.seen.
A fourth edition, unchanged, ha.a subseque,ntq been miae aVallibli
(Bamburg: Meiner, 19.55).
Brentano, F. Onmd.le@:°JrS'utbau der Ethik. Edi.t.od, with an Introduction
and Commentary,
., ska Maier-Hnlibrand.. Bem: Francke, 1952.

Presents Brentano'• idea.a on Ethics sa towid in annotations and outlines used by him in his lectures on "Practical Ppi.loeop}\y" at the University of Vienna (1876-1894). In its present form, the text is supple•
mented with statements taken from o. Kraus• works and other works ot
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Brentano. This painstaking editorical work was origi~ undertaken
by A. Kutil, and subsequ.ent4', after his death in 19501 wu brought
to completion by the present editor, one of his pupils. Content wise,
following a brief introduction (covering some general topics to be
expected at the beginning of 11\Y' course in Ethics), this volume is divided into six parts, touching upon the following broad issues s principles of ethical knowledge, the highest practical good, freedom ot
the will, morality in general, ethical principles, actualization of
ethical principles. The theme underlying all of these issues, and throwing light upon Brentano•a own answers to them, is his basic conception that ethics is neither •heteronomous" (dependent upon extrinsic
norms), nor •autonomous• (in the sense of Protaogru• famous dictum
"man is the measure ot all things•), but •ortho:nomous• (in the sense
that the true •measure of all things• is not •man as such," but "man,
the lmower, insofar as he judges with evidence• (einaichtig).
Brentano, F. Re1t:1on und Philosophie. Edited, with an Introduction and
Commentary,
Franzisk& M8ier-Hlllebrand. Berna Francke, 19$4.
The goal of this volume is to present Brentano•• overall views on
•the relationship between philosopl\v' and religion• and their common
tasks.• As can easiq be interred from the commentary", an almost
herculean and extremeq aaaic:luau ettort (first by A. Kutil and
tben by the present editor haraelt) went into •uaembling• this
volume from very disparate sources (notes, outlines, lecture excerpts, letters, summaries from. previous printed worka). In spite
ot this, aa indicated by the editor herselt1 Brentano•a viewe remain
fragmentary in a number of instances. In terms of content, the
volume contains tour major sections (each subdivided into several
parts), dealing reapectiveq with the following topics& (l) philosophical essay on religion (concept and tasks of religion and philosophy,
religion and typical torma ot religion, the philosopher's attitude
toward •popular• forms of religion), (2) existence and nature of God,
and his relation to the world, (3) problems in theodicy (origin of
evil and its compatibility with the "ordinances• of an all-powerful
and all-good God, optimism vel'8\18 pessimism), and (4) apiri tuali ty
and immortality ot man's aoul. The last part was edited by A. Kutil over a ten year period (193.3-194.3), and was or1ginall1' intended
by him to form the core of a fourth volume on Brentano•s Psychology
(in addition to the three volume• edited by Kraua). The present
editor justifies its inclusion in this volume because, according to
Brentano, the most important task of both philosoptv and religion
ia directed to prove the spirituality and immortality of man's soul.
JJa it preaentl1' stands 1 this part contains an exposition and critique
of the most important "mind•body" theories, toll.olfed by a detailed
statement of proofs designed to show that "the psychic BUbjectF, 11

1.e. "the subject of our psychic activities," is a spiritual,
non-dimensional., non-spatial substance,• and as such immortal.
Among other things, within this context, Brentano debates the
issue ot whether 8ll1' one part of the brain or the brain as a
whole could be the substrate of psychic activities. In view
ot his repeated insistence in previous studies upab. the spirituallqr of Aristotle's "active intellect,• it is ol interest to
notice in pasaing that in the present volume he argues against
the "aemimaterialiam" ot thia author.
Brentano, F. Die Labre von richtigen Urteil. Edited, with an Introduction
and CommeiiGz7, b7 Yranzlak&1Lier-Hiil8brand.. Berns Franoke, 1956.
Baaed upon Brentano'• lecture• on logic (1878·18791 1884-188$, 1887)

and other manuscripts on the theoey of knowledge, the volume attempts

to present Brentano•s conception ot "right• ("characterized aa right,•
•evident•) judgment as a unified whole. In eaaenoe, it gives us Bren•
tano•a own tbeor.y of knowledge.. Aa it atands 1 this volume contains an
introduction (which introduces the reader to the vision of logic as
the doctrine, or better the art, of right judgment) 1 and four parts,
each of which are further divided into numerowt subparts. It will be
n.tf'icient here to list the main areas of disOU.sion with a tn broad
illustrations ot its actual contenta (1) •Ideas and their linguistic
fictions, selbstebedeutende and mitbedeutende terms, claaaitications
ot concepts, judgment and propo8ltions,(types ot judgment)J (2)"0n
immediate knawledge•(a-~ori and a~!fateriori truth8 1 proof• of a•
~teri.ori sources ot ~age, proo 01 the sources of a-priod""'
Ldie)J (.3) •On mediate knowledge• (concept of media~kn0Vledge 1
deductive or •evident• reasoning, detenae of the value of e,yllogism1
problem ot inductionh (4) •On probability• (concept of probabillqr,
Laplace•s principles ol probability, Bernouille 1 s theorem, formation
ot b7potheaes and induction, the principle of causality). The impor•
tance of this volume, within the context of Brentano's thinking, needs
hardq be emphaaised, in view of the fact that Brentano, like Descartee
(and many other thinkers since tha) 1 was convinced that without satis...
factory answers to the questions diacuaaed in it (theory ot knowledge)
progress in philosophJ'1 indeed in 8Zf7 scientific Aacipline, was im•
possible.
•C>

...

Brentano, F.

GrundzK!e der Aesthetik. Edited, with an Introdu.ction and
Commentar,r, by amlaka Lier:Hil.lebrand. Berns Francke, 1959.

Based upon Brentano'• lectures (1885•1886) on "Selected problems from
psychology and eathetics," other unpublished material, and some pre•
vious]¥ published studies by Brentano h:1mselt ( 1892 a, 1892 b), both
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annotated separateq in the present reference list) or by bis

editors. In esaenee 1 it presents all that Brentano ever said on
the matter {and he never said it in complete form, at least not aa
complete as his pronouncements on ethics and logic). Found between
covers are three parts, dealing respective:q with {l) "Selected
problems in psychology and esthetics" (concept of psychology and
esthetica, inclnding a rather comprehensive •longttudinaln historical
perspective, which in turn includes a detailed elq)Osition and sharp
critique of the various theories discussedJ relationship between
psychology and estbetics, with an anaqsia of 8 descr1pt1ve 11 and
•genetic" psychologyJ investigations on imagination-a forty•five
page long •treatise"J Du Genie), (2) "On the beauti~" {the concept ot the beautitulJ val.ue relationships ot ou.r repreaentationaJ
Daa Schlecht.ea ala Gegenstand dichteriacher Darate~), and (J)
~alHca'Elon and lSaessment ot art* (some generCiOnsideratione
and principles 1 followed vi th some essays •on mute•).
Brentano, r. Geschichte der Griecbiachen Philosopbie. Edited, with an Introduction and d'OliilientarT1 bi Pi'iiiZlak& JGi8r-ttllle brand. Berna
Francke, 1963.
Based upon Brentano• s lectures on the history ot pbilosopl\v' (WurzburgVienna). Even in their available broad outline forms, these lectures
show hov vell Brentano set the stage tor bis •saga,• and how well he
knew the part which each actor vaa pl.qing or which he asked him to
pl.q. ot course, the hero in this :narrative is Aristotle, taking up,

as he does, one-third ot Part I, "the ascending pbaae• (beginning with
the Ionian philosophers) and aitting majestical.q at ita apex. Aa
might be expected, Part II, "the phase of decline,• 1• au.ch ahorter1
onq eighty-seven pages, in comparison w1 th three-hundred-and-nine
pages, making up Part I.

s.

Aaaociationia and "act" paycbology. In C. Murchison (Ed.) 1
Psycho~ies 9!, .m.Q• Worcester, Maas.1 Clark Univer~iv Press, 19.301

Brett, G.

PP• ~'-~ •

Leas than one page is devoted to .Brentano in this stud_v, but it's
worth reading, identifying weJ.4 as it does, the nature and e.A-tent

ot the baaic ditterence between bis orientation and that ot empiristic

usociationia.
Brett,

a. s.

lirhol°fni•nwin.Edited
abridged by R. s. Peters.
Nev Yorks McMillan, 195.3.

s.!
George __ _en

History

Also Iondona

and

&

Contains a general 8Wllllal'Y ot the content ot Brentano•s Pszcbol2Q:•
In terms or overall appraisal, the author makes reference to the
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label of "neo-scholastic" sometimes pinned on Brentano, adding that
while on the one hand "the cnphaais must be laid on the word. •scholastic•,• on the other his •modifications or the old in the face of the
new, and the new in the face of the old, are so tar .fundamental that
the work is never in danger of being regarded as a futile resurrection
ot dogmas.• In addition, the author makes a passing reference to the
progress away from physiological and e:xperimental psychology,• suppoae<iq
to be tound in Brentano'• orientation.
Brightman, E. s. The finite self. Inc. Barrett (Ed.), ConteS?orarz idealism
!n Amrica. Hew Yorks MacMillan, 1932.

"% way of an experiment in testing the valldi ty of the idealistic view
of the finite seit,• the author anaqzea (pp. 183-192) "some ot the
main features of the account of the selt• given by Brentano, whom he
considers, together with Lotze and Dilthey, aa one ot "the chief names
in mod.em psychology." Needless to say that, while recognizing that
Brentano aa •an Aristotelian. •• is out of sympathy with modern idealia,•
the author ultimateq finds in his views •a certain relation to id.ea•
llsm. • This prejudiced position, however, does not pre~t him frcm
making some keen observations on Brentano'• holistic conception of the
"mind.•

••

Bruck, Maria. Uber da8 Verhaltni• Edmund &a•rl•s n Franz Brentano vornehm•
~ !!:!,! &kat'Chi
Brentanoa P!jciiO".eii•• lrurzhurg 1 Mitsch, l§jj.

.!!£

A descriptive, anaqtical comparison ot "the philosopqy or Husserl with
that of Brentano,• based upon ample, and general.q well selected references to their main works. The several topics discussed are arranged
in a logical, -ntngful sequences general comparison between Brentano•s
descriptive psychology and &sserl•s pbenomenologyJ anaqsis ot tunda•
mental d1f"terences in their theories of consciousness, and of equal.l.1'
tundamental concomitant d1tferencee concerning the nature of psychic
processes, especialq the so-called "evident perception"J hence, an
anaqsis of their opposite doctrines or evidence, leading to a discussion of their stand as to tlle doctrine ot the object or knowledge,
and to a concluding appraisal or the reproach of psychologism directed,
or at least interred, by Hu.aserl against Brentano. Uae.tul as an introduction to a more critical study in depth of the relationship between
these two thinkers, or as a terminal point for those who, for lack of
formal philosophical background or other reasons, do not wish to delve
into the finer nuances or their views.
Calkins, M.

501.

Psychology as a science of selves. Pbilos •

.!!!!••

19001 91 490-
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!!!

C&lldns, M.

introduction ]2 psycholos.v•

Calkins, M. Psychology as a science of self.
Method, 1908, 5, i2-20, 64-68, m-122.
Calldna, M.

!

first~!!!

psycholgsz.

New York: McMillan• 1901.

:!•

Philos. Psychol.Scient.
.

New York: McMillan, 1909.

Calkins, M. Autobiograph,y. In c. Murchison (Ed.), ! histog !?£. pffcholos.y
in autobiosra.p&. Worcester, Mus. a Clark Universlti ress, JO.

JP. j1:62.

Carmichael, L. What is empirical psychology? Amer. J. Psychol., 1926, 37,

521-527.

.

-

-

Carr, H. Autobiograph,y. Inc. Murchison (Ed.), A histo~of psychology in
autobiograpb;y. Worcester, Mass. a Clark University
ii, i§jo, Pp: j!.

62. (bj

Carr, H. Functionalism. In c. Murchison (Ed.), Psycholo~ies
cester, Mus.a Clark Univeraitf' Press, 19301 PP• 59- 8.
Eaton, H. The Austrian ,Rhiloaop& of values.
homa Press, 1936.
-

~

19.)0. Wor-

Oklahomaa University' of Qkla.

Three out of fourteen chapter• in this volume (pp. l.5-83) are devoted
to an analysis of the content of Brentano' s Psfcho~ and The Qrk.~
of the Knowledge of nsht and Wrong, with pert nenerltica!C'oiiiieiiti,
ot course, ade neatlon of th8 relationship between his orientation and the orientation of the Austrian School. The most comprehenai ve and, in maJ'l1' respects, the best single stud;y on Brentano in
English.

and,

Eisenmeier, J. Franz Brentano•s Lehre der .&npfincbmg.
ahette, 1918, 68 1 PP• 473-492.

·~
P!dffogishe
Monat-

An e:meptionally good e.xposi ti on ot Brentano' s doctrine of sensation,
supplemented with pertinent critical comments. Being based not only
upon relevant works ot our author (1892 c, 1893 a, 1893 b 1 1907), but
also upon "oonversationa" with him and "handwritten outlines• of manu•
scripts which were subsequently published, this study retains its full

value even todq.
Flugel, J.

c.

A hundred

_2!! developients

'1§4; •-c
of ~Qacholo~833-l933 a with ad<il.or}toniJ~r.r'
n ed.)
dona Geral.d15Uekw

1933•

1

•

Considers Brentano as "the first important• representative of 11syste•
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matic psychology," whose 11 originall v ..• consisted in uni ting an ins1.stence upon activity with a strict empiricism." Some of the main
influences of his orientation upon subsequent trends in psychology
(the Austrian School, the Wurzburg School, Gestalt Psychology) are
br,ief'q stated. "The revolt started by Brentano again&t the associ•
ationistic outlook," instead, is analyzed in greater detail, and in
an original manner, insofar as it ia viewed within the conteat of its
influence upon •moat of the important writer• of textbooks on systematic treatises in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century"
(Ward., Stout, Lippa, Hottding, Iulpe, and James). Equalq original
is his statement concerning the inf'luence o£ •the work ot Brentano
and other members of the •Austrian School• ••• aa a directing element
in Spearman•s ambitions attempt to formulate the •principles of
cognition•.•

Oemelli, A. Nuovi oriz1onti dllla psicologia eperimenta.J.e. Milano• Vita
e Pensiero, 1924.

Oemell1, A. Funzioni e strutture paichiche.

.&.!• Psicol., 1942, 211 57-89.

In an effort to clarU)r anci define the object ot psychology, the
author evaluates the point ot view of several psychological school.a
and/or individual psychologists. Brentano•a stand on the distinction
between •aot• and •content,• ia brietq discussed within this context.
In general, Oemelli rates Brentano very high tor his etfort •to avoid
the danger on the one hand of tautological definitions, and on the
other of giving a definition of psychology which presupposes a philosophical system.• In terms of details, he argues against him on the
grounds that the character ot intentionality of pS70h1c phenomena,
while important, is not sutficient to distinguish them from physical
phenomenaJ and criticizes him for his failure supposedq to include in
his definition of psychic phenomena the tact that these phenomena
ttpreaent themselves as related to an I, to a subject.• The article
also contains a comparison between Brentano and Binet.
Gilson, E. Frans Brentano•s interpretation ot mediaeval philosophy.
Mediaeval Studies, 19391 11 PP• 1-10.
A.a an outstanding contemporary philosopher and one ot the first and

foremost scholars of the history ot mdiaeval thought, Gilson de•
llneates skilltulq the origin and nature o£ Brentano•a philosophical
interpretation of the history ot philosophy in general and mediaeval
philosopl\Y in particular, showing that 1t.wu •a perfectq sound and
legitimate reaction against philosophical despair• in Brentano, on the
psychological level, and •quite in keeping with the central inspira-
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tion of (his) own philosopey,n on the theoretical level. His.central
thesis is that, while Brentano•s doctrine contains "a nucleua of truth"
(the basic problem posited by the ebb and flow of philosophical systeJns is "nothing less than the nature of philosophical knowledge itself•), at the same time it contains "s:>me fundamental mistakes concerni?lg the very nature of that truth" (insofar as Brentano "never
upllci~ resorted to more than psychological elrplanations of the
philosophical evolution•).
Gilson, E. ~· lttre

!! ]:'essence. Parisi Vrin, 1948.
248-285) a pertinent critique of Brentano•s

Contains (pp.
theory of
existential judgment, and a brilliant elrposition of an Uternate viewpoint.
/

Gilson, Incie. Methode et me't!;p&siqge selon Franz Brentano.
1955. (a)
-

Pariss Vrin,

An exhaustive study, both exposito17 and evaluative, of how Brentano
conceives the application in metaplJTsics of "the great methodological
principle stated by him in 1866,• and how his thinking in the matter
•evolved,• while •remaining taithtul to some of its deep (original)
requisites.• .l discuaaion of Brentano•a philosophical conception of
the history of philosoplJT is found appropriatel.1' at the beginning of
this stl>.dT, because it conditions Brentano•s original conception that
"the true method of philosopby is no other than that of the natural
aoience.• There follows an a:n&qsis or his conception or the method
of mathsnatical sciences, of the inductive method, and of the bearing
ot induction upon the' principle of causality in its basic philosophical
import, which paves the wq tor the more specific discussion of the
method in metapb;ye1os. This study is more than vortey of consideration
1*: any investigation touching upon the content and/or theoretical premises ot his metapb7aical doctrines.
Gils~

mcie. La psychologie descriptive selon Frans Brentano.
(b) -

1955.

Paria 1 Vrin,

An imposing study of Brentano 1 s descriptive psycholog)r in its phtlo-

eophioal premises and implications, i.e. insofar as it is viewed by
A good portion of it is
appropriateq devoted to an anaqsia of strict:q philosophical issue•
(the concept ot reality 1 the ideas of substance and accident, and
being in the improper sense). The author's philosophical frame of
reference is also reflected in the treatment or the other topic discussed (psychology from an empirical standpointJ Brentano•s analyeis
him aa "the central philosophical science.•
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of psychic life in 1874J autonomy and development of descriptive psychology).
·
Hauber,

v.

1936.

Wahrheit und Evidenz bei Franz Brentano.

-

-

Stuttgarta Schneider,

.

An anaqtical presentation ot Brentano•s views on the issues under consideration, basicalq designed to call into question the interpretation of the viewa as advanced b;y Kraus, Kutil and latkov. The
author also criticises the critique ottered b;y Geiser (a Thmist) ot
Brentano•a theory ot evidence. Ult1mate]¥, therefore, it is not quite
clear what kind of moderate realist Brentano ia, now how his realist
conception bears upon the "relative and provisional criterion of truth"
presented by the author as a way out of theoretical difficulties.

Hernandez, M. D.
19S3.

Francisco Brmtano.

Sal.amanca: Universidad de Salamanca,

Next to Kastil's book, the on]¥ existing comprehensive presentation ot
all facets ot Brentano•• thought. 'lbe author himaeli.' recognizes that
the publication ot Kaatil 1s work, following completion ot his own
stuc:\Y { 19$0)1 would have required som.e important changes both as to
detail and overall appraisal. Yet one is glad that this 'study was
published in its original form. As such, it may be helpful to temper
lastil•a •orthodox• account. Sh.owi.Dg good familiarity with, and discriminative judgment over, the import of the major philosophical trends,
both ancient and modern, the author suoceeda in blending his a:na]3'tical
presentation ot Brentano'• thought with pertinent evaluative view• ot
its position within the contest or a historical•theoretical perspec•
tive. Of more than incidental interest may be the fact that the
author attempts a poaitive reconstruction of Brentano•• theories within his own frame ot reference as a Catholic thinker, while remaining
alert to basic residual differences between Brentano•s point of view
and a Catholic Weltanschauung.
Hernandez, M. D.

Las cuatro .t'ases de la filosotia aegun Brentano. Bol.
Universidad de ...................
Granada, 1948, 20, 163-174.
-

-

0'1tlinea with broad strokes Brentano•s philosophical interpretation
ot the histor,y of philosoptv1 singling out its •polemic relation ;with
the Hegelian and positivistic conceptions," ita "close parallelism with
the conception of Dilthey,• and also its close similarit:l with Spengler's philosop}\y of history.
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Husserl, B. Er:lnnerungen an Franz Brentano. In o. Kraue, Franz Brentano:
zur Kenntnis Mines I.hens und seiner Lehre. Munchena !eek, 1919,

pp; 15j...J1)f.

-

Without forcing histor;y into a procrustean frame of reference, Husserl's
Recollectio~
mq be compared to Plato•• .Apoloq and Xenophon'• ItecolleCt!ou
rates - on a similar scale, ot course, but al such more
OSject!ve&na more apropos. With the breadth ot perapect1'99 of the
philosopher in him, the author delineates vinc:iq the intellectual
portrait of Brentano, and with the empat.tv". of the human aice of his
own personality he sets in high relief many interesting and meaningful
details of his personality in ever;ydq lite.

or

James,

w.

Jones, &.

Principles

~

Psychology.

New Yorks Holt, 1907.
Vol. I, New Yorks Basic

The lite and work or Silpmgd Freud.

Books,~~ -

-

-

Contains onq two incidental references to Brentano. In the first,
simple mention is made of Brentano'• courses taken by Freud, with the
implicit empbasis that •attendance at a three year course in philoaopey
had been~.obligatory tor medical students in Vienna since 180411 (even
though Freud enrolled in one more course than required, which might be
taken to indicate that he liked either philosopey, or Brentano, or
both). In the second, the author plqs down the implication that Brentano•s recomendation to Gomperz ot Freud, as a tranalator of the
twelfth volume ot Mill's collected worka, meant that be "remmbered
him from hia seminare. •
Kastil, A.

Die Philosothie Frap1 Brentanos.

Berna Francke, l9r•

Eine Einfubrung in Seine X.hre.

-

-

ldited poathumouaq by .Pranzis;lta Mqer-Hillebrand who paid the author
the following compliments •His absorption in (Brentano•s) works made
hi.>n .reel that a certain diction similar to Brentano•a style waa th•
onq 'correct and proper one. No other member ot Brentano•s school,
at least none or the 'grand-students• still living, baa had such an
inclination and capacity for this mode of expression, which in a Wl\V'
!nvolYea an assimilation of one•s own personality to that ot the Mu•
ter." Upon being in.formed that this book 1• listed. in a bibliograpey
o.r Brentano•s worka (P!Ychologa 1955) 1 the reader will U.?ldoubteciq
conclude that ve are de&llng here with an exceptionally good study
on Brentano, combining originality ot presentation with faithful
reflection ot his thinking. His admiration, haweYer 1 is likely to
change into its opposite, when he is told that this work is baai-

l.6J

ca.l:q a reproduction of selected statements from Brentano•• booka
(sentences, paragraphs, even whole pages, being reprinted verbatim.,
or with onq minor changes in diot.1.on here and there). onq. the
actual readiiig of this volume will dispel this possible negative
attitude. In so doing, one will soon discover that Kutil'• work
is no plagiarism, and still leas an undergraduate term paper •. Hi•
undertaJdng 1 rather, ma;y- best be deacribed as "reminiscing with
Brentano,• in the beat spirit ot a •Socratic dialogue.• In essence,
this study is a well intrgrated and c::\J!la?Jdc exposition o! Brentano'•
thinking. As such it will alwqs remain of great scientific value.
The fact that it is clasaif'iable among Brentano•• books does not
deJl1' it the character of an original production.
Katkov,

o.

.!.£2!!•

Bewwlataein1 Gegenstand, Saohverh&lt.. line Brentanostudie •
!• gesamte Psychol., 19.301 75 1 459-)4.3.

Even though in no way as significant as o. Kraus seems to impq in a
prefactory comment, this stuctY deserves at least a cursory reading.
Perhaps ita most valuable contribution consiata in a number or introductory considermiikm comprising moat ot the tirat chapter (pp. 46S486), SOM or which are mentioned herea (1) nature and epistemological
value of descriptive psychological anaqaea, (2) lack ot scientific
foundations of a phenomenology dewloped independen~ from deacriPtive peychology, (.3) Suares•• concept ot consoiou.sneaa, (4) nature of
•the immanence or content theor.r of consoiouanesa and its significance
tor tranacendllntaliaa and pbello9naliaa." In the remaining portion of
this chapter (pp. 487-49.3), the author •re'.q restates Brentano•• concept or ool'l8Ciousneas as a quaai•relation, in opposition to N. Losakij•a
conception of it u a true relation or two coexisting terms, and in
oppoai tion to J. Remke' a denial that ~hing relative or qua&i•relat1ve is involved in self-consciouaneaa. The third chapter, too, is
baaical'.q a restatement of Brentano'• critique of •l:lnguiatio fic•
tions• in theories of judgment, with an et.tort to bring out the theoretical reaao~ q1ng at their baeia. By contrast, in the second
chapter, the author sho:f8 more independmce of thinking in that be
tries to dewlap •an apriori psychological proot of the inaeparabilitT
of primary' and aecondar.Y consciousness•· by redlloing •the so-called
differentiation ot conaoiousneaa according to its object to a dit•
terentiation through inner perception.•

Katkov,

a.

....

Descartes und Brentano. line erkermtniatheoretiache Gegenuberetellung. J.!:2!!• !• Rechts•u. SosJ.&9>hil: 1 Berlin, 19.37 1 .301 .587-615.
In view of rather prominent consideration given by the author to
Husserl'• ideas in this study1 a better title tor it wou1d have

beens "Descartes, Brentano und Husserl," etc. or course, this statement is not made in criticism, but merely in recognition ot a tact.
As it stand.8 1 this study recommends itself not only because it 1•
the onq extsting ~onographic treatment on the subject, but, and
espeoia~, because of its intrinsic value in sifting in a discrlmi•
native critical manner undeniable aimilarities, but also basic differences eXlsting between Descartes and Brentano's epistemological orientations and other theoretical interests. While one ~ well take
issue with the author in matters of' details, his overall appraisal
will probably meet few objections.
Koftka, K.

..

Kohler,

Principles

~

psychology.

New Yorks Helt, 1907 •

w. Gestalt Psychology. New York& Liverright, 1929.

Kraus, o. Frans Brentano: zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre. With
the colliboratlon 01 c-;-stumpl' and I. HiiSseri. Munchena B~l9.
The best compliment one must pq to Kraus for this study is to say
that he spent most ot his subsequent scientific endeavors, both in
his Introductions and Commentaries to Brentano•s works edited by him,
and in independent studies, to prove and work out in detail the essen•
tial ideas outlined in 1 t. And he did a good job ot i t•-which, of
course, does not preclude that his overall presentation of Brentano•s
theories is slanted in the direction of maximizing to the limits the
inner consistency, the originality, and the significance or these
theories, as well as the monolithic look or hie teacher•.s personality.
This study remains a good, in some respects perhaps even an essential,
introduction in any study in depth of Brentano•• thinkingJ indeed, as
implied above, it remains a good introdllction to Kraus' 1IUl1'l1' invaluable "introductions"'. to our autho~•

••
Kraus, o. Brentano •a Stellung sur Phanomenol.ogie
und Oegenstand.15theorie.
Isipzig1 M81n8r, 1924.
Reproduction ot the author's Introduction to hie 1924 edition of Brentano•s P&cholo~pp. IVII-iCtfI). In this introduction, however, the
title o't the vo
appears onq in connection w1 th the first or
several aspects ot Brentano•a thought which Kraus discusses: "Brentano' a distinction ot descriptive and genetic psychology and :i. ts relation to phenomenology and theory of object.• That the extension or
part of this subtitle to the study as a whole is justified, is indicated by the fact that the comparison or Brentano'• views with
Husserl's and Meinong •s orientations~. runs the gamut of the other

16.$
topics discussed: Franz Brentano•s doctrine of :psychic relation in its
historical development; doctrine of real (being} as the e.xclusi va object of our consciousnessJ Brentano•s position in respect to psychologism; doctrine of external perception; the expressions "psychic" and
"Ph1'51cal phenomena" in BrentanOJ the method of descriptive or phenomenological psychology, imer perception and inner observations.
The very nature of these topics and the authority of Kraus easiq
concur in making this wr1 ting an essential work to read in 8If¥ stuctr
ot Brentano'• thought.

o. Franz Brentano •a Stellung 1m philosophischen lA!ben der Oegenwart.
Phill)S. Weltanzeiw, 1928, 2. 9-lo. (a)

Kraus,

Brentano'• position, as specified in the title or this article, is
defined in terms of (1) the contributions and/or role of his pupils
(G. v. Hertllng, H. Schell, c. Stumpf, A. Marty, E. Husserl, .A, Meinong,
c. v. Ehrenfels, T. G. Masaryk), (2) ita influence upon "thought psychology" Gestalt psychology and new trend.a of interests or orientations in cesthetics, ethics CScheler, N. Hartmann), and metap}\ysica,
(.3) relationship to other thinkers (Dilthey, Bolzano), (4) translation
of two of his books into foreign languages, and (5) the respect, shown
by .foreign thinkers, of his idea.a (mentioning Titchner, as a good ex•

amplet).

Kraus, o. Die lflopernikanische Wend.ung" in Brentano'• Erkemtnis•und
Wertlehre. Philos. Heftej 1929, J, lJ.3•142. (a)
Original:cy a lecture delivered to the Kantian Society of Berlin and
Halle (November 3 and 6, 1928). Contains a statement and critique
ot the "ontological standpoint" in philosophy, aa e.Dlllplified by
Plato's doctrine of Idea•• the .Aristotelian-scholastic "adequatio
theory" of judgment, and the tenets of various forms of contemporary
"neoplatonism• or "ontological fictionallam" (in thinkers such as
Stumpf', lilsaerl, Meinong, Scheler, N. Hartmann, etc.) Kant himself
is criticized .for not carrying his "Copernican revolution" (adoption
of the "epistemological standpoint•) far enough, aa Brentano did.
The concluding slogan •durch Kant lil,er Kant," summarizes well the
author's own overall appraisal of Brentano•s position in the history
of philosophy.
Kraus 1 o. Zur Prumomenognosie des Zeitbeweastaeins.
l'sychol., 19.301 15, 1·22.

.!:!!!• !.•

gesamte

Based upon an exchange of' letters between Brentano and-·'-• Marty j and a
fragment of a lecture dated 1895. A brief introduction and a more ex•
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tended commentary by Kraus trace the development or Brentano•s views
on the problem or time.
Kubat, D.

Franz Brentano's Axiology• a revised conception.

1958, 12, 138-141.

.!!!!•

Metaph.,

Proposes to present Brentano•s "new" ethical theory as against the
theory he held during the "middle phase or his intellectual development.• Surprising:cy- enough, however, the author pays on:cy- scant
attention to a correlation of chronology and theories. This limits
the value of his study. In addition, one might al.so wish to take
issue with his "revised conception" of Brentano•s later views in the
field of Ethics.
McDougall, w. The battle of behaviorism a an exposition and an exposure.
New York 1
Nortoii; D~2.
- -

r.w.

McDougall,

1923.

McDougall,
PP•

w.

Outline

2!

pqcholog.y.

New Yorks Charles Scribner's Sons,

(a)

w.

Purposive or mechanical psychology. Ps19hol. Rev., 1923, 30 1

273•278. (b)

---

w. Fundamentals of psychology. Psyche, 19241 51 PP• l.3-32.
McDougall, w. Autmbiograpey. In c. Murchison (.Ed.), ! histo!'Z !!.f. psychologr
in autobiogra.p1lt• Worcester, Mass.: Cl.ark University Preas, 19301 PP•
'191-223. (a)
McDougall,

McDougall,

J.2J2•

w.

The hormic psychology. Inc. Murchison (Ed.), P8)chologies of
Worcester, Mass. a Clark University Press, 1930, PP• -36. (b) -

McLeod, R. B.

The teaching of psychology and the psychology we teach.

Psychologist, 1965, 20, 344-352.

.2!!•

Maslow, H. Motivation and personality. New Yorks Harper, 1954.
Merl.an, P.

Brentano and Freud.

i.• J!:l!!• Ideas, 1945, 6, 375•377.

Taking issue with Maria Doren•s cl.aim (Historische Gru.n<gagen der
P~c~) that the existence of direct rela:tioM between Freud
~ cannot be proved, unless the;y were purel.1' personal in
character, the author points out that (1) Freud's consistent opposition "to the more or less materialistic medicine of his time,"
very likely, was inspired by Brentano' s uncompromising insistence

an
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upon the distinction betMeen physical and psychic phenomena, and
(2) Freud, quite possibly, first became acquainted with the problem
of the unconscious through Brentano•s extensive and detailed analysis
ot it in his lectures and P&cholog;y.
Merlan, P.

Brentano and Freud -

A Sequel.

i.•

~· Ideas, 19491 101

45.

To support the stand taken in his first article, the author gives the
title of courses taught b7 Brentano at the University of Vienna in
which Freud was enrolled, pointing out that these were the onq non.
medical courses he took du.ring his whole course of studies there.
Meurer,

w. Gepn

liinpiriam:us.

Leipzig a Heiner, 1925.

Includes a highq prejudiced analysis and critique or Brentano' a
thought from an idealistic point or view. (pp. 83-173).
Misiak• H., and Staudt, Virginia M. Catholics in P!JTChology. A Historical
_5\\rvez. Nev York: McMillan, 1954.
- Brentano is discuued along with "Catholic• in earq German psychology"
(Ch. 2). After justifying his inclusion in their book, the authors
write at some length about his life and some or his writings, and de•
vote the remaining pages to his "act psychology," hi• role in the
history of psychology, and his relationship to Stumpt, Messer and
Marbe. In aciciition, sewral other brief references to Brentano are
found in this volume.
Miziak1 H. The philosophical roots of scientific esycholosz.
FordhamUniversliYPress, New York& 1§61.

New York:

In line with its general tone, this booklet contains several pertinent
references to Brentano, calling attention to his position within the
Leibnitzian heritage in philosophy and science, his role as one of the
critics of assooiationism, his merit in making "the influence of
Aristotle felt in the new psychology," and the inspiration exerted
by him upon a large group of antiwundtian psychologists. By contrast,
the author asserts, "there is no specific erldence •• .-t.o indicate that
Freud was tntluenced" by Brentano.
Moore, ·T.

V~

PYAand:o P!yCholor.t;•

T~

v.

.Cognitive

Moore,

~hologz.

Philadelphia& Lippincott, 1924.
Philadelphiat Lippincott, 1939.
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Most,

o.

Die Ethik Franz Brentanos und ihre geschlichtlichen Grundlagen.
s Hellous, 1931. - -

Munster'; l.

w.

The most comprehensive monographic treatment, as ;yet available, of this
facet of Brentano's thinking. Almost exactly halt ot this work is
devoted to a holistic, well balanced presentation of Brentano•s ideas,
viewed in themselves and in their historical perspectiveJ the other
halt presents an equally well integrated and keen appraisal of these
ideas. The author has succeeded in his goal.a of (l) contributing to
the understanding of Brentano, and (2) showing which trains or
thought or ancient and :medieval philosopqy have re-entered into
contemporary speculation through him. While unable to accept same
ot the most central aspects or Brentano•a views, he shows how this
"does not detract from the high methodical value and inner richness"
or his conception.
Mtiller-i'reinefels.
The evolution or 111oden1 J>~hologye Translated from t.he
"
German b;y w. B.Tolle. New Havens f&le
varsity Press, l9J.5.
This classical work in the history of psychology, as ;yet unsurpassed
in several respects, brings ou.t the fact that Brentano was but one or
several "empirical• psychologists who, in the 1 70'•' and •8o•s,• were
opposed to "sensory associationism" and"Wundt 1 s apperceptionism," in•
so.tar as they "did not try to reduce the multiplicity or mental phenomena to the least possible number of elements, but emphasized more
sharp:q the interplay or single phenomena." In addition, this voll.lllle
contains valuable references to historical and theoretical relation•
ships linking Brentano with the Wuraburg School, the Austrian School,
phenomenology, and Gestalt psychology.
Murpqy,

a.

Historical introduction to modern psychology•

Yorks Harcourt, 1948.

-

(2nd ed.) New

One of the first "modern" textbooks of "modern" psychology, this volume
devotes onq the equtvalent of a single page to Brentano, defining the
meaning of his famous distinction between "acts" and "contents" and
pla.cing it into historical perspective (in reference to Leibniz, Kant
and Herbart). However, it's no exaggeration to stq that this single
page is actually worth a whole chapter, showing, as it does, that
Brentano•s distinction "between the eJq>erience as a structure and the
eJq>erience as a way of acting," or more broa.d:q "as a Wtq of behaving,"
is quite "radical," and hence modern, and of far-reaching significance.
Murray, H.

!N>lorations ,!!! personality. New Yorks Oxford, 1938.

l.69

Murray, H.

Some basic psychological assumptions and conceptions.·

Dialectica, 1951,

5, 266-292.

Pidoll1 M.

Zur Errinerung an Frans Brentano.
l.918 1 68 1 PP• 442-469.

u

Padagogische Monatshefte,

Containa (1) pertinent biographical data, (2) a largeq eulogistic
portrait of Brentano'& personality (re.ferring to him as a •universal
mind,• "a genius," "a master of the historical conception of philo•
sophy," "the greatest knower of Ari.atotle since Theophraatus,• "a
friend or nature," •a master of German language•1 as a man of "towering character" and 11manisided endowment," whose lite was dominated by
a single "leitmotiv-the striving after the knowledge of truth connected w1 th the decision to act in accordance w1 th ••• truth," and whose
exceptional "power ••• of abstraction" went hand in hand with an "artistic-like intuition of ••• the most fundamental sense and original character of phenomena, 11 etc. ) , and (3) a brief synopsis of leading themes
in Brentano•s thought. The latter, too, ia decidedq slanted in the
direction of a positive appraisal. In spite of this, however, it contains some keen observations.
·
Puglisi, M. Fram Brentanos a biographical sketch. Amer. J. Psychol. 1 1924,

JS I 414-4J.9e

-

-

In addition to biographical data, this article also contains a bibliography of Brentano•s writing, as given by Kraua.

Rabeau, G,

.!!

Jugement

~'

existence.

Paris a Vrin 1 1936.

Having laid down for himself the same program of inquiry as Husserl's,
the author criticizes (pp. 32-)4) Brentano•• "existential logic" for
leading to a position of ".forced intellectualism" (all psychological
facts are logical) on the one hand, and of downright "empiricism"
(identification ot logic w1 th psychology) on the other. L1.m1 ted knowledge of Brentano'• ideas, and the author's own theoretical pre•
occupations concur in making his ana'.cy'ais dogmatics rather than factual.
Without being awu·e of i t 1 tm author himself takes awq much o.f the
strength from his critique when he characterizes Brentano'• logic as
"a logic of 9,,Uality" (1.e. a logic geared to "attain, in the primitive
judgment, the real qualitative content which pragmatic neceasitie•
have obscured in every da;y grammatical f orma").
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Ribot, T. German psychology of to~· Translation from the French by J. M.
Baldwin. Ne¥ Yorks Ciiar!esSoribner•s Sons, 1886.
·
The treatment of Brentano•s views on psychology is inserted, almost as
an af'ter-thought, in a catchall eh.apter at the very end of the work 1tselt. This is not surprising in view or the author's associationistic
and positivistic leanings. In essence, Brentano is considered as the
chiet representative of "the ideological or logical" trend within the
"new" psychology, in opposition to the "ph1'8iological" trend (which is
ana]J"zed in detail in this book). As such, he is viewed "as a disciple
of J. s. Mill," since both show •no physiological leanings." In terms
or historical perspective, it mq be or some interest to notice that
Ribot, while asserting that the method of the ideological or logical
school "leads into serious mistakes," grants that this school "may
show more delicacy and aptitude in anal.1'sis than the physiological
school," and devote itself •more close:cy- to what is strict:cy- psycho•
logical."

Rogge, E.

Das Jr..ausalprobl.am bei Frans Brentano.

19.36. -

-

-

Freibvg i. B.1 Harder,

Contains a clear, and t'airq comprehensive analyeia of all facets ot
Brentano•s theory or causalit7, showing that such a theory is but "the
application of his psycholinguistic-P8,Ychognostic method to an essential metap}\ysical problem.• A comparison of Brentano•• thought with
several contemporar;y philosophical trends, although slanted in favor
of the former 1 adds value to this stud1'.

La •Scuola di Wurzburg•a ricerche, metodi, risultati. Orientamenti Pedyogici, 196.3, 10, 3-46.

Ronco, A.

Russell, B.

!h! apallsia 2! ~·

New York• McMillan, 1921.

Criticizes (pp. 14-22) Brentano'& theory ot intentionalit)" (erroneousq
identifying it with Meinong•s point of viev) on two count.es (1) "the
act seems unnecessary and fictitious," as but "the ghost or the sub·
3eot or what once was the full-blooded soul,• and espeoial.q (2) the
reference to outeide objecta is "derivative, and consists largeq in
belief's.• In: the litter context, it is of intereet to notice that
wfil18 Russell claims that "Brental'lo's viev of knowledge ia incapable
of maintaining itaelt either against an ana~tic scrutiny or ·against
a host of raote in psycho~l)"aia and animal pa7chology, on the other
he real:cy- resta his case against it on the asBW11Ption that, except
for the field of sensation (where "realism" is demanded), one must
be an idealist.

171
Sanford, Nevitt.

Will psychologists stuctr human problems? Amer. Psyphol.,

1965, 20, 192-202.

----

Sanz, H. R. El problem& de los val.ores en la teoria del canoscimiento moral
~ Franzl3rintano. ~ca: Univerardad de §aliiia'iiCa, 1948.
An analytical e:xposi tion and a critical appraisal of three basic aspects of Brentano•s thought on the problem under consideration& knowledge or the good, the concept or value, nature of our "preferences."
In general, this study could be read most profitab~ as an introduc•
tion to the more comprehensive monographic investigation of Brentano~•
ethical doctrines by o. Most.

Seiterich, E. Die Oottesbeweise bei Franz Brentano.
Herder. -

Freiburg i. Br.,s

A well documented e.xposi tion of both the foundations of the proofs of

God's existence and the nature of these proofs according to Brentano,
followed by a brief but ?rtinent historical and oontentual critical
appraisal. Pertinent and valuable is also the introduo tion to this
stuey bearing upon the lite, significance, and religious development
ot Brentano.
~ek, R.

Alfred Binet et l' ecole de Brentano.

1924, 21, 88)-888.

i.•

psychol. ~· pathol.,

Binet' s theor,- (as expounded in his book .!!' !!! ~ le C0!]?8) of the
fundamental distinction between the acts and the object or knowledge
(consoiouanesa) is (l) contrasted with the opinions or philosophers
and psychologists who either deJl7 this duality of consciousness, or
base it upon the broader and more basic relation between subject and
object, and (2) compared to the corresponding stand on this issue ot
Brentano, Hofler, Witaaek and Stumpf. In addition to pointing out
dif'terencea and similarities between the views of Binet and those ot
the "School or Brentano," the author singles out the "absolute independence" or Binet•a thinking with respect to this School.
Spearman,

c. •a•

and after.

A school to end all schools.

In

c.

Murchison

(Ed.), Psycho~es of 1930. Worcester, Mass. J Clark University Press,
1930, pp.339- • "{'&)-

Spearman, c. Autobiograp}V'. In c. Murchison (Ed.), ! histo!Z 2.!Jjb'chology
in autobioff&P&'• Worcester Mass. J Clark University Press,
, PP•
~9-J)j.
b)
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Spearman,

c.

Psychology~

.2 !i!!•

London1 Mc.Millan, 1937.

2 Vols.

Spiegelberg, H. Der Begriff der Intentionali tat in der Scholastik, be1
Brentano und bei Husserl. Philoa. Hefte, 19361 5, PP• 7.5-91.
While praisewortl'\f in respect to many details, this stuey lacks integration and depth of understanding for scholastic thought. The
author's intent to show that Husserl is the true father of the "modern"
concept of "intention• and "intentionality" is perhaps the most
important single factor responsible for this basic shortcoming. As
a whole, however, this stuey is worth reading by an;rone interested
in sounding the topic under consideration.
Spiegelberg 1 H. !h!, phenC]_me.-!,!.Ological movement.
1960• 2 Vols.

The Hague s Martinus Mijhoff 1

Contains an e.:xposi tion of basic aapecta of Brentano• s thought w1 th a
critical appraisal of i ta relationship to phenomenology. The pauci t;y
of the author's findings relative to •specitic element.a of (Brentano•s)
philosophy which have influenced and permeated the full-fledged phenomenology of Husserl and his successors• clear:cy- shows that he was
quite justified in asking the important questions "How far is it
legi ti.mate to begin the history of the Phenomenological Movement w1 th
Franz Brentano.•
Stum.pf, D. Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano. In o. Kraus, Fram Brentano:
zur ICenntnisaeinea Lebena und seiner Labre. Muncheru BecfC, 1919, PP•

--

lJ'f-~9.

Represent the most complete source of information on Brentano•s life,
personality, and endeavors during the years 1866-1873. Valuable are
also the author's •recollections• of his contacts with Brentano be•
tween 1873 and 1913, the relationship between Brentano and his pupils,
and the appraisal he gives of several aspects of hie thought.
Stern, W. Autobiograp~. Inc. Murohiaon (Ed.), A his~ of mcholos,y in
autobiograpl:J{. Worcester, Mass. a Clark Univeral t;y
18,6, PP• JJ>-

)8'8.

c. Murchison (Ed.) 1 A history of ~oholo~ in
Worcester, Mass. a Clark University Pfeis;-1 1 PP• 89-

Stumpt, K. Autobiography. In
autobiograpgy.

ti41.

Touches brief:cy- upon Brentano' s influence on his intellectual vocation,
and upon the general tenor of the nagreementa" and "deviations" of his
views in comparison with those of his teacher.

17)

Ti tohner1 E. B.

Structural and functional psychology.

290-299.

Phil. Rev., 1899
-·

1

9,

Titchner, E. B. Brentano and Wundta empirical and experimental psychology.
~· i.• P!ychol, 1921, 32, 108-120. (a)
Discusses points of resemblance,. differences of emphasis,rand essential
differences between Brentano•s Psycholosz and Wundt•s P&aiological
P&c.. In the last ana.11Bls, the author opines, •psychology ...
may g
confess her debt" to both thinkers J yet one must choose
either one 1 "there is no middle way between Brentano and Wundt. tt
Titchner, E. B. Functional Psychology and the Psychology of Act: I. Amer.
J..• P!YPhol., 19211 32 1 .519•$42. (b)
-

Contains an initial general comparison between the two Schools, followed
by an analysis of "features conmen to all functional systems"' (Iadd's
Angell•s and Judd'• qstem being singled out as illustrations).

Titohner, E. B.

i•

i\mctional Psychology and the Psychology of' Acta II. Amer.

Psyphol., 1922, 33 1 43-83.

----

Contains (1) an "a:naqsis" of' the views of several "act psychologists"'
(Brentano, Stumpf, Lipps, Husaerl, Mesaer and Witasek), and (2) an
•integration," directed at showing, against Brentano•s claim or hope,
that "there is no psychology of act, there are onl,y psychologies" J that
"in the concrete, we have to do with••• di.fferentiation rather than
conaolidation•1 that "the differences among the act-systems are in tact
fundamental and inevitable, not superficial and acoidental"J that "the
diversity of opinion among the psychologistl ot act is due precise'.cy' to
their effort toward a consistent syatemati1ation," i.e. to their lack
or true scienti.fio (experimental) temper.
Titohner, E. B.

36, 313•.323.

Experimental Psychols A retrospect.

!!!!.£• .!!• P&chol., l.925,

(a)

At'ter reassuring himself that "experimental psycholoa had an e.xt:r...
ordinary fortllllate birth," the author discusaes the "major influence•
that wrought against the establishment" ot this science. As can
easiq be gu88Bed, one ot these intluences is to be found in the
tenacious persistence throughout the history ot Western thought of
empirical psychology, e.xpressed in lts "exemplary form" in Brentano'•
P&cho!ifl• Within this context, the author re-asserts again some ot
the bas c differences between Brentano•• and Wuncit•s orientations,
on the premise that 1n essence "the effect of empiricism upon experi•
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mentallsm ••• has been

who~

bad."

-

Titchner, E. B,. Review of the 1924 edition of Brentano•e Psychologie. Amer.
!• Psyzhol., 192$, .36, 304. (b)
While not denying "Brentano•a apriorism in the late eighties," the
author asserts that "there is no conscious trace of it in the f.!z.•
cho~," and doubts that the student of this work is preparedcy it
!or~ part played by the a=priori in Brentano•s later thinking.
Titchner1 E. B. Empirical and Experimental Psychology.
192~, l,

176-177.

!•

gen p&chol.,

Buicall,y a repl.1' to L. Damicbael'• identification (1926) ot "empirical"
with •rational" psychology. The author reiteratu a theme developed
more fully elsewhere (1921 a, 192$) that no a•prioristic elements have
slipped into Brentano•s Psyoho.rtJi: and considers both "empirical"' psychology (in the strict sense o t
term) and experimental psychology
a-posteriori, i.e. empirical (in the broadest sense of the term) psycholOaes. In comparison with his previous stand, he seems to adopt
a softer, less critical, attitude toward "empirical" psychology proper,
irusotar u he now grants that it "m.Q', and does, employ the e:xperimental
method.•
Utitz, E.

Frans Brentano.

----

Kant 8tudien, 1918, 22 1 217·242.

An overview ot Brentano's thinking. Contains keen observations on how
meh, and what kind, of .Aristotle is found in Brentano J his conception
of method in science and philosop}\y J the leitmotiv and content of hi•
"psychology from an empirical standpoint" (u found not only in the
homoeymoua work, but also in other writings)J the relationship between
psychology and other science&J the distinction between "genetic• and
"descriptive" psychology, and the central position of tJ:•_,latter within
the gamut of the scientific edifice. The author de.tends Brentano
against the ,accusation ot 11paychologi811J.1 " considering him a "critical
realist and an unswerving theist.• This study is worth reading by
aJ:\YOn• who wants a concise aynopsi1 of Brentano•s basic ideas.

Vanni•Ravighi 1 s. La natura delle categorie secondo F. Brentano. RiY. Filos.
Neoseol., 19381 301 PP• 362·366.
Brentano•a position with respect to the problem of categories is viewed
as a valiant, though unsuccessful, effort to overcome the subjectivism
{the conception of categories as mere modes of knowing) ot tha greatest
part of modem philoaopey. The extent to which Brentano is a genuine
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AristotelianJ how he avoids falling victim to a pure empir1c1stic,
nominalistic and psychologistic conception onl.7 at the price of sane
inconsistency in his thinldngJ and the basic reason for hie steadfast
opposition to admitting "ideal objects" (an encroachment ot logical
and metap!v'sical considerations) are woven meaningfully into the
discussion.
Watson, R.

!!!!. great

psychologists.

Pbiladelphias Lippincott, 1963.

In terms or space allotted to him in this work, Brentano does not seem
to rate among the greatest of "the great psychologists," aa chosen
by the author. He shares a chapter along with Ebbinghaus, G. E.
Muller 1 Kulpe and the Wunburg School, and has a claim on]\y to six
pages {two of which present his biograph.r)J by contrast, Wundt enjoys
at least a modestq long chapter (17 pages, devoted al.moat entireq to
a presentation ot his thinking or scientU'ic activity). Perusal of the
author's presentation, in fact, is limited to casting it into a brief
historical perspective, and to an elamentary analyais ot onq a few of
1 ts essential lineaments: distinction between "acts" and •contents• in·
tentionality, claas1t1cation or psychic phenomena.
Werner, A. Die psichof!isch-erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlyen der MetaPbz•ik Pram ren
o. HlldeslieliUs BOrgmeyer, 19ji.
- A well documented, methodical expo&ition or Brentano•s thought on the
two issues under discussion. Its value may be enhanced when read in
conjunction vi th L. Gilson• a work, Methode et metap&!ique selon Franz
Brentano (1955 a).
The unconscious before Freud. Nev Yorka Basic Books, 1960.
Windisoher, H. Franz Brentano und die Soholastik. Innsbruck: Rauch, 1936.
-------The author shows good familiarity with the theoriu of Brentano and the
Whyte, L.

tenets of scholastic philosoph.r, but unfortu.na.tel.7 his study is a "file
cabinet" type of investigation, opposing or mereq placing one next to
the other the "errors• of the former and the "truths" of the latter.
Needless to say neither Brentano nor Scholastic philosoph.r is enlivened by this operation. If anything the latter actualq appears
quite static and stultified. Yet, parado.x:ical~v enough, one may be
able to find much residual meaning and life in the end product of this
study.
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Woodworth, R.

1922.

R;yrlam!c psycholoq.

New York1 Columbia University Presa,

U.ehen, T. Autobiograp}\y. In c. Murchison (Ed.), ! histpz !l!. bsycholog.y
autob1ogr!F&• Worcester, Mass. a Clark University
sa,
JO.
Z1lborg, G. 1 Sears, P., & Inteld1 L.
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.

Makers 2!, modem science.

!!!

New York:

Contains a brief ~~is (pp. 86-87) of the relationship between Bre11tano and Gestalt psychology, and between Brentano and Freud.
Zub1ri, F. J. Review of the spanish translation of Brentano•s Psychology.
Rev. Occidente, 1926, 14, 403-408.

-

Places Brentano 1s orientation into sharp theoretical and historical
perspective b7 contrasting it with the standpoint of Wundt and ot
positivism. While for Wundt the distinction between psychic and
p}\ysical phenomena is mere~ relative to the observer's point of
view, for Brentano it is essential) while for Wundt there is but "one
psychic phenomenon--the act, susceptible of various complications,"
for Brentano there is a plural.tty- of irreducible psychic phenomena.
Within the broader context ot positivism, Brentano asserts the
legitimacy- and necess1t)'" of investigating what the phenomena are in
themselves, "in their phenanenal purity," and is convinced that such
an investigation will reveal many more data than positivism is ready
to admit. In addition, Brentano paves the wq for such decidedly
ant1-positivistic conceptions as Husserl's pure logic and Scheler•s

objective theory or values.

